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CONTENTS

NOTICE TO READERS: An * indicates material not disseminated in electronic form.

ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

Ukraine Condemns Russian Stand on Nuclear Weapons *[Kiev International]* 1
Sets Conditions for Continuing Talks *[Radio Rossii]* 2
Ukraine Scientists Propose New 'Nuclear-Free Club' *[HOLOS UKRAYINY 5 Mar]* 2

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

'Outraged Peoples' Congress Scores New World Order *[PRAVDA 4 Mar]* 4
Black Sea Countries Create Parliamentary Assembly *[HOLOS UKRAYINY 4 Mar]* 4

INTERREGIONAL AFFAIRS

Prime Ministers' Meeting To Focus on Coordinating Committee *[INTERFAX]* 5
Oil Accord Raises Questions Despite Leaders' Optimism *[IZVESTIYA 4 Mar]* 5
Oil, Gas Industry Bosses Disgruntled *[NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA 5 Mar]* 6
Interior Ministers Meet, Plan To Combat Crime *[KOMMERSANT-DAILY 5 Mar]* 6
Belarus Minister Elected Chairman of Economic Court *[Moscow Radio]* 6

RUSSIA INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

U.S. Seen Seeking To Ease Grain Credit Liability Issue *[IZVESTIYA 4 Mar]* 7
Shokhin Cited on Grain Credit Debts, Repayment *[IZVESTIYA 6 Mar]* 7
Gaydar Urges U.S. Aid for Small-Scale Projects *[IZVESTIYA 6 Mar]* 8
U.S., Others Squeezing Weakened Russian Planemakers *[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA 5 Mar]* 8
Russian CW Convention Acceptance Scored *[PRAVDA 6 Mar]* 9
Iraq Changing Tactics To Emerge From Isolation *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 6 Mar]* 10
Kozyrev Welcomes POW's Back From Afghanistan *[ITAR-TASS]* 10
Rutskoy Comments on Singapore Visit, Departs *[ITAR-TASS]* 11
Japan's Position on Aid to Russia Remains Invariable *[ITAR-TASS]* 11
Ships Humanitarian Aid *[ITAR-TASS]* 11
General Staff Chief Begins Finland Visit *[ITAR-TASS]* 11
Finland Allocates Money for Joint Ventures *[St. Petersburg Radio]* 12
Space Cooperation Agreement Signed With Germany *[ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI 5 Mar]* 12
Ministry Denies Pressuring Azerbaijan Into CIS *[ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI 6 Mar]* 12
Projected Oil, Gas Sales to CIS States Listed *[ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI 5 Mar]* 12

RUSSIA NATIONAL AFFAIRS

Political Issues

Yeltsin Chairs Meeting of Republic Heads *[ITAR-TASS]* 14
Leaders To Discuss Congress *[INTERFAX]* 14
Supports Plan for Federal Treaty *[ITAR-TASS]* 14
Ryabov Believes Congress Will Not Reach Agreement *[INTERFAX]* 15
Kozyrev Sees No Alternative to Constitutional Accord *[ITAR-TASS]* 15
State of Emergency Being Considered *[Copenhagen DET FRI AKTUELT 5 Mar]* 15
Foreign Ministry Reports Chernomyrdin 'Ill' *[BALTFAX]* 16
Rally Speaker Calls For Yeltsin's Impeachment *[INTERFAX]* 16
Opposition Wants 'Superpower' Status *[ITAR-TASS]* 17
Yeltsin Chief of Staff 'Number Two' in State *[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA 5 Mar]* 17
Claim of Yakovlev CIA Link Viewed *[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 6 Mar]* 17

Yeltsin 'Threat' to Deputies' Power Deplored *[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA 5 Mar]* 19
Liberals' Desertion of Yeltsin Analyzed *[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA 6 Mar]* 20
Text of Edict Abolishing Post of Main State Inspector *[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA 6 Mar]* 22

Military Issues

Western Group Commander on Withdrawal Problems *[Moscow Radio]* 22
Views on Reforming Military Doctrine Eyed *[ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI 4 Mar]* 23

Space & Other Issues

Space Industry's Shift in Focus Viewed *[INTERFAX]* 25
Cosmonauts Continue Work on Mir Space Station *[ITAR-TASS]* 27
Primakov Aide on Problem of Nuclear Scientists *[Moscow TV]* 27

Supreme Soviet

Khasbulatov Meets With Legislators *[ITAR-TASS]* 28
Filatov Says Constitutional Coup Under Way *[ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI 6 Mar]* 28
Article Views Supreme Soviet Deputies' Party *[IZVESTIYA 5 Mar]* 29

Regional Affairs

Moscow Mayor Pessimistic About Upcoming Congress *[INTERFAX]* 29
Leaders of Tatarstan, Karelia Oppose Referendum *[INTERFAX]* 30
No Support Among Volga Leaders *[PRAVDA 5 Mar]* 30
Dudayev Optimistic on Improving Ingush Ties *[ITAR-TASS]* 30
Chechen Officials Protest to UK Over London Murders *[ITAR-TASS]* 31
Conservative Attack on Kuzbass Miners Scored *[IZVESTIYA 5 Mar]* 31

UKRAINE

International Affairs

Vice Premier, Bank Chairman on Problems With Russia *[NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA 5 Mar]* 33
Accord on Debt Clearing Reached *[KOMMERSANT-DAILY 4 Mar]* 33
Economics Minister on Debt *[HOLOS UKRAYINY 5 Mar]* 34
Sevastopol's Kruglov Urges City's Return to Russia *[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA 3 Mar]* 34
Turkish Envoy to Ukraine Visits Crimea *[NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA 5 Mar]* 35
Envoy Reports Positive Results of Moldova Trip *[Kiev International]* 36

National Affairs

Kravchuk: Government 'Overestimated' Economic Potential *[INTERFAX]* 36
Kravchuk Rules Out Territorial Autonomy for Hungarians *[Budapest TV]* 37
National Bank Official Discusses Currency Regulations *[Kiev International]* 37
Authorities Opposed to Servicemen's Union *[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA 4 Mar]* 37
Reports of Officer Transfer Requests 'Refuted' *[URYADOVYY KURYER 4 Mar]* 38
Anticommunist, Anti-Imperial Front Formed *[MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI 7 Mar]* 38
Ukrainian Communists Display Increased Activity *[IZVESTIYA 5 Mar]* 39
Communist Party Conference Opens in Donetsk *[ITAR-TASS]* 39
Approves Plan To Restore Party *[INTERFAX]* 39

WESTERN REGION

Belarus

Russian Air Force Officers Refuse To Abandon Belarus *[Minsk Radio]* 41
Deputies Attend Display of Hardware, Armaments *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 4 Mar]* 41
Party of Communists Cochairman Interviewed *[PRAVDA 6 Mar]* 41
Communist Party Official on Next Plenary Session *[ZVYAZDA 10 Feb]* 42

Trade Unions Want Restored Economic Ties Within CIS *[Minsk Radio]* 43
Academician on Need To Develop Energy Resources *[Minsk Radio]* 43

Moldova

Article Alleges Discrimination in Draft Constitution *[BASAPRESS]* 43
Commander of 14th Russian Army Interviewed *[IZVESTIYA 26 Feb]* 43
Kiev Asked To Grant Citizenship to Dniester Ukrainians *[INTERFAX]* 46
Newspaper Opposes Moldova's Unification With Romania *[ITAR-TASS]* 46
Gagauz Leader Topal Visits Cyprus, Turkey *[BASAPRESS]* 46

CENTRAL ASIA

Kazakhstan

Nazarbayev Warns of Decline in Standard of Living *[INTERFAX]* 47
Nazarbayev on Harvest Campaign, Agriculture Issues *[Moscow Radio]* 47
Nazarbayev Forms Commission To Find War Prisoners *[ITAR-TASS]* 48
President Nazarbayev Takes 'Short Vacation' *[INTERFAX]* 48

Tajikistan

Rakhmanov Arrives in Beijing; To Meet Leadership *[ITAR-TASS]* 48
PRC To Provide Credit, Aid *[Radio Rossii]* 48
Russia To Provide 2.5-3 Million Tonnes of Oil *[INTERFAX]* 49
Troops Remain 'on Alert' for Opposition Attack *[ITAR-TASS]* 49
Opposition Denies Forming 'Islamic Republic' *[Tehran Radio]* 49

Turkmenistan

President Says 'Major Achievements' Made in Past Year *[INTERFAX]* 49
Returns to Work *[INTERFAX]* 50
Scientists' Objections to Iran AES Plan Rebutted *[IZVESTIYA 6 Mar]* 50

CAUCASUS

Armenia

Defense Minister Makes 'Surprise Visit' to Mardakert *[AFP]* 52
NKR Forces Report Success in Mardakertskiy Rayon *[Yerevan Radio]* 52
Government Pledges Financial Support to NKR *[Yerevan Radio]* 52
Parliament Discusses Debate Over Constituent Assembly *[INTERFAX]* 52
President Pledges To Crack Down on Crime *[NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA 5 Mar]* 53
Investment Bank, Links With Turkey, Iran 'Priority' *[INTERFAX]* 53

Azerbaijan

Russian, Turkish Ministers To Mediate on Karabakh *[Baku TV]* 54
Defense Ministry Bans Daily Battlefield Reports *[Moscow Radio]* 54
Elchibey Sends Letter to UN Secretary General *[Baku TV]* 54
First Round of People's Congress Held in Baku *[INTERFAX]* 54

Georgia

Shevardnadze Views Abkhazia, Russia, Resignation *[CONTACT INFORMATION AGENCY]* 54
Abkhaz Leader: Sukhumi Spared by Shevardnadze *[INTERFAX]* 55
Anti-Shevardnadze Film Shown on Television *[INTERFAX]* 55
Parliament Declares Recognition of South Ossetia Invalid *[ITAR-TASS]* 55
Gudauta Government To Ratify Treaty With Dniester *[Tbilisi Radio]* 55
Shevardnadze To Visit Armenia, Ukraine *[INTERFAX]* 55
Foreign Minister Chikvaidze Visits Spain *[Tbilisi Radio]* 56

BALTIC STATES

Estonia

Russian Envoy Denies 'Active Postimperialist Policy' *[Tallinn Radio]* 57
Russians 'Shocked' by New Proposals on Troops *[NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA 6 Mar]* 57
Popular Centrists Demand Change in Government Policy *[ETA NEWS BULLETIN]* 57
Laar Satisfied With Economic Performance *[BALTFAX]* 57
Prime Minister Receives World Bank Experts *[ETA NEWS RELEASE]* 58

Latvia

Trade Agreement for 1993 Concluded With Moscow *[LETA]* 58
Movement for National Independence Holds 6th Congress *[LETA]* 58

Lithuania

Problems in Repaying Russia for Gas Supply *[Vilnius Radio]* 58
Opposition, Government Clash Over Russian Oil *[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA 5 Mar]* 59
Landsbergis Gives News Conference on Moving Toward Europe *[Vilnius Radio]* 59

Ukraine Condemns Russian Stand on Nuclear Weapons

LD0703142493 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service in Ukrainian 0800 GMT 7 Mar 93

[Text] The press center of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine has issued a statement by Yuriy Kostenko, minister of environmental protection, head of the delegation of Ukraine at the negotiations with the delegation of the Russian Federation. In particular, the statement reads as follows:

In spite of the fact that accord was reached at the level of the heads of delegations on restraint in elucidating the differences that arose in the course of the negotiations, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation issued a report on negotiations between the delegations of Ukraine and the Russian Federation on a wide range of issues in connection with the nuclear weapons deployed on the territory of Ukraine, on 5 March of this year.

In connection with the fact that this report interprets in a one- sided way, far from reality, both the contents and subject of the negotiations and the problematic issues to be settled at them, as well as the very course of the negotiations, I deem it necessary to state as follows, the statement notes:

1. A proposal to hold negotiations with the Russian Federation on issues of guaranteeing the nuclear and ecological safety of the strategic forces deployed on the territory of Ukraine was made by the Ukrainian side as early as at the beginning of last year.

The Russian side continuously evaded discussing specific facts of the issue of holding these negotiations.

A response to the latest appeal by the Ukrainian side in this connection was only received by us two months after the appeal had been made.

Meanwhile, Russian structures responsible for the nuclear and ecological safety of nuclear warheads knowingly did not perform periodic servicing, which was to guarantee their reliable and unproblematic operation.

The aim of this policy is absolutely clear, and it was openly declared at the latest round of negotiations in Moscow.

This is to compel Ukraine to recognize the strategic nuclear forces on its territory as belonging to Russia, as well as to recognize Russia's right of ownership of the nuclear weapons in Ukraine, with all the negative consequences affecting Ukraine, including its economy.

2. The first and second rounds of negotiations demonstrated the readiness of the two sides' experts to reach agreement between themselves, in particular with respect to the search for specific mechanisms for using nuclear material, which is released after the destruction of nuclear weapons, acceptable to Ukraine and the Russian Federation.

Reaching accord is being hindered by the political position of the delegation of the Russian Federation on issues of the ownership of nuclear weapons' components, and of the status of the strategic nuclear forces deployed on the territory of Ukraine, being issues of principle.

3. The fundamental differences in Ukraine's and the Russian Federation's positions at the negotiations are as follows:

Ukraine, from considerations of principle, cannot agree to the presence of foreign forces on its territory, whereas this is exactly what the Russian Federation insists on.

As is known, under the Minsk agreement of 30 December 1991, the nuclear weapons deployed on the territory of Ukraine only operationally were put under the Unified Command of the Strategic Forces of the CIS, and any attempts by Russia to alter this situation are legally groundless.

The second fundamental difference is that the Russian side seeks to compel Ukraine as one of the legal successors of the former Soviet Union to relinquish its right of ownership of nuclear components of the weapons deployed on its territory.

Thus, this is a consistent policy by the Russian Federation, aimed at transferring the strategic forces on the territory of Ukraine to the jurisdiction of Russia and at appropriating Ukraine's stocks of materials and capital equipment, which have never been handed over to the Russian Federation.

4. An extremely serious issue at the negotiations is that of the right of ownership, and of the further use of nuclear material released from tactical warheads, removed from the territory of Ukraine to the Russian Federation in the spring of 1992 to be dismantled and destroyed.

Ukraine has never relinquished its right of ownership of this material, and insists on settling the issue of its use, together with the issue of the use of strategic warheads.

The Russian delegation ignores this just demand by the Ukrainian side, referring to instructions received from the former's political leadership, which naturally affected the atmosphere of the negotiations.

5. As early as after the first round of negotiations, a policy, by the Russian side, to use the mass media to achieve its real aim also became obvious to everybody.

It is not by chance that the article "Second Chernobyl Developing at Ukraine's Missile Silos" appeared in the newspaper IZVESTIYA.

After the second round of negotiations, the Russian side issued the tendentious and one-sided statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, mentioned above.

In fact, the assessment of the negotiations by Pavel Grachev, minister of defense of the Russian Federation, was negative, with their failure also forecast by him, as early as at the beginning of the second round of negotiations, at a news conference in Moscow.

The Ukrainian side cannot but regard this as pressure, with the purpose of being granted unilateral concessions by Ukraine.

6. Since June 1992, the Ukrainian side has been proposing to hold negotiations with the Russian side on concluding a memorandum on the division of limitations and restrictions imposed by the Strategic Nuclear Arms Treaty [as heard] on the former USSR's strategic offensive arms.

It was envisaged by Article Two of the Lisbon Protocol that this accord be reached between Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine. The Ukrainian side was ready to hold relevant negotiations on a quadrilateral basis. Any other decision would show disrespect for the other sovereign states.

But the delegation of Russia firmly insisted that the discussion of the text of the memorandum proposed by it be held just on a bilateral basis, in spite of the fact that provision was made for the memorandum to be signed by four states.

7. The Ukrainian side is prepared to continue negotiations in a constructive spirit with the purpose of concluding the relevant agreements as soon as possible.

These agreements must ensure the reliable maintenance and manufacturer's inspection [avtorskyy nahlyad] of strategic nuclear arms deployed both in Ukraine and in the Russian Federation; settle issues of the further use of all the components of strategic and tactical nuclear warheads; and ensure the normal functioning of the strategic nuclear forces deployed in Ukraine.

Sets Conditions for Continuing Talks

LD0803131493 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1000 GMT 8 Mar 93

[Text] Yuriy Kostenko, Ukraine minister of environmental protection, says the leader of the Russian delegation at the negotiations on the fate of strategic weapons on Ukraine territory, in an interview with Western journalists on 5 March, absolutely incorrectly interpreted the position of the Ukrainian delegation. Yuriy Kostenko said in an interview with the ANI news agency that the Ukrainian delegation does not refuse to participate in future negotiations, but it requires from its colleagues specific and more precise definitions as to what issues of strategic nuclear weapons will be discussed during the next round of negotiations. The Ukrainian minister said some questions that the Russian delegation wants to discuss are not well-timed.

I would like to remind you of the position of Russia on this problem: Russia wants Ukraine to confirm unequivocally its readiness to become a nonnuclear state, as promised during the conclusion of the relevant treaty with the United States and other states.

Ukraine Scientists Propose New 'Nuclear-Free Club'

AU0803153693 Kiev HOLOS UKRAYINY in Ukrainian 5 Mar 93 pp 6, 8

["Memorandum for Those Politicians, Scientists, Public Figures, and Experts Who Participate in Formulating State Nuclear Policy: Disarming, but in a Sensible Way," signed by Dmytro Vydrin, director of the International Institute of Global and Regional Security; Leonid Tupchiyenko, general director of the Innovation Center for Political Sciences; and Oleh Bodruk and Eduard Lysytsyn, leading scientists at the World Economy and International Relations Institute; issued in Kiev on 12 February]

[Text] We specialists in problems of global and regional security, while considering Ukraine's official position on its nuclear status as being generally correct, are, at the same time, alarmed by the shortcomings in the mechanism for achieving a nuclear-free future and also by individual mistakes that unfortunately have been and still are being made in the process of implementing the aforementioned intentions.

In accordance with our firm convictions, Ukraine must not ask for guarantees for its security, but, as a potential initiator and leader of the movement toward a nuclear-free future, it must obtain such guarantees from the world community.

The movement initiated by our state is not strictly Ukrainian, but constitutes a real international issue. Its success or failure depends upon those "rules of the game" that are elaborated (with the indispensable participation of those states that are genuinely prepared to proceed to achieving a nuclear-free status) and adhered to by the world community.

Convinced of the effectiveness and promising nature of this particular approach, we decided to appeal to political and public figures, scientists, and experts who play a part in formulating the nuclear policy of their states; we are expounding this appeal for the Ukrainian public.

Having achieved the great treasure—independence—Ukraine bears high responsibility for the independent choice of its road. It must also make its choice regarding its nuclear future. It might seem that the choice is simple: The moral position, the economic situation, and the promises given to the world community unambiguously guarantee our country's future nuclear-free status.

However, we would like this to be a voluntarily answer given as a manifestation of the will and conviction of the majority of our citizens. It must also be reinforced by

convincing proof of its rationality and by the confidence on the part of politicians and experts that it will, undoubtedly, be for the benefit of Ukraine and of the entire world community. In our opinion, today, there is no such will, conviction, or confidence.

The nuclear policy of the superpowers, which is overbearing, coercive, arrogant, and didactical, cannot but put us on our guard.

We are fully aware of and share their anxiety regarding nuclear safety in the world. We can readily understand their desire to take the entire responsibility for this safety exclusively upon themselves. We also fully understand and share the impatience of the superpowers regarding the reduction in the number of nuclear states.

However, it is difficult to understand the persistent pressure and coercion under which Ukraine has had to make its consecutive, meaningful, and consistent steps toward a nuclear-free status.

While understanding the messianistic aspirations of the superpowers, we expect them to realize that they do not make the choice for us, but the choice is being made by our independent state. The significance of our choice is largely determined by our own insight and good will and by our own, and not somebody else's, responsibility for the security of the world.

For example, in the present conditions, it might and would have been, temporarily, to the world's advantage if Ukraine had shown servility and hastened to be obedient. However, in our opinion, such a position does not conform to the new prospects in the development of the world community.

Now that the split [rozdvoyennist] in the world has been overcome, a situation has taken shape in which the nuclear superpowers, having joined interests, may impose their conditions and geopolitical rules upon the rest of the countries. The possibility of such diktat contradicts the idea of integrity in interstate relations and has a corrupting effect upon the superpowers.

We should not allow a contradiction to arise between the democratic essence of the superpowers and the undemocratic content of international policy. It is precisely upon democracy that the nations that have embarked upon the road of free development are pinning their hopes for the future.

We Ukrainian scientists and experts in this problem, looking upon the liberation of the world from nuclear weapons not only as a great political, but also as a great moral objective, hope that there will be no masters and servants, no bosses and subordinates, and no big and younger "brothers" in the world's movement toward nuclear security.

Further progress in the process of nuclear disarmament and nuclear nonproliferation calls for new approaches to be devised on the basis of a fundamentally different coordination mechanism.

For the purpose of demonopolizing the process of achieving nuclear safety, we find the following steps worthwhile:

1. The creation of a "nuclear-free club" made up of states that already possess nuclear status or are on the threshold of achieving it, but voluntarily renounce doing so. It is precisely such countries that, having realized the absurdity of possessing nuclear weapons in the contemporary world, would be able to speed up the process of nuclear disarmament and become equal partners or opponents of the superpowers in this cause.

2. The creation of an assembly of the "nuclear-free club" with a corresponding representation in the United Nations, something that will make it possible to recognize and unify the status of the members of the given club in the world community and their benefits and security guarantees. This is necessary to encourage new states to join the club.

3. The creation of a permanently functioning international institute to deal with problems of a nuclear-free future. This institution, gathering independent experts who enjoy a high international reputation, could elaborate the best possible international political and legal framework for progressing toward a nuclear-free future. It could also offer a professional assessment of the position occupied by those states that hamper nuclear disarmament in the world and that are striving to use their nuclear status to achieve, in addition to security guarantees, also their own political and economic advantages, thereby doing harm to nuclear-free states for the purpose of discriminating against the latter.

The above issues could be discussed at the conference that the United Nations is planning to hold in Kiev (Ukraine).

[Signed] Dmytro Vydrin, director of the International Institute of Global and Regional Security
Leonid Tupchiyenko, general director of the Innovation Center for Political Sciences
Oleh Bodruk and
Eduard Lysytsyn, leading scientists at the World Economy and International Relations Institute
[Dated] Kiev, 12 February 1993

'Outraged Peoples' Congress Scores New World Order

PM0503151193 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 4 Mar 93 p 7

[Vyacheslav Afanasyev report: "The Voice of the Outraged Peoples"]

[Text] "Our 'democrats' have done a great deal to convince people that the Soviet Union was an empire. That is not true! An empire necessarily presupposes the presence of a metropolitan country and colonies. But what did we have in the Union? Was Russia really the metropolitan country? On the contrary, it was thanks to the Russian people that many peoples of former Czarist Russia, and these included some who lived in their tribal communities, were able to raise their living standard, be reborn, and join the family of Soviet peoples on the basis of equal rights," Professor Ivan Gobozov, the South Ossetian representative, stated at the Congress of Outraged Peoples Against the "New World Order." The congress was convened on the initiative of the SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA and DEN newspapers, the ELEMENTY periodical, and the National Salvation Front. Representatives of peoples living on the territory of the former Soviet Union—Abkhazians, Chechens, Gagauz, and so on, as well as delegates from the Russian-speaking communities of Moldova and Estonia who are being subjected to discrimination and oppression, were present at the forum, which was held 2 March in Moscow. Representatives of the Palestine State and various patriotic organizations, movements, and parties from Italy, France, the former Yugoslavia, and certain other countries participated in its work.

Many of the speakers expressed the opinion that "our common enemy is the American-Zionist alliance which is called the 'new world order.'"

The participants adopted a resolution which speaks of the need to unite "in the struggle against the United States and against its hegemonic aspirations." "The collapse of the USSR," the draft resolution handed out at the congress and adopted with slight amendments, says, "was one of the main operations to establish the 'new world order,' since, by destroying a great superpower, the United States has left itself free to rule the world single-handed. The United States and its 'agents of influence' are responsible for all the terrible conflicts between the peoples of the former USSR. They, and no one else, are responsible for the Gulf War and the Balkan conflict."

A decision was adopted to establish a standing antihegemonic committee of outraged peoples, whose tasks will include coordinating international contacts and relations between all movements, organizations, mass media, and so on, fighting against the "new world order," American hegemony, and the power of world government. The committee has been instructed to make preparations for the second phase of the congress of outraged peoples with the participation of all antihegemonic movements and forces by fall of this year.

Black Sea Countries Create Parliamentary Assembly

AU0503164693 Kiev HOLOS UKRAYINY in Ukrainian 4 Mar 93 p 6

[Unattributed report: "A Parliamentary Assembly of Black Sea Countries Has Been Created"]

[Text] Representatives of Albania, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Turkey, and Ukraine took part in the meeting of leaders and delegations of parliaments of countries situated in the Black Sea Basin that was held in Istanbul on 26 and 26 February. They signed a declaration on the creation of a parliamentary delegation of countries that are participants in the Black Sea Economic Cooperation. The document stresses the adherence of the countries of the region to the principles of democracy, free economy, and social justice.

The participants in the meeting also elaborated the Statute of the Parliamentary Assembly. It is expected that it will be adopted at the first meeting of the assembly that must take place in the second part of June also in Istanbul. Ivan Plyushch [chairman of Ukraine's Supreme Council], pointed out that the president, parliament, and government of Turkey had done much for its successful work.

Prime Ministers' Meeting To Focus on Coordinating Committee

OW0903112293 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1057 GMT 9 Mar 93

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The main item on the agenda of the Moscow meeting of CIS prime-ministers will be the discussion of a draft agreement on a coordinating and consultative committee of the Commonwealth. The opinion was expressed by the coordinator of the council of heads of state and the council of heads of governments Ivan Korotchenya who arrived in Moscow to prepare the meeting.

He told IF [INTERFAX] that such a committee will be effective only if deputy prime-ministers in charge of relations with CIS countries work on it on a permanent basis.

Korotchenya said the preliminary agenda of the March 12 meeting consists of 10 items. On Tuesday [9 March] he is to meet the Russian Prime-Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin to discuss the coming meeting.

Korotchenya said the agreement to hold the next CIS summit in Yerevan on April 30 has not been altered. Preparations for it are proceeding according to plan.

Oil Accord Raises Questions Despite Leaders' Optimism

PM0503115193 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 4 Mar 93 First Edition p 2

[Sergey Leskov report: "It Was Understood in Surgut That the Oil Problem Must Be Resolved Together—But Agreement on How To Do This Has Yet To Be Reached"]

[Text] The agreement to set up an Intergovernmental Oil and Gas Council, signed as a result of the meeting in Western Siberia by 12 prime ministers from former USSR republics, is being evaluated extremely optimistically by the conference participants themselves. However, a number of experts are making highly cautious forecasts in respect of the prospects for the organ created.

Our correspondent V. Kuleshov reports from Ashgabat that Nazar Suyunov, deputy chairman of the Turkmenistan Cabinet of Ministers in charge of the fuel and energy complex, justified his absence from Surgut in a very dogmatic form: "There is nothing for us to do there, as this meeting will produce nothing concrete apart from generating more paper."

Meanwhile, if the text of the signed document is analyzed paragraph by paragraph, quite a few questions indeed arise. Above all, the mechanism for implementing the intentions declared in Surgut is unclear. The vital questions of the prices for oil and gas supplied by Russia to former USSR countries has not been settled. Nor have the problems of transporting energy resources been resolved, and it is not certain how deliveries of equipment from CIS countries necessary for the normal functioning of Russian industry will be carried out. And without this, it is impossible to seriously succeed in dragging the fuel and energy complex out of crisis.

Today, the document signed in Surgut is reminiscent of an amicably agreed decision to hold a joint championship where just one question remains unresolved—which sport the participants will be competing in. As a result, the most unpleasant surprises are possible. Although the gas faucet between Russia and Ukraine has been left on through the determined resolve of politicians, it is not yet known how events will develop further. The miners' bitter experience teaches us that the extractive industries cannot operate at a loss for long.

At the same time, Ukrainian Prime Minister Leonid Kuchma declared on returning to Kiev that he was wholly satisfied with the results of the meeting in Surgut. If this remark is compared with a similar statement by L. Kuchma after his recent visit to Central Asia, conjecture may arise about a certain feigned optimism in the Ukrainian leadership. Having reached agreement on deliveries of 500,000 tonnes of oil from Kazakhstan, comprising around 1 percent of Ukraine's annual requirement, the premier said that he was "100 percent" satisfied with the trip.

The future of the Intergovernmental Council will depend on how far its participants succeed in concentrating their efforts not on doling out energy resources as is currently the case, but on extracting them. Here, joint investments in the oil and gas complex assume priority significance. Moreover, these investments must be made immediately. For instance, Aleksandr Margulov, general director of one of Western Siberia's largest gas plants, insists that his area's deposits alone will require investments totaling 40 billion rubles this year.

The program initiated to float and privatize the fuel and energy complex forces industrialists to cater not to the good wishes of politicians, but to their own strengths. In this connection, attention is drawn to the fact that Tyumen Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies Chairman Ulyanov preferred a trip to the United States over the Surgut meeting of heads of government. According to reports from Western agencies, Ulyanov issued a statement to the effect that it is precisely through the efforts of the local administration in Western Siberia that favorable conditions for Western investment will be created.

Without any doubt, the Surgut meeting may prove to be an important step in restoring the shattered economic links in the former USSR. The need for this process is felt today by every sovereign state, without exception. Everything possible must be done to disprove the caustic, but unfortunately not unjustified, remark by Turkmen Vice Premier Nazar Suyunov about "another collective farm project in Tyumen."

Oil, Gas Industry Bosses Disgruntled

MK0503122393 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 5 Mar 93 p 2

[SIA-Press report under "Energy Resources" rubric and general headline "140 Million Cubic Meters Free Every Day"]

[Text] Surgut—The oil "generals" regard the results of the intergovernmental conference in Surgut on the problems of the fuel and energy industry complex as "quite disgusting"—this common view of the leaders of the oil-extraction sectors was voiced by A.V. Sivak, general director of the "Varyegan neftegaz" administration. The main reason for this attitude lies in the attempt to solve problems at the top, "disregarding the specifics at the bottom." Directors see a real chance to improve the position in the fuel and energy sectors in a simultaneous solution of two problems for oil and gas extraction, namely through the establishment of organizations to carry through any targeted programs, and the amendment of legislation relating to taxes. It was also stated that the government's hopes of topping up to the budget and covering the deficit by selling state oil industry shares are unrealistic, because once all the "duties" and "quitrents" have been paid the oil industry is left at best with 10-15 percent of the income, which leaves no money even for the restoration, let alone the development of production.

Interior Ministers Meet, Plan To Combat Crime

MK0503123793 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 5 Mar 93 p 14

[Roman Yakovlevskiy report: "Conference on Crime in Minsk. Ministers of Internal Affairs Plan Joint Actions"]

[Text] A closed-door meeting of ministers of internal affairs of Commonwealth countries ended at the CIS headquarters in Minsk on 4 March. The meeting discussed a draft program to combat organized crime on CIS territory. The draft will be submitted for ratification by the meeting of CIS heads of state in Moscow on 12 March. The draft in particular calls for the creation of an Interpol-type standing body, and all participants in the meeting agreed on the need for it.

The internal affairs ministry leaders agreed on a plan of action which envisages joint secret crime-fighting operations to be carried out in the immediate future by law enforcement bodies on CIS territory. For example, the planned operation "Gastrolery" [Strolling Performers] will expose migrant criminals. Another operation mentioned by a minister and codenamed "Road" will involve detaining lawbreakers on highways and railroads. Plans also call for joint wide-scale actions to combat the drug mafia.

Speaking at the meeting Vladimir Yegorov, internal affairs minister of the Belarus Republic, described in detail the crime situation in the republic. Yegorov said that the number of crimes recorded in Belarus was up 18.8 percent in 1992 to stand at 96,600. Yegorov also said that the militia had arrested 450,000 people for hooligan behavior in 1992. Speaking about joint militia-servicemen street patrols in Belarus, the internal affairs minister said that they are now in effect in 35 cities across the republic.

KOMMERSANT-DAILY was told by Yevgeniy Gorelik, chief of the CIS working group's press service, that the CIS ministers of internal affairs taking part in the meeting understood one another "at once, and discussed questions in a professional manner."

Belarus Minister of Internal Affairs Vladimir Yegorov is holding a news briefing on the meeting today. KOMMERSANT-DAILY will report on it on 6 March.

Belarus Minister Elected Chairman of Economic Court

LD0503151793 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 1300 GMT 5 Mar 93

[Text] Elections of the chairman of the Economic Court of the Commonwealth countries took place in Minsk today at the CIS headquarters: Belarus' current Justice Minister Leonid Dashuk was elected. His candidacy and the composition of the Court are to be endorsed at the meeting of heads of states on 30 March in Yerevan.

U.S. Seen Seeking To Ease Grain Credit Liability Issue

PM0803145193 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 4 Mar 93 First Edition p 1

[Aleksey Portanksiy report: "Problem of Liability for Grain Credits Not Yet Resolved"]

[Text] Russian-American talks on the problem of the Russian Federation's liability for previously accorded grain credits and the continuation of grain supplies from the United States have ended without, as yet, any result. This, as REUTER reported, was declared Tuesday [2 March] in Washington by U.S. Agriculture Minister Mike Espy and Russian Government Vice Premier Aleksandr Shokhin.

At the same time, both government figures confirmed the intention to continue the quest for a way out of the existing situation.

At the beginning of 1991 the American Government offered the former USSR credit guarantees to the value of $4.2 billion to acquire agricultural produce in the United States. Last November saw the start of delays in our debt repayments. THE WASHINGTON POST reports that the overall debt for unpaid and overdue credits is increasing daily, and that it is now approaching $400 million. As a result, at the beginning of the year Washington suspended the action of government credit guarantees for programs of agricultural exports to Russia.

According to the American newspaper's information, at present the sum total of current bank requirements in respect of Russia is relatively low, although officials in the United States fear that Russia's growing debts may ultimately have an adverse impact on the American economy and be capable of undermining support in Congress for future aid programs for Russia.

As we know, since 1970 the USSR has been the chief purchaser on the American grain market. A cut in the sale of agricultural produce to Russia is not in Washington's interests, as in this instance the latter would have to spend around $1 billion a year to support its own farmers.

While demanding that Russia settle existing debts, the Americans are trying at the same time to find a means of solving the problem which is acceptable to us.

P. Leahy, chairman of the Senate Agriculture Committee, suggests that offering credit guarantees on normal terms is not an effective means of solving Russia's serious economic problems. He urged President Clinton "to cooperate with Congress in the search for new, special approaches" which would help to expand exports of American agricultural produce to Russia, possibly within the framework of a new plan to finance such exports via government guarantees.

Settlement of the question of Russia's grain credits liability is directly linked with the problem of restructuring the former Union's foreign debts, a definitive solution to which has yet to be found. Furthermore, specialists believe it is necessary to separate Russia's specific debt from the aforementioned total sum of $400 million.

Speaking a few days ago at an American university, Bill Clinton stated that improving the economic situation in Russia is the United States' most important foreign policy objective, and he called for support for his proposal to grant it a further $300 million.

Shokhin Cited on Grain Credit Debts, Repayment

PM0803125993 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 6 Mar 93 First Edition p 2

[Aleksey Portanskiy report: "A. Shokhin: 'Russia Remains Able To Repay Its Debts'"]

[Text] What Russia needs above all is normal trading and credit relations with the United States and the West, and only then assistance, Aleksandr Shokhin, deputy chairman of the Russian Federation Government, emphasized in conversation with IZVESTIYA's correspondent. The purpose of the recent trip to Washington by a Russian delegation headed by the vice premier was precisely to convey this idea to our partners.

I will remind you of the crux of the matter. Last November saw the start of delays over repaying our debts under guaranteed credits for the purchase of U.S. grain which were granted to the former USSR at the beginning of 1991. As a result, at the beginning of this year Washington suspended government guarantees on credits for Russia.

But the complaints leveled against us of late payments to the tune of approximately $400 million actually resulted from delays not by Russia but by the former USSR.

The point is that, if the question of deferring payments under the former USSR's overall debts had been resolved last November by means of signing, as planned, an agreement with the Paris Club on restructuring those debts, then the present problem of failure to repay the U.S. grain credits would not have arisen. As is known, the agreement was not signed because the creditors demanded that we pay considerably more in 1993 than we were actually capable of.

The basic idea of the agreement with the Paris Club is to separate the Russian debt and the Soviet debt. It was this idea that the Russian delegation took to Washington in the belief that, if it had taken hold of the minds of members of the Paris Club, it was logical to enshrine it also in bilateral credit relations, particularly with regard to grain.

It is senseless for Russia to start repaying the former USSR's debts, Shokhin emphasized. Whereas we must pay $30 million this year with regard to Russian grain debts, we must pay $1.5 billion with regard to Union debts, and this Union debt is, all the same, to be

restructured. In addition, if we suddenly start repaying Soviet debts, we at once violate the first commandment of the future agreement with the Paris Club—"an equal attitude toward all creditors."

The Americans admitted that the problem which has arisen is also a U.S. one. Mindful of the strained food situation, Russia has secured deliveries of 5 million tonnes of grain with credits from the EC and France and 2 million tonnes from Australia. These 7 million tonnes are deducted directly from the U.S. exports. If we assume that it suddenly is not possible to reach agreement with the Americans, then we could get out of the U.S. market altogether—which is not at all in the interests of U.S. farmers and the federal budget.

The United States is a country where the law is respected. In that case a delay over repayments of grain credits gives the Americans formal grounds not to send us grain. They fear a precedent which would sever their relations with other debtors. While there is no agreement with the Paris Club, what is needed is a decision by U.S. legislators to separate the Russian debt and the Soviet debt, i.e. a corresponding amendment to their law is needed.

It must also be borne in mind that all the necessary appointments have not yet been made in the U.S. Administration, and the mechanism of interdepartmental coordination sometimes malfunctions in the absence of key figures.

On the whole, in the opinion of Vice Premier Shokhin, the Americans have shown proper mutual understanding and will strive to find the speediest way out of the present situation. The problem should be resolved within the next two or three weeks. In addition, there is hope that an accord will also be reached with the Paris Club by the end of March—which in itself will eliminate the problem of grain credit debts.

Aleksandr Shokhin emphasized that Russia remains able to repay its debts, but its chief creditors—the members of the Paris Club—must nonetheless proceed from Russia's actual potential, which this year does not enable it to pay more than $2.5 billion or $3 billion at most.

Gaydar Urges U.S. Aid for Small-Scale Projects

PM0803171193 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 6 Mar 93 First Edition pp 1, 3

[Aleksandr Shalnev report: "New U.S. Aid Program Will Include 200 Specific Projects"]

[Text] Washington—At his meeting with Boris Yeltsin scheduled for 4 April Bill Clinton will, to all appearances, announce a new program of aid for Russia. This has been made clear by Yegor Gaydar, who is in the United States.

The visit is of an exclusively unofficial nature, but Ye. Gaydar is alternating the delivery of lectures and speeches to mass audiences with talks with high-ranking administration officials—primarily those who tackle in real earnest questions of financial and economic relations with the CIS.

Gaydar declined to tell me just what kind of program, in his opinion, B. Clinton will bring to the summit with B. Yeltsin. But statements by the former acting prime minister, who in the Congress building on Thursday addressed an audience consisting mainly of staffers of the State Department's Agency for International Development [as published], the World Bank, and similar establishments, leave no doubt that Moscow would like from Washington a qualitatively new approach to aid problems. It must be a question not of some massive projects, for which, incidentally, the United States does not have the money at present, but of comparatively small-scale projects requiring investments of $5-10 million each.

Gaydar named the figure of 200. Some 200 projects on such a scale, including in sectors of the former military-industrial complex, could provide a basis for a new kind of Russian-U.S. cooperation. Gaydar also spoke of the importance of still smaller-scale projects: For example, many retired officers in Russia would like to take up farming; by helping them in this we would be helping one of the categories of the population which are encountering the greatest difficulties as a consequence of the processes taking place in the country.

It is perfectly clear that the "promptings" of Gaydar, who, as Washington is perfectly well aware, continues to play a powerful role, albeit a backstage one, in the government of Russia, have to be taken into consideration when drawing up a new aid program.

In principle, this also coincides with the line of argument of the Clinton administration, which, as you can understand, is preparing to gamble not on the volume of aid but on its quality and on its accurate targeting.

Gaydar's speech also attracted attention with some statistics: He reported that, as of 1 January this year, Russia's gold reserves are estimated at 308 tonnes, compared with 290 tonnes at the beginning of 1992, while currency reserves are equal to $2 billion, compared with zero a year ago. True, $1 billion of this $2 billion is accounted for by a loan granted by the IMF.

Finally, the Canadian city of Vancouver has been added to those cities that are prepared to host the summit, and so the list already includes some 10 cities. The decision on just where the summit will be held has not yet been made, but White House Press Secretary M. Myers has said that it is to be announced "soon."

U.S., Others Squeezing Weakened Russian Planemakers

PM0903092593 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 5 Mar 93 First Edition p 4

[Unattributed report: "Skipping Into the Lead..."]

[Text] Viktor Tyurin, deputy director of the Central Aerohydrodynamics Institute (TsAGI), has announced that Russia is still today the world leader in both military and civil aircraft construction, as well as in the spacecraft sphere. However, under the current state of affairs in the defense industry, Russia will soon cede this place to the United States. At present, only these two countries are capable of making heavy airliners. England and France can only construct them with help. So the United States, England, and France are currently "putting the pressure on Russia" through every available means in order to destroy the economically weakened competitor, Tyurin believes. Talking about the size of subsidies in aircraft construction, he stressed that "they cannot resolve a single problem in the sector."

Russian CW Convention Acceptance Scored

PM0903100193 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 6 Mar 93 p 3

[Article by Viktor Kaysyn: "American Time Machine"]

[Text] The Convention on Chemical Weapons was adopted in Paris recently. A. Kozyrev was among the first to sign the document although Russia does not have a single establishment for the destruction of chemical weapons. The noble aspiration manifested in the convention could only be welcomed were it not for one "but": It would be a good idea to give technical backup to the very complex chemical-technological problem, since the destruction of chemical weapons could threaten Russia with ecological disasters.

But was there any need for such haste? Let's think. The 1925 Geneva protocol on banning the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons was ratified by the Soviet Union in April 1928. Two stipulations were made here. First, the USSR stated it did not consider itself bound by the Geneva protocol if it is a case of an armed conflict with a state which has not signed this document. Second, if chemical or bacteriological weapons are used against our country. Consequently the USSR at the time retained only the right to a retaliatory strike. The overwhelming majority (about 130) of the states acceded to the Geneva protocol with similar stipulations. Thus chemical weapons were excluded from the list of means of warfare. It is true that the protocol did not impose any restrictions on the production or accumulation of reserves and their stockpiling. For that reason many countries have such weapons, viewing them as a means of security, as a guarantee of the use of appropriate measures in response to enemy actions.

It may confidently be said that this factor has played its part. Since the Geneva protocol entered into force no widespread use of chemical weapons has been recorded in the world. Even Hitler did not resolve to resort to them, although Germany in the forties possessed large stocks of chemical weapons. Moreover, even then Germany had toxins like "tabun" and sarin had been synthesized under laboratory conditions and later "soman" was obtained—no one in the world had toxins of this kind.

Nor did the United States use chemical weapons during the Vietnam war. It is true that in Vietnam extensive use was made of temporarily incapacitating substances, so-called policing means, but they are a long way from chemical weapons. Incidentally, the United States ratified the Geneva protocol only after the Vietnam war, in 1975.

As for the Soviet Union, it has never used chemical weapons anywhere.

In 1992 President B. Yeltsin stated that the Russian Federation renounces all stipulations made by the Soviet Union when signing the protocol in 1925. Consequently, Russia has ruled out chemical weapons from its arsenal of means of armed struggle. Incidentally, in 1987 our country completely stopped the production of these terrible weapons.

Well, it would seem that we can only rejoice, but what to do with what has already been produced? Destroy it, of course, but I repeat: This problem cannot be taken up suddenly. Even specialists find it hard to name a figure for expenditure on the destruction of chemical weapons, but according to their estimates excessive haste in destroying these weapons will cost the country five times more than their production. At 1991 figures that figure is set at 10 billion rubles, not counting expenditure on constructing the necessary establishments, and these funds have to be used not in the remote future sometime, as people try to persuade us, but as early as 1997. Will the empty Russian coffers withstand that? The reader knows the answer well.

But the United States will incur expenses on destruction, I hear the objection. That is true. But why does it welcome the convention as a national holiday? Count it up. The United States stopped the creation of its chemical weapons stocks in 1967 and has stockpiled about 30,000 tonnes. The USSR stopped in 1987, that is 20 years later. Consequently, U S. shells have been in the depots for 26 years now. Over this time the systems for the use of shells have become obsolete and the guarantee term of their storage is running out. Sooner or later the question of their destruction had to arise. Incidentally, at one time Soviet specialists envied the Americans because the latter produced thin-walled shells, which made them light and large, and they contained twice as much chemical weapons as the Soviet shells.

Now history has dotted the "i's." The United States' thin-walled shells have been laying around for 26 years and their storage is becoming dangerous. The United States has set about matters without haste and in a considered manner: It has constructed the necessary

establishments, adopted laws, and drafted technical documentation. Experimental installations have been created a long way from population centers, in Utah, and they have embarked on running in the technical process.

We can only bow down to such farsightedness on the part of the U.S. diplomats, who have been able to turn a domestic problem into a problem of international importance and achieve the signing of a convention, thus annulling the 1925 Geneva protocol and delivering a painful blow to the budgets of several states. It would seem that if the Geneva protocol were to be updated, if additional agreements on control and destruction were to be adopted with regard to it—then all would be well, as they say. The world would be guaranteed against the use of chemical weapons. But the United States has had its problems—technical problems which have become political and international, that is, they have become our problems too.

In conclusion it should be noted that the convention is a document of 173 pages printed in small script. It contains everything relating to chemical weapons but contains no clear definition of what "the development of chemical weapons" means. On the other hand the terms "establishment for the production," "organization for banning," "processing," and "consumption" are defined quite clearly.

The conclusion which one cannot help drawing in this connection is a frightening one: Existing stocks of obsolete chemical weapons will be subject to destruction yet the convention does not contain a word about the development of new ones! Perhaps precisely because under the convention only existing establishments for their storage, production, and destruction are inspected. In brief, present-day chemical weapons are inspected and that resolves the United States' technical problems. While Russia—and not at the best time for it—has been brought up against problems which it would have had to find out about only in 2019.

In brief, it is surprising that the U.S. president has not rewarded all his diplomats and specialists who prepared the convention. And Minister Kozyrev too, "for services to America." Actually, perhaps that is what he will do.

Iraq Changing Tactics To Emerge From Isolation

PM0803203793 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 6 Mar 93 p 2

[Ravil Mustafin report: "Baghdad Changes Tactics"]

[Text] Judging from reports that are coming in, Baghdad is changing its tactics. It is clear that having become convinced of the impossibility of securing the lifting, or at least the weakening of international sanctions through confrontation with the world community, the Iraqi regime has decided in the prevailing conditions not to take further risks but instead to fulfill the obligations imposed on it by the United Nations.

This is evidenced, for example, by the Iraqis' attitude to the group of UN military experts which the other day visited four Iraqi nuclear installations within the framework of the mission to uncover evidence that the Iraqis are continuing work on their nuclear program. According to D. Perrikos, head of the group and an International Atomic Energy Agency expert, "everything went normally; there were no problems."

Observers are noting that Iraqi diplomacy is stepping up its efforts to emerge from international isolation. These efforts are being made in two main areas. First, the normalization of relations with the West, primarily with the United States. The Iraqi leader recently stated that he is ready to cooperate with everybody who is keen to turn the Near East into a zone free of weapons of mass destruction. "The Americans are still discovering that Iraqis deserve their trust," he stressed. Moreover, according to Saddam Husayn, he is also prepared to review the Iraqi position in relation to Israel if there is "an acceptable settlement of the Palestinian problem."

Second, reconciliation with the Arab and Islamic world by widening the breach which appeared among Arab and Muslim members of the anti-Iraq coalition owing to the inappropriate reaction of the West, which launched a missile and bomb strike against Iraq this January. In many ways the military action turned out to be counterproductive. In the sense that it increased sympathy for millions of Iraqis among their fellow believers. Today Saddam is trying to exploit this by sending his half brother Barzan al-Tikriti on a peacemaking mission around Arab states. The latter has already visited Libya, Tunisia, Yemen, and Mauretania. It is expected that al-Tikriti will leave for Morocco in the near future.

Kozyrev Welcomes POW's Back From Afghanistan

LD0803173493 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1624 GMT 8 Mar 93

[Excerpts] Moscow, 8 March—Two more former Soviet soldiers have been released from captivity in Afghanistan. They have just arrived at the Sheremetyevo airport where their friends and relatives were waiting to embrace them. They were greeted at the steps of the plane by Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev, who said that releasing prisoners was a purely humanitarian act. It became possible as a result of a difficult negotiating process conducted since May 1992. A. Kozyrev expressed the hope that this action will be another step toward resolving the problem of bringing former Soviet soldiers back from captivity in Afghanistan, a problem very painful to Russia.

One of the released prisoners, 28 year-old Leonid Vylku, who was born in Moldavia, was reported missing in October 1984. [passage omitted] The other released man, Viktor Nazarov, was born in Mariupol. He was captured in May 1985. [passage omitted]

Russian diplomats working in Afghanistan, a mission representing servicemen who fought in Afghanistan, and the International Red Cross have made great contributions to getting the prisoners released.

Rutskoy Comments on Singapore Visit, Departs

LD0803153393 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1412 GMT 8 Mar 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Aleksandr Bokhonko]

[Text] Singapore, 8 Mar—Aleksandr Rutskoy, vice president of the Russian Federation who was here on a working visit at the invitation of Singapore's Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong, left for Moscow today.

Speaking at a news conference before his departure, he expressed satisfaction with the results of his talks with the Singaporean leadership on establishing wider economic ties between the two states.

"In pursuing its policy in Asia, the former Soviet Union disregarded the region's huge economic potential," Rutskoy pointed out. "Russia intends to redress this imbalance. The question of developing economic cooperation with the countries of Southeast Asia is moving to the foreground now. Cooperation with these countries will enable Russia to enter huge markets in this part of the world. We have much to offer, namely our raw materials, our scientific potential, and various equipment".

In Rutskoy's view, investments from Singapore and other Southeast Asian countries can help set up a vast network of joint enterprises to meet Russia's interests. Among specific areas of this cooperation, he listed the use of Singaporean capital in agricultural production in our country and also emerging prospects for cooperation between the two countries in the field of military technology.

A. Rutskoy concluded his visit to the countries of the Asia- Pacific region, which has taken him to Malaysia, New Zealand, and Singapore.

Japan's Position on Aid to Russia Remains Invariable

LD0903120893 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1132 GMT 9 Mar 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Vyachelav Bantin]

[Text] Tokyo March 9 TASS—Tokyo's invariable position on providing large-scale aid to Russia has been confirmed by Japanese Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa during debates held in the Japanese parliamentary Budgetary Commission on Tuesday [9 March].

Miyazawa expressed the opinion that in an unnatural situation when there is no peace treaty between Russia and Japan the priority task is to improve bilateral relations and only after that a question of large-scale aid can be considered.

He said that Japan does not intend to link these two questions and is not going to sign a barter deal with Moscow, but stressed that it is important to normalise the relations between the two countries so that Japan could provide aid to Russia in future.

Evidently, the Japanese prime minister implied that first of all it is necessary to resolve the territorial dispute between Moscow and Tokyo. The Japanese government does not think it's possible to provide a large-scale aid to Russia until some progress is made in the settlement of the problem of South Kuril Islands, claimed by Tokyo.

Ships Humanitarian Aid

LD0903121293 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1133 GMT 9 Mar 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Vladimir Kutakhov]

[Text] Tokyo March 9 TASS—The motorship Aleksandr Fadeyev with humanitarian aid given by the Japanese Government to Russia left the Yokohama port this morning and sailed for the Vostochnyy port situated next to the city of Nakhodka.

ITAR-TASS learnt at the recently formed division for aid to newly-independent states of the Japanese Foreign Ministry that the distribution of aid is planned to be conducted under the so-called monetarisation system when Japanese goods are sold through the trade network at prices lower than on the market. The returns will be distributed by local authorities among the needy.

The first batch of canned fruit and condensed milk—350 tons in all—will be delivered to shops in the Khabarovsk region, Sakhalin and the Maritime Territory within two or three weeks.

Then, humanitarian aid will be brought to Blagoveshchensk, Chita, Irkutsk and Ulan-Ude. It will come to Moscow and St. Petersburg some time later.

The Japanese Government will give 12.5 billion yen worth of humanitarian aid to 12 republics of the former Soviet Union during the 1992 fiscal year (it ends on March 31). Some 50 per cent of the total will go to the Russian Federation.

General Staff Chief Begins Finland Visit

LD0903111593 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1019 GMT 9 Mar 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Aleksandr Surikov]

[Text] Helsinki, 9 Mar (ITAR-TASS)—The working visit to Finland by Colonel General Mikhail Kolesnikov, chief of general staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, began today.

On his arrival in Helsinki he visited the Finnish General Defense Headquarters where he met with Commander in Chief Admiral Jan Klenberg.

A plan of measures to develop links between the armed forces of Russia and Finland for 1993-1994 was signed. It envisages a wide exchange of visits by military delegations of different levels, up to and including defense ministers.

A luncheon was hosted by Finnish Defense Minister Elisabeth Rehn in honor of the Russian military commander.

Finland Allocates Money for Joint Ventures

LD0803205593 St. Petersburg Radio St. Petersburg in Russian 1500 GMT 8 Mar 93

[Text] ITAR-TASS reports that this year the Finnish Government plans to allocate 100 million Finnish marrkas, which is $17 million, for joint projects to develop neighboring regions on the Finnish- Russian border. This decision was adopted at the first sitting of the group for the development and cooperation of neighboring regions. Representatives of the Russian Foreign Ministry, the Finnish Government, and the administrations of Murmansk and Leningrad oblasts and Karelia are taking part.

Implementation of joint projects in the spheres of energy conservation, increasing the safety of nuclear power plants, transportation, communications, public health, forestry, and environmental protection are the main aspects of the group's work.

The joint Russo-Finnish group will also supervise investments in a number of major ventures in the northwest of Leningrad Oblast, primarily, the construction of a northwest heating plant, which is estimated to cost $1.5 million. The Finnish side is expected to finance the construction in exchange for supplies of electricity. It is also envisaged that the Finns will build a residential district for 40,000-50,000 people in Leningrad Oblast.

Space Cooperation Agreement Signed With Germany

PM0803161993 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 5 Mar 93 p 2

[Unattributed report under the "Decision Made" rubric: "Agreement on Space Research"]

[Text] Wolfgang Wild, general director of the German Space Research Agency (DARA), and Yuriy Koptev, general director of the the Russian Space Agency, have signed in Bonn an agreement on space research and its employment for peaceful purposes.

The first joint project will be the creation and testing of the "Express" reentry vehicle, in which Japan will also take part, providing the booster rocket.

It is intended to launch the "Express" craft into near-earth orbit in 1994.

Ministry Denies Pressuring Azerbaijan Into CIS

PM0803155593 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 6 Mar 93 p 1

[Report from ITAR-TASS and INTERFAX roundup under the "Events, Facts, Opinions" rubric: "Russian Federation Foreign Ministry Statement Regarding A. Elchibey's Claim That Russia Is Attempting To Draw Azerbaijan Into the CIS"]

[Text] As the mass media have reported, President A. Elchibey has stated at an expanded conference of representatives of the People's Front in Baku that Russia is allegedly making attempts to goad Azerbaijan into joining the CIS. This claim is untrue and therefore cannot fail to astonish.

The Russian leadership has stressed on several occasions that the issue of Azerbaijan's joining or not joining the CIS is a purely internal affair of this sovereign state and the matter will in no way affect bilateral relations between Russia and Azerbaijan. Moreover, as the Russian Government delegation stated during its visit to Baku last September, "Russia will not exploit the ties that have developed between it and Azerbaijan to exert any pressure, and it will respect any sovereign choice." This is our line on the said issue and it remains unchanged.

Projected Oil, Gas Sales to CIS States Listed

PM0803131593 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 5 Mar 93 p 3

[Aleksey Volin report: "Around 15 Percent of Russian Oil Extracted in 1993 Will Be Supplied to Nearby Foreign Parts"]

[Text] In 1993 the Russian Federation plans to supply to former Union republics 55.8 million tonnes of oil (around 15 percent of all Russian oil planned to be extracted in 1993) and 96 billion cubic meters of gas. This was reported by Leonid Smirnov, deputy chief of the Administration for Fuel and Energy of the State Committee for Economic Cooperation with Commonwealth Members. He also noted that the price of the sources of energy supplied will be based on world prices, but will be ultimately regulated by bilateral agreements.

It is expected that out of the total quantity of hydrocarbon fuels exported to the nearby foreign parts 37.9 million tonnes of oil and 15 billion cubic meters of gas will be sent to the former Union republics within the framework of the interrelated reciprocal supplies envisaged by the appendixes to the agreements on trade exchange for 1993.

According to the figures of the Russian Federation State Committee for Statistics, in 1992 Russia supplied the former Union republics with 75.5 million tonnes of oil and 106.4 billion cubic meters of gas. In 1992 the Russian Federation produced 396 million tonnes of oil, whereas this year oil extraction will fall to 340 million tonnes.

In 1992 the average price of oil sent to nearby foreign parts was 18,500 rubles [R] per tonne (34 percent of the world price). The cost of 1,000 cubic meters of gas to the former union republics was R2,070, which is only 5 percent of world prices.

Experts from the State Committee for Economic Cooperation with Commonwealth Members think that in 1993 the Russian Federation will supply 20 million tonnes of oil and and 69 billion cubic meters of of gas to Ukraine; 16 million tonnes of oil and 16 billion cubic meters of gas to Belarus; 12.1 million tonnes of oil and 2 billion cubic meters of gas to Kazakhstan; 4 million tonnes of oil and 4 billion cubic meters of gas to Lithuania; 4 million tonnes of oil to Uzbekistan; 165 million [as published] tonnes of oil to Turkmenistan; 700,000 tonnes of oil to Azerbaijan; and 3 billion cubic meters of gas to Moldova, 2 billion cubic meters of gas to Latvia, and 1 billion cubic meters of gas to Estonia. The gas requirements of Uzbekistan, Georgia, and Armenia will be met to a considerable extent by the export there of this raw material from Turkmenistan, the volume of whose gas supplies will come to 80.9 billion cubic meters.

Last year Russia supplied 19.7 million tonnes of oil and 17.7 billion cubic meters of gas to Belarus; 11.5 million tonnes of oil and 1.66 billion cubic meters of gas to Kazakhstan; 3.9 million tonnes of oil and 3.2 billion cubic meters of gas to Lithuania; 4.1 million tonnes of oil to Uzbekistan; 1 million tonnes of oil to Turkmenistan; 855,000 tonnes of oil to Azerbaijan,; 672,000 of oil to Georgia; and 3.4 billion cubic meters of gas to Moldova; 1.6 billion cubic meters of gas to Latvia; and 850 million cubic meters of gas to Estonia. In 1992 Ukraine received 33.53 million tonnes of oil and 78 billion cubic meters of gas from Russia. However, accoeding to unofficial figuresa, 8 million tonnes of crude oil were reexported by it.

At the same time, according to the information of the State Committee for Economic Cooperation with Commonwealth Members, in 1992 the former Union republics failed to meet to a considerable extent planned deliveries of equipment needed by the Russian fuel and energy complex.

Leonid Smirnov noted that at the present time around 32,000 oil wells in Russia are lying idle. However, it is planned to reactivate 2,365 of them with the help of a number of former Union republics, with which appropriate bilateral agreements are being concluded.

Ukraine, for example, plans to reactivate 794 oil wells, Belarus 444, and Tajikistan 955. Here, according to preliminary figures, Ukraine could invest R11.2 billion in the Russian fuel and energy complex, while Belarus could invest R12.9 billion. Moreover, it cannot be ruled out that Ukraine will bore 1,143 oil wells in Russia this year through its own efforts. It will also send Russia rolled ferrous metal products, pipes, trucks, diesel engines, and other necessary equipment.

The oil extracted as a result of this work will be channeled into the general CIS system, from which, according to experts from the State Committee for Economic Cooperation with Commonwealth Members, "all participants in the process will benefit."

Political Issues

Yeltsin Chairs Meeting of Republic Heads

LD0903082993 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0750 GMT 9 Mar 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondentse Ivan Ivanov and Gennadiy Talalayev]

[Text] Moscow, 9 Mar—The Council of Heads of Republics within the Russian Federation convened this morning in the President Hotel in Moscow, with Boris Yeltsin in the chair.

According to the preliminary agenda, the council will debate a means of implementing the Federation Treaty, but the main topic is expected to be preparations for the Eighth Congress of People's Deputies of the Russian Federation.

Declaring the meeting open, Boris Yeltsin congratulated Ruslan Aushev on his recent election as president of the Ingush Republic; in turn, Ruslan Aushev announced that Ingushetia wishes to accede to the Federation Treaty within the next month. Boris Yeltsin said that this "is politically significant especially in view of the existing situation in the northern Caucasus."

Attending the meeting of the council are Valeriy Zorkin, the chairman of the Constitutional Court; Viktor Chernomyrdin, the chairman of the Council of Ministers; Nikolay Ryabov, the deputy chairman of the Supreme Soviet; and Sergey Shakhray, a deputy prime minister.

Leaders To Discuss Congress

OW0903081093 Moscow INTERFAX in English 0802 GMT 9 Mar 93

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The session of the council of Russian federative republics, chaired by Russian President Boris Yeltsin, has begun. Sergey Filatov, the head of the presidential administration, told an Interfax correspondent that only one question would be discussed at the meeting—possible ways to reach an accord at the coming Congress so as to overcome the constitutional crisis.

In the opinion of Supreme Council Deputy Chairman Nikolay Rybov, it would not be advisable to discuss the Law on Authority proposed by the president at the session, since it departs from the framework of the constitution. In order for it to be passed, it would be necessary for the Congress to confirm corresponding changes to the constitution, and it is unrealistic to expect the deputies to do this.

Opening the council of federative republics, President Yeltsin congratulated Ruslan Aushev on his election as president of the Ingush Republic. Aushev confirmed that he would cooperate closely with federal authorities, and asked Yeltsin to name, within the month, a date for the signing of the Ingushetian Federative Treaty. Yeltsin agreed to the suggestion, noting that the matter had particular importance in light of the situation in the North Caucasus. He also called for the earliest possible signing of the Federative Treaty by Ingushetia.

The council of federative republics also involved the participation of Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin and Constitutional Court Chairman Valeriy Zorkin.

Supports Plan for Federal Treaty

LD0903114893 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1044 GMT 9 Mar 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondents Ivan Ivanov and Gennadiy Talalayev]

[Text] Moscow, 9 March—Today's meeting of the Council of Heads of Republics making up the Russian Federation examined issues connected with the implementation of the Federation Treaty and the congress's draft decision on this question. Journalists were told this by Boris Yeltsin at the end of the meeting, which lasted over two hours. The president stressed that he was satisfied with the results of the meeting.

The president's press secretary, Vyacheslav Kostikov, informed journalists that "basically the heads of the republics proposed that the scenario for the entire congress should be changed to some extent." "They consider the nonimplementation of the Federation Treaty, which they regard as a foundation for stability in the Russian state, as the root of the crisis rather than the contradictions that now exist between the executive and representative authorities."

Therefore, the heads of the republics within the Russian Federation, continued Vyacheslav Kostikov, are proposing to shift the focus of the discussion and to work out a draft resolution of the congress that would facilitate the adoption of the Russian Federation law on the principle and mechanism for the implementation of the Federative Treaty. The Council of Heads of Republics is appealing to the Eighth Congress with a proposal to work out and adopt a law on the principle and mechanism of the implementation of the Federative Treaty and is proposing that the congress set up a commission chaired by the president to work on the draft.

"In principle, Boris Yeltsin is in favor of this idea," said Vyacheslav Kostikov. However, the president believes that this could take a lot of time and he continues to be worried about the disproportions in plenipotentiary powers that have arisen between the legislative and the executive powers.

"Some of those taking part in the meeting doubted whether the congress would accept this matter for consideration," Vyacheslav Kostikov went on, adding that the congress might simply fail to include it on the agenda. "Then both the statement by the Council of Heads of the Republics and this idea of concentrating on

debating the mechanism for implementing the Federation Treaty as the core of statehood as a whole might miscarry." "Understanding that this proposal might not work, the president sounded out the opinions of the heads of the republics on concluding a constitutional agreement at the congress in the realization that it should be concluded if the president opts to cancel the referendum. On the whole, the heads of the republics think there is no need for a referendum. They backed the president's idea that work on concluding a constitutional agreement should be done at the congress. In this, they solidly support the president," Vyacheslav Kostikov announced.

The Council of the Heads of Republics, Vyacheslav Kostikov added, proposed that a moratorium on the holding of referendums be declared in 1993-1994. The president, his press secretary continued, is prepared to drop the referendum if the congress will adopt a constitutional agreement that, if it does not resolve the constitutional crisis, will at least bring a settlement of it nearer. At the same time, the president considers that his draft agreement is not an ultimatum or a final option. Boris Yeltsin is prepared to discuss it and introduce amendments allowing for sensible proposals from the deputies.

However, Vyacheslav Kostikov emphasized, if the agreement is not adopted by the congress, Boris Yeltsin will put to a referendum the four questions that he announced on Sunday.

Ryabov Believes Congress Will Not Reach Agreement

OW0903112093 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1056 GMT 9 Mar 93

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] In the opinion of Supreme Council First Deputy Chairman Nikolay Rybov, the Congress of People's Deputies will not be able to reach any sort of extraconstitutional agreement. He continued by saying that it was now clear to everybody, including even the president, that the draft of any document intended to eliminate the political crisis could be considered by the Congress only if it were based on the currently-functioning constitution. "We do not deny," said Ryabov, "that laws passed by the Supreme Council are not perfect and contain contradictions, but the use of these contradictions as the basis for activity by one of the conflicting sides is inadmissible, since this would lead only to a deepening of the conflict." He also recognized that Article 104 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, which holds that the Congress is the supreme organ of state, and not executive, authority, is ambiguous. One cannot, however, ignore this clause, and it may only be changed by a vote at the Congress.

Ryabov believes that this question will not be discussed at the coming session of the Congress. There will also be no discussion of the Law on Authority, as the president had suggested. The document, opined Ryabov, departs from the constitutional framework and demands special constitutional changes.

Kozyrev Sees No Alternative to Constitutional Accord

LD0803220593 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 2149 GMT 8 Mar 93

[Text] Moscow March 9 TASS—"If the Congress moves towards adopting, in any form, the agreement proposed by the president, preparations for a referendum on the basis of the questions proposed by the president will follow," Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev said on Monday [8 March].

In an interview with the Ekho Moskvy (Echo of Moscow) radio station on Monday, Kozyrev said "this is a clear alternative of common sense which allows deputies to continue their work and direct it in the constructive channel."

Kozyrev believes another alternative "is chaos and civil confrontation." "I do not think that the major part of the deputy corps which will not receive power in this case anyway will agree to pull chestnuts out of the fire for a group of politicians striving for power."

State of Emergency Being Considered

PM0903115893 Copenhagen DET FRI AKTUELT in Danish 5 Mar 93 p 13

[Report on interview with Aleksey Yablokov, adviser to President Boris Yeltsin, by Per Dalgaard in Moscow; date not given]

[Text] Moscow—Russian President Boris Yeltsin and his closest advisers are giving serious consideration to a possible state of emergency in order to escape from the deadlock between him and parliament.

"Perhaps we cannot save democracy and the reforms other than by introducing presidential rule which arrogates for itself dictatorial powers. This is perhaps the only way in which we can avoid a bloody civil war in which Russia's republics, regions, armies, and militias fight each other endlessly," Aleksey Yablokov, adviser to President Boris Yeltsin, told DET FRI AKTUELT during a conversation in one of the Kremlin's old palaces.

Yablokov's candid statement is yet another confirmation of the fact that the power struggle between the old Russian parliament, which dates from the Soviet era and is headed by chairman Ruslan Khasbulatov, and the democratically elected president has become extremely acute in the lead-up to the planned referendum on 11 April.

The referendum, which is being fought tooth and nail by the parliament chairman, is intended to bring clarification to the power structures in the country. Originally the referendum formed part of a compromise between

Yeltsin and parliament reached during the most recent People's Congress at which Yeltsin was forced to dismiss his young reformist prime minister.

But the chairman of the parliament fears the result of a referendum so much that he has called a meeting of the People's Congress, the largest assembly of the parliament, next week. The stated aim is to prevent a referendum from being held, but there is a fear that the unpredictable congress could decide to assume full power.

President Yeltsin himself hinted recently that he could be forced to use unparliamentary means if parliament wants to put an end to democracy and reforms. Yesterday he was given the green light by the country's military leadership to take tough action to halt the political power struggle which has brought the country into chaos.

"Both we and the majority of the population have realized that the present parliament is absurd and that it is impossible to enter into agreements with it. That is why the voice of the people must be heard," Yablokov said on the reason for the referendum.

According to Yeltsin's adviser, three questions have to be asked:

—Should Russia continue to be a united federation of equal states?

—Should the rights of the individual be the most fundamental principle of the new constitution?

—Should the new constitution be adopted by an assembly elected by the people expressly for the purpose and not by the parliament?

Yablokov believes that people will vote "yes" to all the questions and that this will be able to eliminate the communist-dominated parliament and resolve the crisis.

"We will hold this referendum and we must have a new constitution. We cannot live with a constitution which gives parliament legislative, executive, and judicial powers. That is antidemocratic. A referendum would be the best solution, but the situation could become so serious that a temporary reinforcement of the president's powers could be necessary."

[Dalgaard] Dictatorship to save democracy? Is that not a contradiction in terms?

"No, because we shall not simply be saving democracy. We will also avoid a bloody civil war, like that in Yugoslavia. At the same time we also have to recognize that it has been impossible for us to make the leap into democracy at a stroke. A longer transition period is needed, presided over by a democratically elected, yet strong leader. With a strong, popularly elected president who has extraordinary powers we will be able to make progress into a state of democracy, at the same time as there is law and order in the country. People are longing for law and order. People cannot feel safe with all the crime and disorder we have."

Aleksey Yablokov is certain that Yeltsin will gain popularity by showing strength and introducing law and order. But, he claimed, the president has refrained from doing so hitherto in order not to tarnish his reputation as a democrat.

"Who else can solve Russia's crisis? No one! In the current situation Yeltsin is the only one who can stop the country breaking up in a bloody nationalist civil war. And my advice to him is that he should do so no matter what the price!"

Foreign Ministry Reports Chernomyrdin 'Ill'

OW0803155593 Moscow BALTFAX in English 1548 GMT 8 Mar 93

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The meeting of the Lithuanian and Russian heads of government has been put off to no earlier than March 12, or after the Congress of People's Deputies' session, Baltfax was told by officials in the headquarters of the acting Lithuanian premier Bronislovas Lubis.

The meeting was scheduled for March 5.

Rinaldas Kedikas, an assistant of the acting premier, has said that the efforts made by President Algirdas Brazauskas of Lithuania and Russian ambassador Nikolay Obertyshev to hold the meeting at an earlier date failed. The ambassador has handed an official message of the Russian Foreign Minister saying that Premier Chernomyrdin is ill.

The meeting is expected to discuss details of the trade and economic accord between the two countries for 1993, withdrawal of Russian troops, supplies of fuels, and transit of Russian cargos to Kaliningrad Region.

Rally Speaker Calls For Yeltsin's Impeachment

OW0803140893 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1313 GMT 8 Mar 93

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] A nearly 6000-strong rally of the so-called "socialist-choice" advocates was started today in front of the government building on 8 Staraya Square. The rally participants demanded reinstatement of the Soviet Union, end of armed confrontations and price cuts for the basic products.

Taking part in the rally staged by the Organizing Committee of the Soviet Women's Congress were activists of the movements "Workers' Moscow," "Workers' Russia," the National Salvation Front and Russia's Communist Party.

Speakers at the rally was sharply critical of the policy pursued by President Yeltsin and the Russian government aimed at what

they termed "capitalization of the country". The leader of "Workers' Russia", Viktor Anpilov, called on the Russian people's deputies to impeach President Yeltsin at the extraordinary congress of people's deputies which is due to open in Moscow on March 10.

A militia officer told Interfax correspondent that no disturbances were reported during the foot march of the columns of demonstrators from Oktaybrskaya Square, where the meeting began, to the Russian government building on Staraya Square.

Opposition Wants 'Superpower' Status

LD0803141293 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1408 GMT 8 Mar 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Yuriy Vdovin]

[Text] Moscow March 8 TASS—As most Russians are busy with holiday chores of International Women's Day traditionally celebrated in Russia on March 8, over a thousand of opposition supporters rallied in Moscow to demand President Boris Yeltsin's resignation.

The participants in the rally organised by the Labour Russia Movement, the Russian Communist Party and the Congress of Soviet Women gathered on Oktyabrskaya Square several miles from the Kremlin and marched to the government headquarters on Staraya Square.

The demonstrators demanded the resignation of President Yeltsin and the parliament and a "return to the times when the Soviet Union was a superpower."

No incidents were reported during the rally, the city police said.

Yeltsin Chief of Staff 'Number Two' in State

PM0803141593 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 5 Mar 93 First Edition p 5

[Voldemar Koreshkov commentary: "The Entire Apparatus Army Is in the Hands of Sergey Filatov"]

[Text] The Russian Federation president's edict ["On Improving the System of Backup for the Russaian Federation President's Activity"] lays out an integral system for providing backup for the activity of the top official—the head of executive authority in the Russian state.

There is no doubt that society has an interest in strong, democratic power, and in the triumph of a law ensuring the implementation—in civilized forms, naturally—of all the rights, personal freedoms, and duties of citizens. Just one thing is needed in order to achieve the given aim: to overcome the syndrome of misunderstanding the purpose and specifics of legislative, executive, and judicial authority, which frequently operate in our country like the proverbial swan, crayfish, and pike [reference to Krylov fable, indicating a tendency to pull in different directions]. Being to all intents and purposes counterbalances restraining one another, the branches of power in question are intended to set themselves not destructive, but creative tasks.

Naturally, in order to ensure backup for his own activity, the president is not only entitled but obliged to form the requisite consultative and analytical organs. However, you get the impression that the elaborators deliberately overdid it. Duplicate structures have appeared (this can be confirmed from the diagram published alongside the edict). The functions and powers of the Security Council, the revived Presidential Council, and the Analytical Center for General Policy clearly overlap; as do those of the president's State-Legal Administration and the newly formed Administration for Working with Russian Federation Territories and Presidential Representatives and Relations with the Supreme Soviet, and so on.

So in general, if we look at the clause about the lattermentioned administration, interrelations between the president and the Supreme Soviet and its organs have taken a back seat to actual political processes.

The Monitoring and Observation Council under the leader of the President's Administration looks like an illogical appendage, and the functions of the Monitoring Administration are not defined.

It is worth paying some attention to the fact that president's administration is, on the basis of the new status, turning into a powerful apparatus monster whose leader essentially becomes number two in the state.

This is proved in particular by the inclusion in the overall structure of the president's administration of the vice president's apparatus, the leader of the Council of Ministers apparatus, and presidential representatives in the regions, the creation of a number of common services, and the investment of the administration leader with additional personnel and administrative functions. It seems that this option will curb the growth of the government's autonomy and responsibility.

Finally, let's take a look at the apparatus being set up from the taxpayer's point of view.

When examining the federal budget, the Supreme Soviet should nitpickingly evaluate all innovations in the president's administration captiously, and agree only to the most rational expenditure.

Claim of Yakovlev CIA Link Viewed

PM0803124593 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 6 Mar 93 p 3

[Article by Aleksandr Vasilyev: "Was A. Yakovlev a CIA Agent?"]

[Text] We must investigate calmly, "without anger or bias," the article by former USSR KGB chairman V. Kryuchkov entitled "Ambassador of Misfortune" printed in SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA. Leaving aside

political sympathies and antipathies, let us assume that A.N. Yakovlev may have been a CIA agent and may not have been and also that V.A. Kryuchkov may have been writing the truth and may have been lying.

Let us turn to the primary source, that is to the publication in SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA. To judge by this item, Yakovlev did not like the KGB. Back in the years of stagnation, when he was USSR ambassador in Canada, he had an audience with Kryuchkov and reviled the chekists in the strongest terms: All they were doing was shadowing him, bugging him, or to put it more briefly, "wallowing in dirty linen."

Kryuchkov writes on this subject: "If our staffers had actually engaged in what Mr Yakovlev imputes to them, I think we would have found out far earlier some 'details' which this 'architect' of perestroyka is still carefully trying to keep secret..."

The question arises: Why actually did the KGB agents in Ottawa not engage in "what Mr Yakovlev imputes to them?" What were the workers of the so-called "KR line"—foreign counterintelligence—doing there and whose duty was it to prevent the recruitment of Soviet diplomats by the local special services? In 1960 they worked far more efficiently. After all, if we are to believe V. Kryuchkov, it was then, when the future "ambassador of misfortune" was studying at Colombia University, that the Chekists received information that Yakovlev had embarked on the path of treason: "He entered into unsanctioned contact with Americans and when we found out about it portrayed the matter as though he had done this in an attempt to obtain the items the Soviet side needed from a closed library."

That "Kryuchkov's people" did not wallow in dirty linen is negligence on Kryuchkov's part. Any Soviet embassy was of interest to foreign special services since it kept secret diplomatic correspondence and the codes used for communication with Moscow. Any diplomat is a state employee, a bearer of secrets, and could therefore become the target of a recruiting operation.

It looks as though Kryuchkov's men in Ottawa were in that sense far more tolerant than their U.S. counterparts in Moscow. Even in the second half of the eighties, when the U.S. ambassador to the USSR was a friend of the Soviet democrats, Jack Matlock, very tough rules operated at his embassy: U.S. diplomats should not meet with Soviets one on one—only in the presence of another American, and they were obliged to report to their bosses all contacts with the "natives." There was one more injunction, which embassy staffers jokingly called "sleep with NATO": They were forbidden to enter into intimate relations with USSR citizens—only with male and female guests of the capital from Western powers. Yet outside there was already perestroyka and the new thinking was spreading inexorably across the planet.

So that there was no point in Yakovlev insulting the Chekists. Actually, the scene described by Kryuchkov makes us doubt that the architect of perestroyka was an enemy agent. Would he have staged a scandal before the chief spy of the Land of the Soviets, thus giving rise to unnecessary suspicion? On the contrary, he would have wormed his way into his confidence, cunningly disguising himself as an ideological fighter against imperialism: You must be tirelessly vigilant, Vladimir Aleksandrovich, he would have said, and discipline should be increased among the agents.

But let us return to the document we are studying. In 1989, the former USSR KGB chairman writes, the flow of material compromising Aleksandr Nikolayevich was resumed. "In 1990 the KGB, through intelligence and counterintelligence channels, received from several different sources (assessed as reliable) extremely perturbing information about A.N. Yakovlev," V. Kryuchkov writes. "The purport of the reports came down to the fact that in the assessment of the Western special services Yakovlev held positions advantageous to the West, was reliably countering the 'conservative' forces in the Soviet Union, and that he could be firmly counted on in any situation."

Here several elements simultaneously arouse serious doubts. Let us begin with the fact that without special permission the KGB did not have the right to do work involving CPSU functionaries, beginning at rayon committee first secretary level. Thus the Soviet special services were placed under the control of the party which, by comparison with Stalin's times, when no one at all controlled the Chekists, was a progressive step. Yakovlev was a member of the Politburo and a secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. In collecting material on him Kryuchkov was violating all norms of "socialist communal living" and putting his head at risk.

Substantial proof of treason could only have been provided by a document from a CIA file, for instance a paper signed by Yakovlev containing top secret information or a receipt for a fee received. But, I have found out from extremely reliable sources, by the late eighties the KGB had no agents capable of acquiring such information. Intelligence was paralyzed. A series of betrayals by Soviet agents and the decline of the Soviet Union's prestige in the eyes of its former friends had had an effect.

And even such a document could not have been grounds for charging A.N. Yakovlev with betraying the motherland. I recall that Stalin was handed some "documents" by German intelligence as a result of which Tukhachevskiy and other military leaders were repressed. The insufficient proof has been recognized by V. Kryuchkov himself. Reporting the materials to Gorbachev, he added that they were in need of further checking. The former KGB chairman recalls: "Here I said that the channels and means of carrying out the necessary checks were in this case very effective and all the work could be done within a tight schedule." That's enough, Vladimir Aleksandrovich, what "effective means" and "tight schedule?" It was in 1990!

Gorbachev advised Kryuchkov himself to talk with Yakovlev, which was done. "I realized that Yakovlev simply did not know what to say in reply. To all appearances this conversation was a complete surprise to

him." Again information in Aleksandr Nikolayevich's defense. Had he been an agent, the conversation would have been no surprise to him: He would have prepared for it daily.

It would seem that Vladimir Aleksandrovich has been refuted, debunked, and disgraced. But it is not all that simple. The former KGB chairman categorizes Aleksandr Nikolayevich as an agent of influence—a charge which cannot be proved but cannot be refuted either. Speaking at a closed session of the USSR Supreme Soviet in June 1991, V. Kryuchkov defined agents of influence as people "capable in the long term by virtue of their personal and professional qualities of holding administrative posts in the management apparatus and performing tasks formulated by the enemy."

For many years the tasks of the Soviet Union's opponents included establishing a multiparty system and private ownership in our country. A.N. Yakovlev, who had managed "to hold an administrative post in the management apparatus," advocated precisely this. All the CIA's agents of influence had to operate in this channel but not all those who struggled for a multiparty system and private ownership were CIA agents.

It is entirely possible that A.N. Yakovlev met regularly with some U.S. agents but he could not fail to know that a particular America was an agent. It is entirely possible that the CIA had a file on Yakovlev and that he was given a codename but once again that could happen without his knowledge. A CIA staffer who met with the architect of perestroyka could have reported on the work done using quotations from Aleksandr Nikolayevich's speeches which were the fruit of yakovlev's own independent thought. An agent of influence is not subject to jurisdiction since people inevitably influence each other in the process of communication. Each of us is someone's agent of influence.

In brief, V.A. Kryuchkov has leveled against A.N. Yakovlev charges which can neither be proved nor refuted. As for the story involving M.S. Gorbachev, here we have one of two things: Either Vladimir Aleksandrovich was telling a big lie or at the time, in 1990, he was going for broke without a single trump card.

Yeltsin 'Threat' to Deputies' Power Deplored

PM0803170393 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 5 Mar 93 First Edition p 3

[Observer Aleksey Vorovyev commentary: "The Constitution Is Above the President"]

[Text] The president's influence is waning rapidly and inexorably. This can be easily verified: You only have to go out onto the street and ask a random sample of 10, 100, or 1,000 passersby...

Against this background, his supporters' steps look even more clumsy. At the end of last week, for instance, a draft constitutional agreement was distributed in parliament. Its wording left no room for doubt: The president intends not to negotiate, but to demand unilateral concessions from the legislators. This in principle immediately ruled out dialogue. To maintain the initiative (and the appearance of a strong politician), in such a situation he should have either drastically rewritten the draft, or disowned it. The stubborn second proposal of that text, obviously in order to demonstrate the steadfastness of the head of the executive, revealed an inability to react quickly and flexibly to a change in the situation. And it turned out that disdain for the document struck a far stronger blow to the image of the political leader than the imprecations of mass rallies.

And why was it necessary for the president to address the "Civic Union" forum to level accusations at parliament and the system of soviets, while simultaneously offering constructive dialogue to the centrist bloc? Was he really relying on the short memory of those assembled in the House of Soviets? After all, similar proposals had already been voiced on the eve of the Seventh Congress, and "Civic Union" had adopted them then, extending the hand of friendship to its political opponent. Immediately after the Congress, however, the president withdrew his hand, explaining at a meeting with his democratic brothers-in-arms that he had merely used a crafty tactical approach.

But maybe this time the president was genuinely seeking cooperation with "Civic Union." Why, then, the categorical tone and tough turn of phrase in the speech? Alas, the speech did not make much of an impression, and the president again lost several valuable points.

An extremely disadvantageous backdrop to this obviously misguided presidential tactic was created by the fierce propaganda campaign launched on television by his loyal comrades. The accusations which rained down on opponents from the television screen were too far-fetched, banal, and ill-reasoned. A scandal followed at the "Ostankino" television center. By undertaking to dig this muddy patch, the loyal warriors of the presidential team succeeded in the first instance in spattering their already far from spotlessly white clothes. And again, it was the president who ended up the loser.

Logically enough, under the impact of these obvious presidential failures, representatives of the "Russian Unity" opposition bloc distributed their own draft law on amendments and additions to the Russian Constitution for discussion in parliament.

The authors propose in essence to relieve the president of the position as head of the executive and supreme commander in chief, and to refrain from burdening him with leading the Security Council, signing interethnic treaties, or guaranteeing social security. It is even proposed that the president be decorated or have titles bestowed on him only on the initiative of the Council of Ministers or parliament.

Of course, this is a political challenge. But it has to be admitted that such challenges are only thrown down to floundering politicians. It is quite clear that sober-minded people will be acting irresponsibly if, in the heat of political battle, while trying to overthrow an individual personality and his team, they discard the actual institution of the presidency. In the atmosphere of political and economic chaos, this would be very dangerous. Haste, opportunist interests, aspirations for political skirmishing should not seriously undermine state order, or radically alter the country's Fundamental Law.

Or are we going to start rewriting the Constitution every time it fails to please the state leaders?

However, the actual fact of disseminating a radical draft law should wake the president up. In his rejection of the Congress, the Supreme Soviet, and of representative authority in general, he is crossing a dangerous line. Beyond it lies an uncompromising clash, in which, having lost the support of virtually all strata of society and the political movements, the president is doomed to solitude and defeat.

P.S. It would seem, after a short vacation in Moscow Region, that the president is following a scenario elaborated there. He made another statement at a meeting with representatives of the "Democratic Election" movement. The president said: "...I did not swear by a Constitution which incorporates the corrections of the sixth and seventh congresses." Several questions arise here. First: Is it the case, then, that the amendments were made in violation of the Fundamental Law and the appropriate procedure? If so, the president could contest them in the Constitutional Court. Second: If the president is prepared to serve merely that Constitution by which he swore, what is the situation regarding the manifold amendments introduced to the existing Constitution purely on his own initiative and insistence? Does he now reject them? Or does the president only recognize what he wants to in the Constitution?

And something new was voiced this time: "...There is also a final version which I do not want to talk about. I do not think things will go this far, and I would not like to see things go this far—the Constitution has to be respected. But if the conservatives embark upon extreme measures in order to destroy Russia, then for the sake of its salvation, and for the sake of the salvation of democracy and reform, another way has to be found." One of the "Democratic Russia" leaders, Lev Ponomarev, evaluated his words as a warning about the possible introduction of emergency powers. That is, dictatorship is acceptable as a means of saving democracy.

Of course, this could be described as an empty threat, blackmail, or a demonstration of impotence, but you know such things are not said either by Lev Ponomarev or even Mikhail Poltoranin, who can be forgiven, so to speak, for his shallow, provocative statements. The threat comes from the lips of the president! The threat is to all representative power. Obviously, our president will not rest until not a single political figure apart from himself remains on the political skyline.

Liberals' Desertion of Yeltsin Analyzed

PM0803193793 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 6 Mar 93 p 3

["Review-cum-Prognosis" by political scientist Boris Pugachev: "Why the Liberals Are Leaving Yeltsin"]

[Text] Recently a number of liberal-minded politicians—G. Arbatov, O. Bogomolov, G. Burbulis, G. Starovoytova, V. Tishkov, F. Shelov-Kovedyayev, Ye. Yakovlev, and others—have left Boris Yeltsin's entourage for various reasons. What is the reason for their departure? Undoubtedly there was a reason for the resignation in each specific case. At the same time, in our view, there is a general regularity in the change in the president's entourage. The fate of Gennadiy Burbulis, a political figure once so close to Boris Yeltsin, may be the most indicative.

Until recently Gennadiy Burbulis was the target of great pressure from various political forces which saw him as the chief culprit of all Russia's present woes. Today it is possible to discuss more calmly the problem of "genius and evil" in the form of this now disgraced politician who until quite recently was so influential.

Just who is Burbulis and what are the forces which rapidly elevated this provincial social scientist to Moscow's vain Olympus?

His birthplace itself—Sverdlovsk Oblast—is symbolic. "Middle Russia"—a region of industrial giants and barrack-like desolation. This was where Boris Yeltsin, the present political "autocrat," was born and raised. At the time of Gennadiy's birth—August 1945—the 14-year old Boris had already completed his audacious marches across the taiga of the Urals.

The locality of their birth predetermined a number of character traits of both political personages, traits connected with the harsh social competition which you could only hope to win by relying on yourself alone. This explains the inner stubbornness and desire to "make something of themselves" which are characteristic of both Yeltsin and Burbulis. To a considerable extent this also brought them closer together in the "Moscow" intellectual hothouse which developed with the naivety of a neophyte into Gorbachev's perestroyka.

In the Moscow environment Burbulis could not but feel an outsider. He graduated from the Urals University late in life, at the age of 29, and before 1989 was connected with "social science"—the elite new religion of Marxism. It was the study of "Marxism" that subsequently made an indelible imprint on his entire "political complexion": lack of clarity, glibness, and cautiousness in all public utterances are testimony to an emasculated Marxist scholasticism.

But the study of "Marxism" produced Burbulis' distinctive reverence for Moscow intellectuals, something which Yeltsin does not have and has never had.

Herein lie the roots of Burbulis' "anticommunism," like that of all the "unfrocked priests" of communism—from Popov to Sobchak. Isolated in an ideological paradigm of communism, they inwardly rebelled against it. However, this rebellion was and remains a spiritual emanation of the "Oedipus complex." In rebelling against the "father"—communism—they tried and managed to take his place alongside the "mother"—power. The desire for power, as the assertion of their own identity, was the most important covert motive of all the neodemocrats to whom Burbulis resolutely attached himself in 1989 with all his characteristic energy and purposefulness.

It was this energy and purposefulness and the ability to "materialize" the goals of the political struggle which attracted the attention of the "godfather" of the communist rebels, Boris Yeltsin. The combination of "communist rebelliousness" with good political ambition cemented the so-called Interregional Deputies' Group, where Burbulis completed the 25-member coordinating council.

On entering "big league" politics, Burbulis devoted himself wholly to the struggle. Discipline, the ability to make people work for the set goals, and most important the ability to achieve the solution of such a goal at any price are qualities which were highly rated by Yeltsin. It was Burbulis who became the "mechanism" of Yeltsin's victories—from his election as Russian people's deputy to his ascent of the presidential throne.

Undoubtedly Burbulis also contained an element of the Catholic "knight": his desire to stay in the shadows and keep out of the limelight. This is not so much political cunning as an aspect of his character. It was when he emerged into the limelight in Yeltsin's government that his "grassroots" influence was cut from underneath him. Burbulis was not created for leading roles. Unlike Sobchak and Popov, for example, who naturally play the main political roles, Burbulis felt uncomfortable as a "favorite," he was out of place, as it were. That was clear to see.

Gennadiy Burbulis was doomed to defeat in the struggle against other groups of "courtiers." During the years of "democracy" everything came full circle. Yeltsin is now surrounded by the same communist nomenklatura slightly diluted with a neodemocratic nomenklatura. Burbulis has not been through the school of apparatus intrigues and was doomed to failure because of this alone.

But there are deeper reasons for G. Burbulis' departure from the president. Burbulis was lifted to the pinnacle of power by a powerful anticommunist liberal wave. His departure, like that of other "liberals," marks the crisis of liberalism. Yeltsin did not and could not have his own state philosophy. A product of the communist system, Yeltsin is the naked will of power in action. Such he was among the Moscow party secretaries, such he remains to this day. Yeltsin's character has always been dominated by a "childish" mischievousness, the rebellious stubbornness of the odious "ego." This stubbornness in opposition to the conformist Gorbachev leadership was what made him the leader of the "democratic camp." But because of his social origin and the party medium from which he emerged Yeltsin could not independently formulate political "superideas." That was why he sided with the Moscow democrats and that was precisely why Burbulis assumed the role of the "generator" of ideas.

Yeltsin is confident and determined when he has already made a decision. But he is timid and politically "weak willed" in situations which are unclear to him and are not clear-cut in terms of political action. Here, too, Burbulis was irreplaceable—the materialization of the policy of the "democratic" course was his element. Yeltsin's energy and will, directed toward achieving correctly perceived aims, are invincible. But when directed toward the attainment of false goals, they are ruinous. Many of the president's glaring mistakes today are due to a misunderstanding of the complexity of the "moment." The liberal course, embodied in the Yeltsin-Burbulis policy, was lethal to communism and ultimately destroyed it.

The philosophy of liberalism, being disastrous for communism, is today proving ruinous to Russia itself. Hence the fluctuations in Yeltsin's policy. It was this factor in the president's "subconscious" which led to Burbulis' resignation. A different political course is needed, but Burbulis is not needed for that. This is an "objective" fact of Russia's historical "drama." Liberalism does not have deep roots in present-day Russia. As the antithesis to communism it has done its job. Attempts to achieve the "positive" embodiment of liberalism lead to its self-denial because the system of "working" liberalism presupposes a real market economy, a real civil society, and a real democratic state.

Those things do not exist today because they take centuries to create.

The consequence: The fiercest crisis of democracy and its "degeneration." The creation of the Russian market is resulting in the criminalization of the economy. The privatization of ownership is resulting in its total plundering. "Democratic" power is degenerating before our eyes into a struggle for domination of the neo-elite ruling political groups.

The basic civic rights and freedoms are under threat because the metamorphoses of liberalism are leading to anarchy linked with disrespect for the law, an orgy of crime, and the powerlessness of the law enforcement organs in the face of it.

As a result, instead of the ascending process of the creation of a civil society, what we have is a distinctive descending process of "barbarization" in the form of spasmodic backward movement. The leaders of the liberal and democratic intelligentsia have still not realized the full depth of the Russian drama: There is no

straight road to liberal democracy in Russia. That is perceived intuitively by Yeltsin; and he is becoming nervous and "dreaming" of finding new guidelines for his policy. That was why Burbulis as the personified embodiment of the policy of liberalism had to go and indeed did go. That was why other liberals have left Yeltsin and will continue to do so. Today Boris Nikolayevich is politically isolated. He is looking for a new course, a new political navigator. Who will it be?

Text of Edict Abolishing Post of Main State Inspector

PM0903094993 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 6 Mar 93 p 2

[Edict No. 330 of President of Russian Federation dated 4 March 1993]

[Text] On the abolition of the post of Main State Inspector of the Russian Federation—chief of the Control Administration [upravleniye] of the President of the Russian Federation's Administration, and the release of Yu.Yu. Boldyrev from that post in connection with its abolition.

In connection with the confirmation of the new structure of the President of the Russian Federation's Administration and in the light of the Russian Federation President's Edict No. 186 dated 5 February 1993, **I resolve:**

1. To abolish the post of Main State Inspector of the Russian Federation—chief of the Control Administration of the President of the Russian Federation's Administration.

2. To release Yuriy Yuriyevich Boldyrev from the post of Main State Inspector of the Russian Federation—chief of the Control Administration of the President of the Russian Federation's Administration in connection with the abolition of that post in accordance with Point 1, Article 33 of the Russian Federation Labor Law Code.

3. To regard the following as having lapsed: RSFSR President's Edict No. 127 dated 24 September 1991, RSFSR President's Directive No. 54-rp dated 14 October 1991, Russian Federation President's Directive No. 40-rp dated 29 January 1992, Directive No. 54-rp dated 17 February 1992, and Directive No. 125-rp dated 25 March 1992.

4. Within two weeks, S.A. Filatov, leader of the Russian Federation President's Administration, shall ratify the Statute on the Control Administration of the Russian Federation President's Administration and its structure and shall resolve questions of organizational and personnel support for the work of the Administration [Upravleniye].

5. This Edict shall go into force from the moment of its signing.

[Signed] President of the Russian Federation B. Yeltsin
[Dated] Moscow, the Kremlin
4 March 1993

Edict no. 330

Military Issues

Western Group Commander on Withdrawal Problems

LD0803141593

[Editorial Report] Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian at 1543 GMT on 7 March carries a nine-minute interview with Colonel General Matvey Prokofyevich Burlakov, commander in chief of the Western Group of Forces, by an unidentified correspondent; the place and date of the interview are not given.

The interview starts with the general's views on what makes a real man. Asked if one can be a real man if one has nowhere to live, Col. Gen. Burlakov first talks about his personal experience and then turns to the Western Group of Forces. He says: "Before the reunification of Germany in October 1990, the Group numbered 546,000, including 340,000 servicemen, some 200,000 family members, and blue- and white-collar workers. There were 92,000 kids, of whom 51,000 were schoolchildren. The Group consisted of six armies, with 111,000 items of equipment and arms. The Group had accumulated material resources worth 2.5 million [word indistinct]. Initial plans involved withdrawal to Ukraine, Belarus, and the Baltic states. But later, after the break up of the Union and the transfer of the Group to Russian jurisdiction, the Group changed those plans so that the main units had to withdraw to Russian territory. I made these alterations along the following lines: 30 or 25 percent every year from 1991 till 1993, and about 15 percent in 1994. We are concerned about the fact that in two years we have withdrawn 31,500 families of officers and warrant officers to Russian territory without housing for them. You know that troops from the near abroad [states that used to be part of the USSR] as well as those from the far abroad are being pulled back to Russian territory. Therefore, the resettlement of our Group is, I believe, a heavy burden for the Russian state at present. So we count more on a program involving 7.8 billion German marks allocated by the German side for resettlement. Of those officers who were withdrawn to Ukraine, 48 percent received housing by 1992, whereas in Belarus they have built housing for 134 percent—for future withdrawals, you know how it was planned."

Noting that once again it is Russian officers who are at a disadvantage, Col. Gen. Burlakov continues: "In Bonn on 27 January, a session of the joint Russian-German commission was held. I am its cochairman from the Russian side. I put this issue before the Germans: to allocate as much money as possible in 1993, in order to build at least 20,000 to 22,000 apartments this year. More precisely, the construction of all 18 settlements [gorodok] that are to be built on Russian territory should begin this year, to be commissioned by the end of this year or the first half of next year. In a joint statement by President Yeltsin and Chancellor Kohl, the Group has

been set a task of speeding up the withdrawal by four months. But at present the rate of the Russian troop withdrawal is nine times higher than the rate of resettlement. This is an abnormality, and we have to fight against it. Well, the German side said it was ready to fund the 1993 program. Now much depends on the Russian side."

The general spells out what steps he expects Russia's leadership to take, adding: "Using officers' private savings as well as the special monies not passing through the budget of the Group, we bought 1,280 apartments last year. In all, we plan to buy about 10,000 flats. We have 10,000 officers with 20 or more years of service behind them. They are entitled to pensions, and can be retired when the cuts in the Armed Forces take place." These people are our prime concern, the general says. Permission has been received to purchase apartments, with officers themselves paying 25 percent. Burlakov goes on to say that he has met with good understanding from the leadership of Stavropol Kray, Leningrad Oblast, St. Petersburg, Moscow Oblast, Nizhniy Novgorod, and Voronezh Oblast. But in Ulyuanovsk Oblast, the leadership refused to sell apartments.

Turning to allegations of financial malpractice, Burlakov says: "We are often criticized for selling out everything, allegedly to fill our pockets. But we do not actually sell anything ourselves. No officer in the Group is involved in sales." He goes on to say that servicemen are doing preparatory work, sorting out scrap metal, etc, while contracts are signed by the commission. Burlakov adds: "We do have a Trade Directorate, it is called the Directorate of the Western Group of Forces, but it is not accountable to us in financial and commercial matters. Unknown to us, they have been involved in transactions at the instruction of the Main Trade Directorate in Moscow, and there has been some malpractice. But I repeat that we do not sell anything. Are there breaches of the rules? Yes, indeed. But this sort of thing happens in every state." Burlakov concludes by saying that the Group has always exposed all offenders itself, and that no outside commission has ever discovered any cover up.

Views on Reforming Military Doctrine Eyed

PM0803140393 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 4 Mar 93 p 2

["Opinion" article by Army General Makhmut Gareyev, doctor of military sciences and professor: "Why Russia Needs a Military Doctrine"—first three paragraphs are introduction]

[Text] The debate on the nature and direction of Russia's military doctrine has been increasingly lively lately. The discussion that has developed has revealed a number of new approaches and interestingly argued opinions that are broadening our understanding of problems relating to military doctrine. But there have also been ultraradical suggestions.

In particular, the following fundamental question has been raised: Do we need a military doctrine at all? It is clear that we cannot have the same kind of military doctrine today as we had during the time of M.V. Frunze or the Soviet Union. We need to carry out a thorough critical review of many things.

ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI asked Army General Makhmut Gareyev, doctor of military sciences and professor, to give his opinion on this matter.

Not so long ago an article was published in NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA by Professor D. Proektor, whom I respect a great deal, entitled "Do We Need a Military Doctrine?" On the basis of an extremely broad interpretation of the history of formulating military doctrine, the author tries to prove that all past attempts to establish the basic principles of such a doctrine have not been particularly useful and therefore, he says, we should not bother formulating basic principles in a single document at the present time.

D. Proektor also believes that the traditional division of military doctrine into two parts is inexpedient and thinks its political aspect should be excluded. Instead of this, he proposes "arriving at the badly needed unity of views by proceeding from three interlinked elements. First—military policy... which indicates the main principles of military-political tasks, military organizational development and strategy, the budget, etc. Second—defense organizational development, which embraces the vast spheres of the activity of the military-industrial complex, the formation of the Armed Forces, ensuring combat effectiveness, education, reforms, and conversion. And third—military strategy, the extensive spheres of strategic and operational planning, leadership, and administration of the Armed Forces in peace and war."

It is hard to agree with this, mainly because these opinions are based on the author's extremely schematic approach to the issues under examination.

Various views on questions of organizing the country's defense and the organizational development, training, and combat use of the Armed Forces can and should exist within the scientific basic principles of military policy and in military science. But in resolving specific issues it is impossible to proceed from different views simultaneously. What would happen if every commandant or commander were to determine entirely off his own bat what weapons he should arm his troops with, what operational methods he should use in training them, whether he should stick to universal military service obligation or man his forces solely on a contract basis, whether or not he should recognize the principle of one-man command, and so on?

Without a definite officially adopted system of views on all these and other problems it is impossible to build the practical activity of state organs and military cadres in a purposeful and coordinated way. It is customary to call this entire system of mandatory, basic views on military-political and military-technical issues the military doctrine.

The NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA author bases his doubts about the need to formulate a Russian military doctrine on the fact that "today everything is in flux in our country, Russian statehood has not yet fully emerged, our borders are unclear, the constitution is changing, our Army is only just being established, military reform has only just been started, the economy is unstable and in crisis, a global regrouping of world power centers is under way, and there are disputes about the main priorities of foreign policy." All this is so, but on the other hand it is impossible to wait until all these things have been completely sorted out because the Armed Forces cannot function without knowing their purpose and they will be unable to continue their existence without reforms that take into account the new character of their defense tasks.

The existence of doctrinal aims in the most important defense issues, while ensuring unity and providing definite guidelines for practical activity, cannot fetter initiative and creativity in this sphere provided, of course, a sensible and not just formal approach is displayed toward implementing the basic provisions of the military doctrine.

The rational aspect of D. Proektor's opinions is that all new documents relating to the formulation of a military doctrine should be more flexible than before and should not overregulate the basic provisions. But we cannot do without some framework, of course.

The need for the first element—a military policy—is generally acknowledged. The second element includes the issues of defense organizational development, the basic thrust of which is determined by military policy. But questions of the "formation of the Armed Forces," which it is customary to call "Armed Forces military organizational development," and of "ensuring combat effectiveness, education, and reforms" are artificially divorced from the third element, which is usually categorized as the prerogative of the Ministry of Defense and the Armed Forces. So if we sort out all the issues, we again end up with the two elements or two parts of the military doctrine to which the author tries to object. On the one hand he bemoans the "fragmentation" and cumbersome structure of a military doctrine divided into two parts, while on the other he essentially proposes dividing these very issues into three elements. Moreover, tactics, military training (operational and combat training), and Armed Forces military organizational development are all excluded from the author's list of issues which comprise the contents of the three elements he describes...

I cannot agree with D. Proektor's repudiation of military doctrine's "political side," the existence of which, in his opinion, "was justified by an overpoliticized defense consciousness" which is now "losing its topicality." At the same time he takes no account of the fact that the military doctrine relates not only to the Armed Forces but also to the state as a whole, and therefore the author's concern that the splitting in two of the military doctrine has led to its fragmentation, "as it were transferring some of the state's political functions to the Army," is unfounded.

Moreover, in present conditions the thrust of the military doctrine is determined not by overmilitarization but by the renewed military policy of the Russian state, and its basic provisions cannot fail to be reflected in the military doctrine, just as the most important aspects of state policy as a whole are reflected in the economy, culture, the financial system, and other areas of activity. The Army can and must be outside politics, but this does not mean it will stop being a political instrument.

Despite all the different approaches, if we take the essence of the matter, issues relating to military doctrine in most states are reflected in four groups (codes) of documents.

The first is a military-political declaration by the leadership of a country or a coalition of states on its attitude to war and basic approaches to defense issues (for example the 1987 Warsaw Pact military doctrine, or "A New Security Structure" and "NATO's New Strategic Concept," which were adopted at the Rome NATO session in November 1991).

The second is legislative documents (in Russia's case this means the laws on security, defense, military service obligation and military service, and so forth).

The third is combat regulations and manuals defining the activity of the Armed Forces in a combat situation.

The fourth is general military regulations and certain other documents regulating military service in peacetime.

Documents of this sort exist in one form or another in all states and set out not theoretical views, but officially adopted, doctrinal propositions on issues relating to the country's defense and the military organizational development, training, and combat use of the Armed Forces.

Professor Proektor advises that we should not be hasty in drawing up yet another new doctrine. But when certain politicians who until quite recently believed that all the world's problems could be resolved by purely political means cannot do without the use of military force, when every day you hear of force being used in Iraq, Somalia, Cambodia, Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Georgia, Yugoslavia, the Caucasus, the Dniester region, and other regions, you cannot help thinking that we are still a long way from the good intentions of resolving all contradictions by exclusively peaceful means. It is impossible to formulate sure guidelines for issues of war and peace if you lose touch with reality.

On the whole, despite certain quibbles on my part, Professor Proektor's article seems to be fairly important, primarily from the point of view of stimulating critical interpretations of past experience and modern approaches toward formulating a Russian military doctrine. An article by Yu. Gaydukov (in the journal MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN) also seems extremely thorough; this article contains a number of

interesting opinions on issues relating to military doctrine, particularly in the part dealing with its historical aspects. But I cannot agree with him that military strategy does not fall within the framework of the art of warfare because it should allegedly comprise not just military-strategic issues but also formulate the state's military-political aims and the means of achieving them and tackle issues of state security as a whole (political, economic, information, and other aspects of security, apparently).

But this is essentially a return to Stalin's 1947 concept of military science, which embraced political and economic factors together with the art of warfare, or so it was said at the time. Today, as then, it has not been taken into account that, besides military strategy, there are also political and economic strategies dealing with their own problems. Only by thinking in purely militarized terms or by clearly failing to understand the essence of the matter is it nowadays possible to entertain the thought that the theory of military strategy should subsume the political and economic sciences and determine the direction of the entire system of national security.

Military strategy should without fail take account of political, economic, and other factors, but this does not mean that they can be included in the subject matter of the theory of military strategy and military science as a whole. If we take the entire system of national security, military strategy is designed to deal with just one element in it, namely the problems of military security.

Nor does the author take account of the fact that the military doctrine as a system of officially adopted views includes not only strategic but also tactical, military-technical, and other issues. The author's opinions on the coordination of strategic military theory and the military doctrine seem strange. The theory of strategy and military theory as a whole form the scientific basis of the military doctrine, from which the latter selects the most important provisions appropriate at any given time to the state's military-political aims and potential.

It would seem obvious that the matter of forming a new Russian military doctrine is such a serious and crucial task that an exceptionally well thought-out and competent approach to it is required. Strange as it may seem, along with these analytical articles I have examined which are worth discussing, there are also plenty of clearly lightweight articles on this very issue.

An article has been published by Major V. Tkachev, again in NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, which makes the following "sensational" statements: "Today's combat readiness is tomorrow's military disaster." He goes on to say that "if nobody is threatening us on our borders, there is no point in covering them with troops during peacetime," and this includes air defense systems as well. He therefore proposes assembling the entire Army in the heartland of the country at special training centers.

I shall not even bother to speak of the naivety of these opinions from the point of view of operational-strategic considerations. But even if it is possible to agree with such utterly radical proposals, surely it is not hard to understand that implementing them would mean that the entire Russian Army, including its officers, warrant officers, and their families would have to be withdrawn from existing military camps and housed all over again in new locations and training centers, thus turning them into one vast refugee camp together with all the troops withdrawn from the Western Group of Forces, the Northwestern Group of Forces, Transcaucasia, and other regions.

Or else people make appeals, for example, for our immediate unilateral abandonment of all our nuclear weapons, although it is clear that in the prevailing world conditions (until universal nuclear disarmament is achieved), nuclear weapons remain the most reliable and cheapest way of deterring aggression. But, of course, you cannot achieve this with just a few dozen nuclear munitions. And nuclear weapons are still the "final argument" not just of savages. The United States, France, Britain, and China are not hurrying to ditch this "argument" altogether. Nuclear weapons are already a terrible threat to mankind, and in the vitally necessary struggle for the complete elimination of these weapons realistic assessments will be of more use than cheap speculations on this extremely complex problem.

Space & Other Issues

Space Industry's Shift in Focus Viewed

OW0903082093 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1523 GMT 8 Mar 93

[From the "Space" section of the INTERFAX "Business Report"—item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Russian space technology engineering companies have suffered a sharp reduction in government financing, and are shifting their focus to developing commercial satellite launching systems.

Most of these systems are designed to launch and maintain small satellite systems which are highly attractive to users.

Systems using small satellites, weighing up to 1,000 kilograms and circling the earth in low orbits of up to 1,000 kilometers, are cheaper than ordinary stationary orbit systems.

The small space systems are more viable (6-10 years, as opposed to the 2-5 year service life of traditional systems) and use more simplified and mobile surface monitor equipment.

The need for compact space systems arose in part as stationary orbit systems (at altitudes of roughly 36,000 km) have become overloaded. The high-orbit systems cannot provide reliable communications at high latitudes.

Once satellites in stationary orbit have exhausted their service life, they are difficult to recover and often remain in orbit "polluting" space, while small satellites either self-destruct or can easily be destroyed from earth.

SMALL SATELLITE SYSTEMS ALREADY OPERATIVE

Several projects using small satellites have already been developed in Russia and are partially operative.

The largest of these, the $4.5 billion Iridium project, envisages the organization by 1998 of a telephone, telex, and computer network using 66 small satellites weighing 700 kg, able to operate for 6-7 years.

The American Motorola has formed an international consortium to implement Iridium, comprising the Russian aerospace Khrynichev Plant (Moscow), and the American McDonnell Douglas and Lockheed.

The $45 million Russian Gonets project will create an electronic mail service for a broad network of users and will be based on 36 small satellites (2 are already functional) orbiting the earth at 1,400 km. The systems are being produced at the Prikladnaya Mekhanika scientific and manufacturing association (Krasnoyarsk-26, Russia's largest satellite systems developer, located in Siberia).

Another Russian project - Signal - will create a telephone, telex, and fax system for enterprises and individuals based on 48 small satellites in circular orbit.

The project is expected to cost over $70 million and was developed by the Russian scientific and manufacturing association Energia (Moscow), a satellite systems specialist.

SMALL SATELLITES NEED NEW LAUNCH SYSTEMS

Although small satellites are already used for commercial purposes, the problem of creating effective launch systems which are cheaper than missile carriers currently used, remains.

General information on heavy rocket carriers

Name	Country	1	2	3	4
Torad-Delta	USA	190	2.45	65-80	14-18
Titan-4	USA	862	9.6	180	9-12
Atlas-Centuar	USA	150	3.27	75-95	12-13
Arian-4	France	460	4.9	85-110	10-11
Proton	Russia	700	10.9	70-90	10-11
Zenith	Russia	460	7.6	60-70	10-11

1. starting mass (tons), 2. payload (tons) launched into orbit at 1000 km, 3. cost ($million), 4. proportional cost of launching payload ($thous per kilogram).

The proportional cost for light rockets is even higher (for example, $40-45,000 per kilogram for the American Scout).

Launch costs could be trimmed by using rocket launching airplanes (the American Pegasus rocket launcher which piggy-backs on the B-52 jet, costs $15-20,000 per kilogram).

Nevertheless Scout and Pegasus able to put 160 kg into orbit at 1000 km, no longer meet commercial demands, increasing in both volume (5-7% a year) and weight (the Iridium system's main satellite weighs 700 kg).

RUSSIA TO DEVELOP EFFICIENT LAUNCH SYSTEMS

Independent experts said Russia's Burlak complex currently being developed has good perspectives for creating an economical, environmentally clean, and functional aerospace system to put small satellites into orbit.

The main designer of the complex, the Raduga machine-building design bureau (Dubilliona, Moscow area), which engineers and produces space launching systems, said it will take 3 years and $70 million to develop the complex.

The Burlak project will use rockets mounted on an airplane to put small satellites into space. The system includes two supersonic Tu- 160 aircraft carriers (a modified version of the Russian heavy bomber) with a take-off mass up to 275 tons and able to carry a fully equipped Burlak rocket carrier weighing nearly 27 tons from the airfield to point of launching (5-6,000 kilometers).

The Burlak rocket carrier will be able to launch a payload of up to 820 kg into circular orbits at altitudes of 1,000 km within 72 hours of request for launching.

The fuel used by the rocket carriers burns cleaner than fuels used in other rockets.

Experts said that by reducing or eliminating expenses for transport, assembly, construction, servicing, repair, etc., the proportional cost of using the Burlak complex will be between 2 and 2.5 times less than similar vertical launch rocket systems. The Burlak system will cost an estimated $6-8,000 per kilogram.

The Burlak system can launch 2.5 times the payload launched by similar American models using Pegasus rockets and the B-52.

The Burlak rocket carrier's high carrying capacity combined with low launch costs and high efficiency will allow the system to compete with Western-made heavy rocket carriers, experts said.

Start-1 is another new system developed from the CC-25 mobile military ballistic missile complex. The Start-1 system is designed to put payload of up to 550 kg into low orbit (up to 700 km).

The Start-1 complex was created under contract by the I.V.K. Russian stock company at the Kompleks scientific center (Votkinsk, Urals) and can launch from mobile systems (not using stationary airfield launch equipment) from a given point on earth.

On March 25 the first test launch using the Start-1 system will be conducted at Russia's Plesetsk (northern Russia) aerospace field.

Western information shows that the Commonwealth of Independent States has over 340 intercontinental CC-25 missiles with a range of 10,500 km, which could be re-equipped to launch satellites.

Cosmonauts Continue Work on Mir Space Station

LD0903121493 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1133 GMT 9 Mar 93

[Text] Moscow March 9 TASS—The Space Mission Control Centre reports this Tuesday that the space programme of cosmonauts Gennadiy Manakov and Aleksandr Poleshchuk for March 6-8 provided mostly for rigging out the Mir space station with new equipment delivered by the Progress M-16 ferry.

Working at the Kvant-2 module, the cosmonauts assembled frames to install additional power gyroscopic stabilisers and checked pressurisation of the system for their vacuuming.

The crew checked the operation of the onboard computing system after replacing worked-out electronic elements.

They will continue work on assembling gyroscopic stabilisers today. The cosmonauts also plan to refuel tanks of the united engine installation with oxydizer.

According to reports from the station and telemetering data, the mission proceeds smoothly.

Primakov Aide on Problem of Nuclear Scientists

LD0803165593 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 2220 GMT 6 Mar 93

[Studio interview with Tatyana Viktorovna Samolis, press secretary to the director of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service, by anchorman Vladimir Sidorov; date not given; from the"100 Degrees Celsius" program—live or recorded]

[Text] [Sidorov] We have Tatyana Viktorovna Samolis, press secretary to the director of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service, in the studio to comment on the problem of the brain drain.

[Samolis] Those scientists in whom you are evidently interested and in whom the public in general is now interested, are engaged in chemistry, biology and nuclear power engineering. There are approximately 100,000 such people working in Russia. But there are 1,500 to 2,000 scientists working in the munitions sector. That is where we begin to get the objects of desire of those countries with bad climates, which you are evidently concerned about as being possible places of work. But, fortunately or unfortunately, as the case may be, there are only a few dozen scientists who not only work in the munitions sector but who know everything, right down to the details.

It goes without saying that in this difficult situation that exists in Russia, that there is an emergence—I am able to tell you that there are already firms and certain specialists in Russia who are trying, who are making certain movements around these people. Regarding these few dozen people, I am able to tell you that, as a rule, they live in closed towns and we are not talking about them leaving. Though, of course, it is they who are the main objects of desire, it is they who are wanted. But once again I have to say that it is not just minds that are wanted; hands may also be wanted, namely engineers and technicians, and these are included in the category of 100,000 about which you asked.

[Sidorov] Is there any reason for us to fear our own scientists helping to create a nuclear bomb that might later fall on our own heads?

[Samolis] Despite the fact that the area around this topic—as we have already said—is highly infected with misinformation, all the same, we cannot, of course, fail to attach importance to this or to understand the extent of the danger. Theoretically, of course, such a thing could occur.

[Sidorov] In other words, you cannot say openly: Yes, I know that such and such a scientist has gone somewhere and is helping to make a small nuclear bomb. Does your service permit you to say such things? Or is our conversation just ...

[Samolis, interrupting] You know, if our service were to know that a scientist of ours, specifically a scientist who represents a danger—and fortunately, there are few such scientists—if we were to know that he was leaving for another country, then of course, every effort would be made to neutralize this danger.

[Sidorov] Up to and including murder?
[Samolis] No, that is ruled out.

[Sidorov] Were any nuclear scientists physically eliminated prior to 1985?
[Samolis] I don't think so.

[Sidorov] You don't think so or you don't know?
[Samolis] I don't think so.

[Sidorov] All in all, Primakov was not mistaken when he invited you to take up the post of press secretary. To be quite honest, you have told me nothing specific during our whole interview. I value this, it is professionalism. In actual fact this is top professionalism. Thank you very much.

Supreme Soviet

Khasbulatov Meets With Legislators

LD0803184193 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1833 GMT 8 Mar 93

[Text] Moscow March 8 TASS—Heads of local legislative bodies of power of Russian constituent republics, territories, regions, autonomous regions and the cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg met with Russian parliament Speaker Ruslan Khasbulatov in Moscow on Monday [8 March], the Russian parliament press center said.

In his opening speech, Khasbulatov said such meetings have become traditional on the eve of crucial political events in the country. On Tuesday, the parliament will consider questions proposed by President Boris Yeltsin for the referendum scheduled for April 11, 1993 and the heads of legislative bodies need to discuss the situation before taking the final decision, Khasbulatov said.

The majority of speakers stressed the referendum should be cancelled, but, taking into account the urgent demand for such a referendum by the executive branch, deputies recommended the parliament and the eighth Congress of People's Deputies opening on Wednesday to adopt a decision to hold the referendum and determine the responsibility of its initiators for its possible consequences.

Filatov Says Constitutional Coup Under Way

PM0803135593 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 6 Mar 93 p 2

[Tatyana Akkuratova report: "Sergey Filatov: No to 'Constitutional' Blocking of Reforms!"]

[Text] Television viewers probably recall seeing how a parcel containing issues of the newspaper DEN, delivered to the rostrum, was instantaneously snatched by parliamentarians during a break in the Supreme Soviet's session, as well as the speaker's condescendingly jocular words: "And I thought it was IZVESTIYA..." Of course, television viewers could have imagined even for one moment that this particular issue contained a leaflet calling for the creation of underground armed structures in the Army.

The freedom of speech, which has become one of the few real gains of democracy, has played a cruel joke on us. Until only yesterday the Russian opposition press was accusing the authorities of muzzling it. Exactly the opposite situation is emerging now: A whole series of opposition newspapers carry on their pages open calls to overthrow the president elected by the people. Such hysteria can hardly be described as political pluralism. But the executive power is doing virtually nothing to protect itself and democracy, while the Russian Federation Prosecutor's Office and Ministry of Information and the Press remain inactive. Furthermore, sizeable subsidies are being paid to newspapers calling for the overthrow of this power. It is hard to disagree with Yu. Chernichenko, who was right in noting that "we ourselves are rubbing soap into the noose which will be used to hang us." He was addressing the latest session of the consultative conference of representatives of more than 80 political parties, trade and creative unions, associations, and other organizations of a democratic orientation. The conference was held 3 March and was devoted to the problems of mass media and their relations with society.

While upholding the genuine freedom of speech, session participants spoke out sharply against both extremism in the press and the attempts to introduce censorship, especially in the electronic media. This is exactly how the parliamentary hearings on the Law on Television and the amendments thereto were perceived. Addressing the session, "Ostankino" Chairman V. Bragin rejected the accusations of bias by television journalists and declared that the television and radio broadcasting company will strive to ensure that different points of view are "presented in a balanced fashion." He put forward the idea, actively supported by session participants, of creating a consultative council comprising representatives of the public, which could also include leaders of the State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company's most important subdivisions.

Sergey Filatov, leader of the President's Administration, spoke of the important role of the press, the parties, and the public in solving the constitutional crisis. He believes that there is need for major explanatory work by the press, since the opposition is trying to present the constitutional deadlock as disrespect for the Fundamental Law and "petty squabble by individuals for power." Meanwhile this constitutional deadlock is blocking the implementation of reforms and, Filatov emphasized, if we want results this year, we must avoid the creation of "constitutional" blocks on actions by the president, the government, and local executive structures. The question of power is the question of the future of reforms—there is not only a constitutional but also an economic coup d'etat under way.

The session participants expressed support for the president and discussed their participation in the preparation for and holding of the referendum or poll of the population.

Article Views Supreme Soviet Deputies' Party

PM0803133993 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 5 Mar 93 First Edition p 4

[Article by Stepan Sulakshin, Russian Federation president's representative for Tomsk Oblast: "There Is Such a Party—the Deputies' Party"]

[Text] The first bell rang when Ruslan Khasbulatov answered the journalists' question as to who is responsible for Russia's fate: "The chairman of the Supreme Soviet and...the president." This despite the fact that, under the constitution, the speaker has the right to direct only the work of the Congress and the Supreme Soviet, to submit candidacies for election, and to hold talks with foreign parliaments. The constitution gives no other powers to him, nor to soviet chairmen at all levels. But the president is the head of the executive and the state's top official.

But what happens? R. Khasbulatov travels all over the country, calls one conference after another of soviet chairmen at all levels, delivers political reports, holds talks with the president, makes various statements.... At the same time deputies set their own wages (such a thing happens nowhere in the world), "present" themselves with official apartments in Moscow, patch the constitution the way they want to (once again for themselves).... If there is an interest which has nothing in common with the voters' interests, then this interest will definitely seek the form of its own protection. Before our eyes the legislative community of deputies is degenerating into a political fraternity which is very reminiscent of the corporative fraternity of the communists when they were in power.

The legislators crave omnipotence. Local soviet chairmen are being drawn into the struggle for this, as the recent meeting in Novosibirsk showed. Its participants—oblast soviet chairmen—certainly did not discuss the progress of the reforms in the provinces. They concentrated on something else—on adopting a statement on the speaker's political report. But legislators at the local level do not resort to this kind of activity—making statements. A purely political action has emerged—that of officials linked by corporative (party) solidarity.

People might object to me—the Union of Governors also pursues a concerted policy—but this union is a public organization. An administration head is not a collective organ; he is responsible only for his own decisions.

Now about the essence of the statement. It maintains that the Seventh Congress made a very grave mistake by scheduling the referendum. From this it follows, at least, that the Congress is insolvent and must be disbanded. But the meeting participants who signed the statement draw the directly opposite conclusion. "In this connection (!)...it is necessary to convene an extraordinary congress in March 1993...which...must find ways out of the crisis." But what if there is another mistake? Issue another statement? Convene another congress?

The statement rejects the "constitutional agreement" proposed by the president to stabilize the constitutional system. This compromise measure is based on the existing constitution and the existing powers of the branches of power and requires nothing but good will and the rejection of corporative interests, but these interests are clearly very dear to deputies. Dearer than civil peace and public concord.

You might think that if the top legislative organ has adopted the decision to hold the referendum, it must be carried out. If deputies are really interested in preserving Russian statehood, they should consolidate the regions in a single approach and not play a marked card by actively provoking the subjects of the federation to sabotage the Congress resolution, but upon returning from Novosibirsk, Tomsk Oblast Soviet Chairman G. Shamin disseminated the statement among deputies at the soviet session and urged them to sign it. In this way the representative organ turns into a party meeting.

Incidentally, did Shamin himself have the right to sign the statement in Novosibirsk? The session in Tomsk discussed nothing and did not empower Shamin to sign it. He and 60 other soviet chairmen appropriated this right. They exceeded their powers, although of which powers is it possible to speak if the essence of the power crisis consists precisely in reviving the monopoly on power, only not of the CPSU but of its successor—the system of soviets at all levels? The "general secretary" is already known, and Novosibirsk also revealed the "oblast party committee first secretaries" beneath the masks of soviet chairmen.

It follows from the Novosibirsk statement that sociological research in the regions "attests to a lack of support for the idea of the referendum in broad sections of the population." I do not know who conducted this poll or how, but according to the sociologists' data only 33 percent of those polled in Tomsk do not want to vote in the referendum, 34 percent have definitely decided to vote, and 33 percent still have an opportunity to decide. This is what the same data say about confidence in the soviet power headed by the Supreme Soviet. Some 13 percent of Tomsk residents trust Khasbulatov personally, and 8 percent trust Tomsk Oblast Soviet.

Such is "people's" power. Such are the soviets, which are increasingly turning into a party of deputies. With their own political aims and personal, far from selfless interests.

Regional Affairs

Moscow Mayor Pessimistic About Upcoming Congress

OW0803160093 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1550 GMT 8 Mar 93

[Report on "exclusive" interview with Moscow Mayor Yuriy Luzhkov by unidentified INTERFAX correspondent on 8 March; place not given—following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Yuriy Luzhkov, Mayor of Moscow, said he did not expect the Eighth Congress of People's Deputies, opening on March 10, to do any good to the nation. In an exclusive interview given to Interfax on Monday [8 March], he said, "It's not the right time for a congress now. Now we should be focusing on measures to achieve economic stabilization." In his opinion, "the deputies will aggravate the general situation, which has a tendency for stabilization." A fairly large group of deputies, he said, sought "to destabilize the situation, create political chaos, and thereby attain what are often their personal aims."

Gavriil Popov, formerly Mayor of Moscow and today chairman of the Russian Movement for Democratic Reforms, in an interview with Interfax, expressed support for Luzhkov's point of view. "One should now be thinking of land problems, of sowing, of many other things," he said. At the same time, he said "the knot must be cut. It's impossible to go on living like this."

Leaders of Tatarstan, Karelia Oppose Referendum

OW0903113893 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1056 GMT 9 Mar 93

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Tatar President Mintimer Shaymiyev said in an interview with Interfax that he was categorically opposed to the idea of holding a referendum on 11 April. In his opinion, the Council of Heads of Republics should adopt a resolution which would serve as a "cold shower" for the Moscow authorities. Shaymiyev is convinced that political passions have heated up to the point that now everything possible must be done too cool "all of the hot heads." According to the Tatar leader, the Council of Heads of Republics could adopt the idea of declaring a moratorium on political battles for several years so as to allow all branches of power to continue functioning. During that time, said Shaymiyev, it would make sense to establish a representative commission headed by President Yeltsin which could work out a mechanism for stabilizing the constitutional order and working with the republics and regions of Russia.

Shaymiyev believes that such a commission's resolutions would be a good basis for the preparation of a draft of the new constitution. He specifically noted that many resolutions passed in Moscow were "not being implemented locally."

Karelian Supreme Council Chairman Viktor Stepanov told Interfax that a referendum will be held in his republic only in the event that such a resolution is passed by the coming VIII Congress of People's Deputies. "I personally am against a constitutional accord," added Stepanov, explaining his position by saying that there already was a constitution in the country, and all of the state's high authorities should follow its provisions.

No Support Among Volga Leaders

PM0803152993 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 5 Mar 93 p 2

[Aleksey Vorotnikov report: "Who's Who"]

[Text] Saratov—Saratov's sociologists have conducted a poll among leading officials of the Volga Region Administration. They are, as a rule, supporters of the president appointed to high office with his blessing. The results of the survey were as follows. Asked their opinion about the situation in the country, 21 percent of respondents called it catastrophic on the political front and 5 percent catastrophic on the socioeconomic front. The situation was described as critical by 37 and 75 percent respectively. Asked whether the holding of a referendum will help to improve the political situation in Russia, no one said "yes," and 79 percent said "no." So Yeltsin's supporters in the outlying districts have unambiguously stated that the referendum is not necessary.

However, if the vote does take place anyway, the administration will be on the president's side, although he is not right. The functionaries are well aware who calls the tune and on whom their prosperity depends.

With whom does the ruling elite of the Volga region link its hopes? Above all with Chernomyrdin, Rutskoy, Zorkin, and Volskiy. And what about the president? They no longer link any hopes with him.

Dudayev Optimistic on Improving Ingush Ties

LD0803191193 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1236 GMT 8 Mar 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Sharip Asuyev]

[Text] Groznyy, 8 March—The official inauguration of the first president of Ingushetia and creation of other power structures in this republic should stabilize the relations between the fraternal Chechen and Ingush peoples, Movladi Udugov, head of Chechnya's recently created national information service, said, quoting the opinion of Dzhokhar Dudayev.

He admitted that there is some dispute between Chechnya and Ingushetia over the borders. He stressed, however, that it must be resolved without third party interference, by the Chechens and Ingushis themselves, using exclusively peaceful means. "All fabrications and allegations about an aggravated situation on the border between our two republics are being spread by design, in order to maintain tensions in the region," Movladi Udugov said. He refuted the allegation that Dzhokhar Dudayev's hasty departure from Nazran yesterday was motivated by his rather cool relations with the Ingush leadership. He said that the Chechen president had to observe the Muslim Uraza fast and therefore he could not stay for the celebratory banquet; that is all there was to it.

As is well known, the territorial dispute between Chechens and Ingushis still revolves round the areas of Malgobekskiy and Sunzhenskiy rayons. Last year the Chechen parliament adopted a special decision, according to which the border between Chechnya and Ingushetia must be drawn down the line which separated the Chechen and the Ingush autonomous oblasts in 1934 until they were united in one autonomous republic. Chechnya Parliamentary Speaker Khusain Akhmadov again confirmed the Chechen side's positioin in his television interview last week and said that now when the question of creating the Ingush republic in Russia has already been effectively resolved, President Dzhokhar Dudayev is compelled, in accordance with the republic's constitution, to ensure the sanctity of its borders. The introduction of a curfew in these disputed rayons is perceived by Gorznyy as a deliberate attempt by the Russian leadership to worsen relations between the Chechens and the Ingushis, considering that the people of Ingushetia have already elected their president.

The problem of disputed territories will evidently be one of the most difficult problems for Ruslan Aushev. So far, however, he is not paying special attention to it; he is giving preference to stepping up the elimination of the aftermath of the Ossetian-Ingush conflict and the establishment of the economy of his young republic. It is well known that Ruslan Aushev has a much milder view of the territorial dispute with the Chechens than other Ingush leaders. At least, while still head of the the provisional administration in Ingushetia, he resolutely denounced the introduction of Russian troops into the village of Psedakh in Malgobekskiy Rayon, and publicly called it a Chechen village.

Dudayev on the other hand by his recent decree arranged to create in disputed villages bodies of local self-government subordinate to the Chechen authorities. In curfew conditions, however, it is hardly possible to carry out this order.

Chechen Officials Protest to UK Over London Murders

LD0803132093 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1235 GMT 8 Mar 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Sharip Asuyev]

[Text] Groznyy, 8 Mar—Representatives of the Chechen republic have filed an official protest with British authorities in connection with the murder in London of two Chechens, the Utsiyev brothers. This message was faxed from London to Groznyy today by Chechen Deputy Security Minister Alaudin Musayev, who came to London just to take part in the investigation of the circumstances of this tragedy. Alaudin Musayev stated that the British authorities subjected the Chechen representatives to a humiliating search at the London airport, keeping them there for over an hour, and now they are being kept away from the investigation under various drummed-up excuses. [passage omitted] It has been suggested that, in spite of Chechnya's statement, the murder is of a criminal, rather than a political, nature, but many circumstances of this case still remain unclear.

Conservative Attack on Kuzbass Miners Scored

PM0803145393 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 5 Mar 93 First Edition p 4

[Viktor Kostyukovskiy article: "Slap in Miners' Face. Opposition Called Them 'Agents of Influence'"]

[Text] Kemerovo—The day after the miners' warning strike the newspaper KUZBASS carried under the rubric "Appeal" a letter from a number of people's deputies entitled "Strike Is Ax Over Russia."

The idea gives rise to no doubts, although it was put too expressively in the headline. The miners themselves have repeatedly emphasized that they are well aware of the ruinous nature of strikes for the country's already weakened economy. In each instance they have found it very difficult to venture upon this extreme protest measure and have spent several days weighing all the "pros" and "cons" before crossing the line. To maintain that such steps are taken lightly and thoughtlessly, under the influence of selfish interests and irresponsible emotions, means regarding strikers as people who do not know what they are doing and who are incapable of picturing even the imminent consequences of their actions. Each strike, including the first one in 1989, has been preceded by appeals and warnings, and it was only when the response was arrogant silence or even a harsh bellow that the miners said: "Enough."

At the same time there have always been people who have tried again and again to urge the strikers to weigh once more all the possible consequences for themselves and the country and to reconsider their modus operandi. In the majority of cases these responsible words have met with understanding among the miners, even if they have continued to strike. Is this mentioned in the aforesaid appeal? Is the deputies' letter imbued with this sense of responsibility?

Nothing of the kind. The first thing the deputies do is rush to enlighten their fellow countrymen that the miners' demands are drawn up "in the centers of Western special services." Can you imagine that the CIA is so concerned with the problems of Russia's financial and credit policy that it formulates the miners' demands for order to be instilled in this sphere? For just these problems were the chief trigger of the strike movement's new spiral. Not trade union ambitions, nor the desire to grab, but the fact that practically all enterprises in the subsidized sector, even previously highly profitable ones, have gone bankrupt and have nothing with which to pay not only wages but also to settle accounts with subcontractors, to pay the state's taxes, to keep up sociocultural and domestic services, or, finally, to ensure the safety of their work, which is known to be dangerous—deadly dangerous. For whom, then, are the cheap gibes about the intrigues of Western special services

designed? For it is quite impossible to believe that the authors do not know the people whom they are apparently addressing.

But it is this "apparently" that is the trouble. They hardly labor under the delusion that the miners themselves will believe them. Something is more important to them: to stir up the gullible who are not accustomed or have become unaccustomed to thinking and who readily accept that most monstrous lie about "enemies of the people," "spies," and also, in the modern version, "agents of influence"—a lie which is so convenient and so "historically" understandable to a Soviet person, particularly an elderly one. For the referendum does, perhaps, lie ahead, and early elections cannot be ruled out either. They need votes, and all means are good in the struggle for power.

Two of the authors signed themselves as people's deputies of the USSR—Avaliani and Golik. The rest as people's deputies not of Russia nor of the Russian Federation, but of "the RSFSR": Shashviashvili, Dyudyayev, Parshukov, Tsapayev, Makhanov. Some names are widely known. In the past Teymuraz Avaliani headed the oblast strike committee, and Vladimir Makhanov—Prokopyevsk City Strike Committee. This is probably why the letter divides strikes up into the "good" one (1989) and the "subsequent" ones, which were already directed by the hand of enemies abroad. True, there is one discrepancy: If you follow the "logic" widespread in certain circles that the USSR was messed up by the special services through the "traitor" Gorbachev, then why is the strike against Ryzhkov's Soviet government called "correct," while the 1991 one, when the miners demanded Gorbachev's resignation, is included among the strikes inspired from outside?

There are other discoveries, too. It is claimed: "In connection with the fact that the Western economy is being drawn into a very grave economic crisis, it is faced with the task of creating jobs. But, since everything in the world is interconnected, it is possible to create them in the West by eliminating them in our country." I do not believe that even experienced economists would be able to grasp this "interconnection" uncovered by the deputies.

Golik and Shashviashvili are known, inter alia, as the authors of the SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA article on "agents of influence." Kuzbass miners have now ended up under the influence of Western intelligence services. For some reason people who were publicly called "political scoundrels" did not turn to the court to protect their honor and dignity. Of course, it is far easier to muddle the gullible than to argue a deliberate lie in court. Not only do no public denials embarrass them but they merely increasingly inflame them. Whereas at one time they spoke in allusions, now, corrupted by impunity, they bluntly call the country's top official a "venal Western puppet who likes to call himself the 'nationally elected president.'" On trying to grasp the meaning of the "appeal," you become clearly aware that it was this slander, and not the warning about the consequences of a strike, that was the authors' true aim. "Miners!" they write. "The president has already betrayed you. Now he is preparing to sell you like draft animals."

In recent days we have heard so much spy-mania gibberish from the lips of members of the State Committee for the State of Emergency and other followers of theirs that you cannot help getting an impression of a skillfully coordinated campaign. The moment has not been chosen by chance: Speculating on difficulties, failed or bankrupt political careerists thirst for revenge. If they had the army and punitive organs in their hands, there would be no need to look for any arguments, and it would be sufficient to issue the order. But today they have to strive after power by "constitutional" means.

"It would be possible to laugh at all these lies," Aleksandr Korotkikh, excavator operator at Prokopyevsk's "Tyrganskaya" Mine and a member of the Council of Kuzbass Workers' Committees, said, "but in the recent situation we have not felt like laughing, for this is all too serious. The warning strike was accompanied by purely economic demands and, in general, we endeavored for quite a long time not to 'rock the boat.' But in a few days' time, when we meet for an enlarged session of the council and the Independent Miners Union Executive Bureau to decide what to do next, obviously we will adopt a political statement. Many people are insisting on this."

International Affairs

Vice Premier, Bank Chairman on Problems With Russia

MK0603125993 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 5 Mar 93 pp 1,3

[Vladimir Skachko report: "We Are Like Two Paupers, Trying to Harm Each Other as They Drown"]

[Text] At a 3 March press conference in Kiev Viktor Pynzenyk, vice premier in charge of economic reform, and Viktor Yushchenko, newly appointed chairman of the Ukrainian National Bank Board, cited as Ukraine's main economic problems the absence of a normal system for mutual settlements with Russia and a payments crisis, underlying which, in the opinion of both, is the worsening of Ukrainian-Russian relations and Russia's intransigence on this issue since 1 July last year. Viktor Yushchenko also admitted Ukraine's share of guilt insofar as it failed, in contrast to Russia, to switch over in good time to a system of prepayment for its goods and is still using a collection procedure. He pointed out that today the Russian enterprises' debt to Ukrainian enterprises is 600-650 billion rubles, and the Russian side has virtually broken the 15 January 1993 bilateral agreements on immediately offsetting its debt to Ukraine. According to Viktor Yushchenko, Russia could carry out these offsetting procedures in the first ten days of March or directly afterward, and Viktor Pynzenyk added: "All the Ukrainian-Russian talks on this issue that have been held recently have been fruitless to Russia's position—showing that we have reached a deadlock.

"Furthermore we are coming up against other unfriendly moves on the part of Russia. When Ukraine was making payments, all payment documents were in order, but nonetheless Russia was detaining its goods on the Ukrainian-Russian border."

Among the main tasks in stabilizing the mutual settlements system both inside and outside Ukraine, Yushchenko again mentioned the offsetting of Russia's debts, the final transfer to an advance payment scheme, the enactment of the bankruptcy law in Ukraine, and incentives from the state to encourage "both aggressive imports and beneficial exports."

Commenting on the internal situation, Viktor Yushchenko stated that by 17 March potentially bankrupt enterprises would be identified. For his part, Viktor Pynzenyk added that the government will in the future be subsidizing from the state budget only those enterprises that cannot be shut down right now, and the government is drawing up a special program to support them.

Among other government plans to stabilize the economy Pynzenyk cited the drafting of a general state program for the development of internal cooperation that is meant to finally destroy the old Union integration network and establish internal links among enterprises which are mutual suppliers. "This should have been done at least a year ago. Ukraine produces many things but they are still being supplied to allied enterprises outside its territory," he summed up the situation, adding that there are now significant signs of economic stabilization in the republic. These signs include a certain stability of the karbovanets against the dollar, the slowing down of increases in prices and average wages, and a reduction of household incomes not matched by goods. As Viktor Pynzenyk said, the Ukrainian government can consolidate these trends only if the politicians "do not twist the government's arms, prompted by populist motives."

Responding to a NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA correspondent's question about the prospects of Ukraine's signing a "zero option" agreement on the issue of the division of the debts and assets of the former USSR, Pynzenyk said that Ukraine would hardly accept that option. "Another option—'zero plus' —was discussed. What it involves is that Russia should cede part of the assets to us. However, the latest developments show that Russia is unwilling to agree to this option. They suggest another one: You transfer your assets to us and we will dispose of them and credit the debts to you. In other words, Ukraine will actually retain its debts, while the assets will be returned only as their are disposed of. Naturally, this option does not suit us," Pynzenyk said, adding that the question of mutual settlements on Russian fuel and energy supplies has not been resolved yet because Russia does not agree to a simultaneous proportionate increase in prices both for its gas and oil and for their transit across Ukrainian territory. Viktor Pynzenyk described as unlikely the possibility of political and economic pressure being brought to bear on Ukraine by Russia with the aim of restoring the USSR. He stated that this confrontation between the two states rather reminds him of two paupers who are drowning but nonetheless refuse to act in their common interests. "The policy of pressure is impossible. It will only lead to the emergence of a new seat of international danger. Given the integration of our economies, we can only overcome the crisis together, and confrontation in this situation, from whatever side it may be originating, is folly," Viktor Pynzenyk said in conclusion, expressing the hope that everything could be resolved positively at a meeting of the Ukrainian and Russian premiers, to be held possibly this week or next, when Viktor Chernomyrdin recovers from illness.

Accord on Debt Clearing Reached

MK0503105693 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 4 Mar 93 p 4

[Alla Kovtun, Yegor Glukharev report: "Ukraine Hopes To Revive Trade With Russia"]

[Text] The problem of interstate payments between Russia and Ukraine can presently be resolved only after the two sides agree on measures to clear the reciprocal debts of Russian and Ukrainian enterprises. Viktor

Yushchenko, National Bank of Ukraine chairman, and Ukrainian Vice Premier Viktor Pynzenyk said this at a press conference in Kiev yesterday devoted to the organization of accounting between enterprises in the two states.

Viktor Yushchenko stressed at the press conference that at present all technical conditions have been established to clear payments between Russia and Ukraine, and that the problem has already been solved at the level of banking infrastructure servicing those payments. In particular, currently Russian and Ukrainian commercial structures have several legal ways of clearing payments: through the cash payment centers of their national banks, through direct mail accounts at commercial banks, and through clearing houses set up by commercial banks. Commercial institutions specializing in clearing payments between Russia and Ukraine are helping significantly to reduce transaction times, but nonetheless they are incapable of resolving the problem of reciprocal payments in its entirety.

In addition, it was specifically mentioned at the press conference that the restriction of the money supply in January coupled with some industrial production growth in Ukraine had led to a stabilization of the karbovanets' exchange rate against the dollar and the Russian ruble. This creates conditions to start transferring payments from Ukraine to Russia (previously, commercial banks could not guarantee the conversion of karbovanets payments into rubles and were only conducting exchange operations in the opposite direction).

In the Ukrainian leadership's opinion, the main reason for the suspension of such payments is the difference in the Russian and Ukrainian sides' approaches to the way the amounts of reciprocal debts of Russian and Ukrainian state enterprises should be evaluated. In order to "revive" the clearing of payments once the amount of debt is agreed, a decision will be made at the intergovernment level on the mandatory repayment of Russian and Ukrainian enterprises' reciprocal debts for products actually delivered. A similar decision on clearing payments was made back in January, but has never been implemented.

Economics Minister on Debt

AU0803152893 Kiev HOLOS UKRAYINY in Ukrainian 5 Mar 93 p 1

[Report on news conference by Economics Minister Viktor Pynzenyk in Kiev on 3 March: "Debts Must Be Repaid"]

[Text] The negotiations that we recently held with the Russian Government regarding prices of energy sources and mutual settlements turned out to be unsuccessful, not to mention previous agreements are not being fulfilled. This was stated by Viktor Pynzenyk, Ukraine's vice prime minister and minister of the economy, at a news conference that dealt with questions of external and internal settlements.

Viktor Yushchenko, chairman of the Board of the National Bank, stated that as of today Russia owes Ukrainian enterprises about 650 billion karbovantsi [K]. Ukraine, in turn, owes Russia 100 billion [monetary unit not specified].

Viktor Pynzenyk stressed that leaders of our enterprises and the government itself are responsible for this inbalance. We introduced the previous form of payment for goods and raw materials too late, when it was already effective in Russia. Debts may only be repaid through negotiations that have not, so far, produced desired results.

The participants in the news conference told journalists about conducting an internal bank audit to reveal bankrupt enterprises. It is true, though, that auditing will only be conducted at state enterprises, and some of them will, if necessary, get assistance.

Viktor Pynzenyk also talked about a certain stabilization of the economy. According to him, this is pointed to by the fact that the rate of the karbovanets relative to the dollar has been maintained at the same level for almost one month.

Sevastopol's Kruglov Urges City's Return to Russia

PM0503114793 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 3 Mar 93 First Edition p 7

[Interview with A.G. Kruglov, deputy of the Crimean Supreme Soviet and Sevastopol City Soviet, by Boris Sverdlov in Sevastopol; date not given: "This Special City by the Black Sea"—first paragraph is introduction]

[Text] Sevastopol—A.G. Kruglov is a deputy of the Crimean Supreme Soviet and Sevastopol City Soviet. If you read the local Crimean and central newspapers you will be amazed. In some he is all but portrayed as a national hero, and in others as a criminal.

[Sverdlov] Aleksandr Georgiyevich, despite repeated stern warnings, you are organizing unsanctioned rallies. The impression being created is that you seem to be demonstrating wanton license.

[Kruglov] Your question forces me to delve a little into the recent past. Under the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium edict of 29 October 1948, Sevastopol was singled out as an autonomous administrative-economic center with its own budget, and placed in the category of cities of significance for the republic. Now let us cast our minds back to Krushchev's "czarist" gift to Ukraine in 1954. At that time, when the peninsula was transferred, the edict in question was not rescinded. Therefore, it has not lost its force. The upshot is that Sevastopol has remained Russian...

[Sverdlov] Forgive me, but not so long ago Ukrainian President L. Kravchuk noted in an interview that, on 25 April 1968, the RSFSR Council of Ministers recognized

that the decree on financing Sevastopol had become invalid. Thus it confirmed its transfer to Ukraine.

[Kruglov] I am familiar with this document. But the Council of Ministers' decree should not be confused with the Supreme Soviet edict. The latter does have legislative force. Back in 1990 a decision was adopted at the Sevastopol City Soviet's seventh session to hold a referendum in January 1991 to confirm Sevastopol's Union-republic status. You know, at that time the Black Sea Fleet and the majority of the city's enterprises were financed through the USSR Defense Ministry. Today, my fellow countrymen are demanding that their will, expressed at the referendum, be honored. There was a Union then and Russia is the USSR's legitimate successor, so there is no legislative or lawful basis for Ukrainian status over Sevastopol.

[Sverdlov] But nevertheless, Aleksandr Georgiyevich, have you not forgotten that Russia recognized the inviolability of Ukraine's borders? And Sevastopol is on its territory.

[Kruglov] This is not quite the case. A decision was adopted at the Seventh Congress of Russian Federation People's Deputies to examine the question of Sevastopol's status. It is a very wise decision. It coincides with the wish of many parties and movements in the city, such as the Russian People's Assembly, the "Ecology and Life" Committee, the Russian Movement, the Russian Party... And, of course, the Sevastopol National Salvation Front, uniting a whole list of organizations.

[Sverdlov] What is being saved, and from whom? Moreover, the National Salvation Front is not registered.

[Kruglov] The time has come to save, for instance, the economy, which has brought the vast majority to the brink of poverty, but let us say we forget about that, the economy. Even if Ukraine has fed the people of Sevastopol with its own fat and sausage, we will still strive for historical justice—the return of the city to its rightful motherland. Not only because Russia is vital to us, but also because Sevastopol is vital to Russia.

[Sverdlov] Does it not seem to you that when the issue of Sevastopol rises to this plane it becomes a kind of bone of contention between two Slav states?

[Kruglov] Official Kiev tells us with great frequency in the media that the Union, apparently, kept hold of Ukraine with the aid of bayonets. Otherwise it would have become an autonomous, democratic state long ago. Fine. But is it not through force (economic, and so on) that democratic Ukraine is holding onto Sevastopol today? I do not understand—why are the views of my fellow countrymen not being taken into account? We perceive all this very negatively. We are expressing our dissatisfaction at rallies. And what is the response? Criminal proceedings are being instituted against some activists.

[Sverdlov] So you are firmly convinced that Sevastopol will ultimately be Russian?

[Kruglov] It is a pity that you were not at my January meeting with the voters on Nakhimov Square. My fellow countrymen demanded unanimously that the question of the hero-city's Russian status as the Russian Black Sea Fleet's main naval base be brought up at the next city soviet session and that the question on transforming the administration, which is headed by a representative of the Ukrainian president, into a city soviet executive committee be examined at the same time. It is in this that I see the entire point of my life. And of course, I will not compromise. Whatever my fate may turn out to be.

Turkish Envoy to Ukraine Visits Crimea

MK0503103893 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 5 Mar 93 p 3

[Report by Aleksandr Pilat: "Crimea—Bridge of Friendship Between Ukraine and Turkey. Acar Germen, Turkish Ambassador to Ukraine, Visits Peninsula"]

[Text] Acar Germen, Turkish ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary to Ukraine, was in Crimea from 1-4 March. There are so many questions now which require the ambassador's participation if they are to be resolved that Acar Germen was forced to extend his stay in the peninsula by one day. Crimea is Turkey's neighbor across the sea, and moreover, as the ambassador said, "our brothers—Crimean Tatars—live here." It was these two factors that dictated the program for the Turkish ambassador's first trip to Crimea. "Turkey favors the development of economic and trade relations among all states in the Black Sea region," he told a NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA correspondent. "Turkey was the initiator of the establishment of the special club of Black Sea countries. These countries possess enormous potential and Turkey is prepared to use its experience to promote its exploitation—although one must not expect immediate results from this alliance. It should not be forgotten that the Common Market is not without its problems either. Turkey considers it has a duty to reduce the period required for the Black Sea countries' entry into this market. The question how Crimea itself can gain access to the Common Market and what it has to offer was discussed at meetings between the Turkish ambassador and Crimean Supreme Soviet Chairman Nikolay Bagrov, the head of the Crimean council of ministers, and the chairman of the Crimean chamber of trade and industry. The meetings were fruitful, the ambassador said, and the sides achieved mutual understanding. An important (if not the main) part of the program for the Turkish ambassador's stay in the peninsula was his acquaintance with the status of the Crimean Tatars. The Crimean Tatars are returning to their own land, he said. "A mistake of history is being rectified, and that is a good thing." Despite having to overcome great difficulties, the Ukrainian Government is doing all it can to relieve the plight of a people that has undergone great suffering." [no opening quotation mark as published]

According to the ambassador, the other CIS states must not remain aloof from the Crimean Tatar problem. As for Turkey, its government will decide on its involvement in the solution of this complex problem. One will be able to talk later about the scale and forms of assistance to the Crimean Tatars, but one thing is clear—a great deal of comprehensive assistance is needed. For instance, at a meeting with Crimean Tatar students at Simferopol University it was learned that they do not have textbooks or any other educational literature in their own language. The situation is no better in schools. The Turkish ambassador, as is the way with diplomats, talked in muted terms about the general social conditions experienced by Crimean Tatars who have already returned from deportation areas. He is optimistic about the future of cooperation between Turkey and Ukraine, while "Crimea, with the Crimean Tatar people living here, should become a bridge of friendship, a bridge of good mutual relations between them," the ambassador believes.

Acar Germen met with Mustafa Dzhemilev, chairman of the Crimean Tatar People's Assembly, and with the leadership of the Crimean Tatar national movement organization; he also visited the Crimean Tatars' improvised dwellings. This was a depressing experience for the ambassador. People are living in enormous family groups in hastily erected structures, without light and without water. "Let me tell you, no matter what, Turkey will not leave its brothers in the lurch," the ambassador told the people living in the shanty towns, promising that his country would provide substantial assistance in the important matter of getting the people settled in their historic homeland.

Before Acar Germen left Crimea a NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA correspondent asked him a few questions.

[Correspondent] Mr. Ambassador, what is your opinion on the division of the Black Sea Fleet; is Turkey not frightened of a conflict here, and what is its reaction?

[Germen] It is not for me to say. I can only hope that this matter will be resolved in the best possible way between Ukraine and Russia, and resolved peacefully. We believe that common sense will prevail and there will be no conflicts.

[Correspondent] There was a report in our press about an arms exhibition opening this summer, and that Turkey intends to acquire armaments worth $85 billion. What kind of weapons and precisely for what purpose?

[Germen] These exhibitions are organized annually. They are visited by representatives of various countries. Anyone can come, look, and buy the weapons he likes. Of course, Turkey will be producing and buying the weapons it needs to ensure its own security. Turkey is in an unstable region and has to provide its own insurance; it has to protect itself. But Turkey is not acquiring weapons for offensive purposes, merely for defense. We have never forgotten that the Turkish people's national liberation movement in 1918-1923 led to the formation of the first republic in the Near and Middle East, which was proclaimed on 29 October 1923. Since then Turkey has not attacked anyone. My country wants to see peace and friendship in the Black Sea region.

Envoy Reports Positive Results of Moldova Trip

LD0903115693 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service in Ukrainian 0600 GMT 9 Mar 93

[Text] In the current period, the principles of mutual understanding and trust are natural for Ukrainian-Moldovan relations. This was stated by (Andrey Ozadovsky), representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine. Commenting on the results of his visit to Moldova, he assessed with approval the aspirations of its leadership to establish all-around relations with our state. In his words, an entire package of documents on questions of mutually advantageous cooperation has already been prepared, particularly in the areas of power engineering, transport, agriculture, culture, and education.

National Affairs

Kravchuk: Government 'Overestimated' Economic Potential

OW0603164693 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1639 GMT 6 Mar 93

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Addressing the second congress of the Ukrainian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs in Kiev on Saturday [6 March], Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk called on entrepreneurs and enterprise managers to join him in giving support to the resolute steps taken by the government.

Going into the causes of the present economic crisis, he said, "We obviously overestimated the potential of our economy. We overlooked the fact that it was structurally incomplete," which meant that it was dependent on the economies of other countries. Other mistakes, in his opinion, were the postponement of privatization and demonopolization, and the fact that "earlier the role of the state in economic administration was obviously underestimated." "It took us too long to realize how much the monetary system of Ukraine depends on the money issue policy of the Central Bank of Russia," Kravchuk continued. This entailed a number of mistakes as Ukraine created its own banking system. Ukraine should normalize its credit and finance relations with Russia and solve "all problems concerning customs policy and the movement of commodities," he said.

Kravchuk thinks Ukraine should strengthen its ties with other member countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States, but on a new basis. "We must ensure that the market of the Commonwealth of Independent States and the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance [as received] (Comecon), the market of the former socialist

camp, works for our economy," he said. That this was possible he realized during his visits to Hungary and Poland.

The mistakes can be corrected by "providing organic connection between the radical economic reform and the evolutionary transformation of the state sector, especially in the basic industries and the military industrial complex." According to Kravchuk, Ukrainian leaders had never said anything about severing economic ties with Russia. He said pressure was currently being put on Ukraine which was more political than economic.

The President said documents for the division of the Black Sea Fleet had already been drafted. "I was ready to sign them when I was in Moscow but I was told Ukraine must first recognize Sevastopol to be a Russian city," he said.

Prime Minister Leonid Kuchma was going to replace some of the members in the cabinet, Kravchuk said.

Kravchuk Rules Out Territorial Autonomy for Hungarians

LD0503210393 Budapest Duna TV in Hungarian 1800 GMT 5 Mar 93

["Exclusive" interview with President Leonid Kravchuk by unidentified Duna TV correspondent; place and date not given—recorded]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] [Correspondent] The key to the peace in Europe is undoubtedly the inviolability of state borders. At the same time, many believe that the price must be paid by ensuring special [kueloenleges] rights for national minorities. Can these special rights mean autonomy in respect to the Hungarian minority living in Ukraine?

[Kravchuk, in Ukrainian with superimposed Hungarian translation] In my view, it is not special rights that we must talk about, but rights and freedoms; equal rights and equal freedoms which all citizens of a given republic are entitled to. A relevant Ukrainian law ensures these equal rights. Hungarians in Ukraine are completely equal with the others. In addition to general freedoms, the law ensures for them the freedom to foster their mother tongue, national culture, and national traditions and to maintain their national characteristics. [passage omitted]

However, beyond this we cannot extend special rights to any single nationality whatsoever, because if we did so the rights of others would be limited. The abovementioned law also deals with autonomy. It speaks about cultural, national, and territorial autonomy. From a judicial point of view, I do not see any problem whatsoever, and all realistic means exist to implement this law.

There are things for which more time is needed; that is another matter. The financial conditions must be created. For instance, fostering a mother tongue means schools, kindergartens, teachers, books; that is, a complete infrastructural set of problems. However, in my judgment, the situation of the Hungarian minority in Ukraine is, from a political and legislative point of view, settled in every way.

National Bank Official Discusses Currency Regulations

LD0603213893 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service in Ukrainian 1700 GMT 6 Mar 93

[Text] A briefing was held today at the National Bank of Ukraine to discuss the bank's action program in connection with the decree on the system of currency regulation and currency control adopted by the Cabinet of Ministers.

The decree enables state currency policy to be coordinated, taking into account the real economic situation in the country and in accordance with general trends in the government's economic policy, Oleksandr Sharov, deputy chairman of the board and chief of the Main Currency and Economic Directorate of the National Bank of Ukraine, said in an interview with journalists.

The main principles of the new legislation are the recognition of Ukrainian currency as the single means of payment, the mandatory sale of foreign currency earnings to commercial banks, and the formation of a state currency fund from budgetary funds. These principles are fully supported by the bank's experts.

The skillful use of the new rules of currency regulation together with measures in the field of budgetary and monetary policy can promote the stabilization of the Ukrainian karbovanets, believes Oleksandr Sharov.

Authorities Opposed to Servicemen's Union

PM0803151993 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 4 Mar 93 First Edition p 7

[Grigoriy Bessmennyy report: "Trade Union in Uniform"]

[Text] Kiev—The founding congress of a servicemen's trade union has taken place in Kiev. It has taken place despite active opposition from Defense Minister Colonel General K. Morozov, General Mulyava, chief of the Ukrainian Defense Ministry Sociopsychological Directorate and hetman of the Ukrainian Cossacks, and General V. Martirosyan, chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers Committee on Questions of Servicemen's Social Protection.

The Ukrainian Officers' Union [UON] has also not let this fact go unnoticed. It reacted to the congress in a very original manner: It held a conference on the same day at the same time which was essentially devoted to the question: "How should one regard the idea of forming a trade union?" However, this idea was not unanimously rejected.

Incidentally, on the subject of power: according to the Ukrainian law on servicemen's social and legal protection, they have the right to form their own public associations with the proviso that these cannot act as political parties. But a trade union is by no means a party. So what has alarmed the "departments" of Generals V. Mulyava and V. Martirosyan and Militia Colonel G. Omelchenko (chairman of UON)? Are the leaders of these structures, who have already gotten themselves a cozy position, not afraid of having to make room for the newly formed trade union?

There is no paragraph in the current laws on defense which allows trade unions in the Ukrainian Army. But there is also nothing to directly forbid this. Whatever is not forbidden is allowed.

Reports of Officer Transfer Requests 'Refuted'

AU0503152993 Kiev URYADOVYY KURYER in Ukrainian 4 Mar 93 p 1

[Unattributed report published under the rubric "Information for This Issue"]

[Text] The Press Center of Ukraine's Naval Forces has refuted information by some mass media, including Russian media, to the effect that many officers of Ukraine's Naval Forces have requested to be transferred to the Black Sea Fleet for the continuation of their service. As Mykola Savchenko, chief of the Press Service of the Naval Forces, stated, not a single officer or warrant officer of the Naval Forces made any such requests. Nor are there such applications in the Administration for Personnel of the Naval Forces.

Anticommunist, Anti-Imperial Front Formed

MK0403095093 Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI in Russian No 10, 7 Mar 93 (Signed to Press 2 Mar 93) p A 9

[Sergey Tikhiy commentary: "Ad Hoc 'Front'"]

[Text] During the little more than a year that Ukraine has been independent, the republic's national movement has fragmented into a number of organizations of the most different stripes: from national democrat to openly national socialist. Previously this movement could have been called massive probably only in the western oblasts. In the heart of Ukraine, where the real politics are done, its influence is steadily declining, while in the east, which constitutes the greatest threat to the integrity of the sovereign state, the word combination "national revival" is still used as a curse. It is only the realization of its own weakness that prevents the national movement from a final split.

The latest example of it is the creation of the AAF (Anticommunist, Anti-Imperial Front). The step is a reply to the calls to scrap the decree banning the Ukrainian Communist Party and sign the CIS Charter. The new grouping, to all appearances, has little to do with the original idea. Despite the fact that leaders like Chornovil, Goryn, and Drach have managed to agree to sit down at the same table for the first time in 10 months, they have not been joined by the liberals or social democrats. This reduces to zero AAF's influence precisely in the regions where a communist renaissance is most probable, and pro-imperial sentiments the strongest: the East, the South, and the Dnieper area.

A statement issued by leadership of the pro-market New Ukraine says that this organization no longer sees any sense in forming alliances on the principles of negating something. This is not the only reason, though. A swelling of AAF ranks is also unlikely because it has already been joined by such organizations as the UNA (Ukrainian National Assembly), which holds extreme nationalist positions, and UNSO (Ukrainian National Self-Defense). UNSO, incidentally, has its own paramilitary units and believes that reforms are possible only after order has been imposed, and that repressions will be unavoidable in the process.

Rukh Chairman Vyacheslav Chornovil said that the participation in the AAF of organizations that do not recognize democracy as a matter of principle is yet further proof that such alliances are short- lived, and that they are created to tackle ad hoc tasks. This statement, however, was too late to change anything. The liberals, unwilling to sour their relations either with the South and East, or with pragmatic people from the state structures, have no reason at all to take a risk merely to give the communists another scare. The communists, however, are not afraid of anyone or anything, of which recent developments in the Supreme Soviet provide convincing proof. Last week the "nonparty" majority proceeded to elect a constitutional court over all objections from the opposition. Symbolically, one of its elected members was one Korneyev, the only deputy who voted against Ukraine's independence on 24 August 1991. For the time being the minority, which has dwindled further over the past two years (some joined the diplomatic service, others took jobs in the government), have succeeded in blocking the election of constitutional court members by refusing to register for voting. The nature of the debate and the reactions from the floor to what speakers were saying, however, show that, like the Bourbons, Ukrainian deputies have forgotten nothing and learned nothing.

Despite the fact that the organizations that have joined the AAF have declared their unity on several positions of principle (the demand for an early termination of the soviets' powers and the rejection of Ukrainian unilateral disarmament), resolving these questions will depend on the interests of the parliamentary majority. The election of deputy Korneyev is a convincing example of the possibility of pluralism....

Ukrainian Communists Display Increased Activity

PM0503143993 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 5 Mar 93 First Edition p 2

[Journalist Raisa Adashinskaya report: "Idea Once Again Getting Hold on Masses"]

[Text] Dneprodzerzhinsk—A sharp increase in the activities of communists has been noted in eastern parts of Ukraine and in the Dnieper region. Primary party organizations are being recreated, Communist Party membership is being reinstated, and active preparations are being made for the All-Ukrainian Communists' Conference, which opens in Donetsk 6 March.

An oblast conference of 112 delegates representing 57 primary party organizations was held in Dnepropetrovsk on the eve of the conference. It is noteworthy that a party card served as a pass to the conference. Questions of the development of the communist movement and of the "unconstitutional ban on the Ukrainian Communist Party" and also the problem of ensuring party members' rights to vigorous political activity were discussed.

The conference elected the organizing committee, which will coordinate the work of members of the Ukrainian Communist Party (CPSU) in Dnepropetrovsk Oblast until the next conference. Delegates to the All-Ukrainian Communists' Conference and the next CPSU congress were elected.

Communist Party Conference Opens in Donetsk

LD0603111093 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1053 GMT 6 Mar 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Anatoliy Gordeyev]

[Text] Donetsk, eastern Ukraine March 6 TASS—A founding conference of the Ukrainian Communist Party opened here today. According to preliminary information obtained by ITAR-TASS at the organising committee, it is being attended by delegations from all regions of Ukraine, as well as the Republic of the Crimea.

The conference is still being held, despite powerful resistance of national-radicals, including in the republican parliament. At the same time, attempts are being made to consolidate the efforts of all opponents of communists. However, despite emphatic declarations about the creation of a united anti-communist, anti-imperial front of Ukraine, unity does not seem to be their characteristic features.

Unlike their political opponents, the organisers of today's conference did not make any bombastic statements, although never missed a chance to use the press, radio or tv. Communists were not embarrassed by critical comments of journalists. They focused their attention on the work directly with people. Most probably, it is the results of their efforts that put national-radicals on their alert: communist conferences were held in all the regions of the republic, even in the Lvov region, which has traditionally been regarded as the stronghold of Ukrainian nationalism.

Moreover, according to the most general estimates, some 10 per cent of members of the Communist Party, which was banned in August 1991, continue to regard themselves as party members. This makes about one hundred thousand people. The strength of the reviving Communist Party cannot but frighten opponents of the communist idea. It is now clear to all that most national-democratic parties, which call themselves "popular, all-people and all-Ukrainian", are reflecting in reality the interests either of small sections of the population, or of some regions of Ukraine.

In this situation participants in the conference will discuss the organising problems, which are of special importance for the Ukrainian Communist Party today. Aside from the programme documents and the rules, delegates will work out the attitude to other Communist Parties and unions, which have emerged already in Ukraine. There are about five such organisations now, and each of them insists that it is "the most communist of all". The conference will make it clear whether or not communists will reach agreement more quickly than national-radicals.

Approves Plan To Restore Party

OW0703115593 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1131 GMT 7 Mar 93

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] A national conference of communists ended in Donetsk on Saturday [6 March] by approving a plan for the gradual restoration of the Communist Party of Ukraine, CPU.

The delegates who had their mandates extended had also set up an organising committee designed to campaign for unbanning the party.

The conference involved 318 delegates from 23 regions including eight deputies from the Supreme Soviet who insisted that the resolution's clause demanding the restoration of the CPU be deleted lest it should hamper the party's legalisation in a parliamentary way.

Coordinator of the parliamentary Social Justice faction Boris Oleynik said the legalisation issue was already on this month's agenda of the Supreme Soviet. He said the lifting of the ban was very much on the cards given that the motion had enlisted support from 245 deputies.

Chairman of the Organising Committee Petr Simonenko blamed the CPU breakdown on what he described as Mikhail Gorbachev's "personality cult". Himself commercial director of the Ukruglemash coal mining equipment manufacturers, Simonenko denied allegations that the communists were trying to resuscitate the old command- administrative system. However, he stressed that communists were opposed to the dismantling of

socialism and restoration of capitalism. Simonenko said the communist party must act as legal opposition to the government's anti-socialist policies.

A number of delegations including those from Kharkov, Dniepropetrovsk and Carpatian regions joined by part of the delegates from Chernigov, Kies and Lvov regions had rejected the final resolution by issuing a separate statement.

Their statement says Simonenko's activity was out of line with the forum-declared aim of restoring the CPU. The dissidents spoke of wanting to work further to try to restore the CPU as part of the former Soviet Communist Party.

Members of the nationalist People's Rukh [Ukraine People's Movement for Perestroyka] movement and other nationalist groups with pro-democracy leanings had put pickets outside the building in which the forum was held.

IF [INTERFAX] note: The Communist Party of Ukraine was banned by the leadership of the Ukrainian parliament on August 26, 1991.

Belarus

Russian Air Force Officers Refuse To Abandon Belarus

WS0903093793 Minsk Radio Minsk Network in Belarusian 0400 GMT 9 Mar 93

[Text] Four hundred and ninety-seven Russian officers of the Lida Air Force Division, subordinated last summer under the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation, have refused to move to Russian territory. Leonid Privalov, deputy chairman of the Supreme Soviet Committee for National Security, Defense, and Combating Organized Crime, has stated that the basic motives of the Russian aviators' refusal to abandon Belarus have been merely economic, and not political, namely—a chance to obtain apartments. A special committee composed of representatives of the Belarusian Supreme Soviet and Russian and Belarusian Ministries of Defense has been created to solve this issue.

Deputies Attend Display of Hardware, Armaments

PM0803162593 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 4 Mar 93 p 1

[Valeriy Kovalev report under "From Our News Bureau" rubric: "Belarusian Parliamentarians Received Food for Thought From Military"]

[Text] Minsk—At the invitation of the Ministry of Defense, a large group of Belarusian Supreme Soviet deputies and senior officials of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Belarus has visited the Rogachev Guards' Motorized Rifle Division. The guests were shown the modern combat hardware and armament at the disposal of the republic's armed forces.

It seems that the military department had an ulterior motive in arranging this display. The parliamentarians not only saw for themselves the perfection and might of the hardware and armament but also received serious food for thought as regards ways to preserve the existing combat potential in the present difficult conditions and to prevent it from falling to a level below which the very raison d'etre of the Belarusian Army is lost. It is now up to the representatives of the top state power.

Party of Communists Cochairman Interviewed

PM0803134193 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 6 Mar 93 p 2

[Interview with Viktor Chikin, cochairman of the Party of Communists of Belarus, by correspondent Oleg Stepanenko in Minsk; date of interview not given: "Refutation to Those Who Are Driving Wedges"—first two paragraphs are introduction]

[Text] Minsk—The Republic of Belarus Supreme Soviet has repealed the decision to suspend the activity of the Communist Party of Belarus. Its organizations have set to work. In the next few days there will be a Central Committee plenum, which will give the deadline for holding the 32d, extraordinary, congress. The delegates' attention will undoubtedly be focused on the question of the unity of the communist movement in the republic.

The point is that today one more communist party, created at the time when the Communist Party of Belarus was banned, is still operating actively here. It is the Party of Communists of Belarus [PCB]. Our correspondent met with and talked with its cochairman, Viktor Chikin.

[Stepanenko] Viktor Valentinovich, how did the PCB receive the news of the lifting of the ban on the activity of the Communist Party of Belarus?

[Chikin] As a great political victory for the left-wing forces. We are glad that understanding is growing of the fact that the Communists are the only serious political force capable, together with the left-wing organizations and associations, of leading the republic out of crisis.

[Stepanenko] But the communist party has been undermined. The former party—the Communist Party of Belarus—is only being restored, while the PCB, created 15 months ago and officially recognized only in May last year, is still not strong enough and is unimpressive in terms of mass membership.

[Chikin] Everything is relative. We have over 20,000 members in the PCB. If you compare it with the Communist Party of Belarus, which before its ban had something like half a million members, that is not impressive. But if you recall that the ruling Communist Party of Belorussia in 1924 had 8,000 members and in 1947 it had 24,000 Communists, that is quite a lot.

[Stepanenko] Precise organizational structures are needed for the party's effective work.

[CHikin] They have been created. Oblast, city, and rayon committees have been elected and are operating. In addition the PCB supports parties and associations of left-wing orientation which have formed a powerful democratic current.

[Stepanenko] Today the two parties are operating independently. Does the development of events not threaten you with a split, a struggle, and consequently the weakening of each party?

[Chikin] I am sure not. We have before our eyes the example of Russia, where the communist movement has been split into many pieces. Indeed in Ukraine it is no better. We must learn from other people's mistakes. The leadership of the Communist Party of Belarus and the PCB is of the firm opinion that there should not be two communist parties in the republic. Only a single one.

[Stepanenko] Obviously the Belarusian Communists are united by the struggle against national separatism and for the restoration of the friendship and unity of the USSR peoples?

[Chikin] Undoubtedly. We oppose the constant attempts by the "democrats" and especially the members of the Belarusian People's Front to drive a wedge between Belarus and Russia and the Russian and Belarusian peoples. We are in favor of the restoration of the Union on a renewed basis.

[Stepanenko] What is your mood as you enter a new, complex, difficult period of the struggle?

[Chikin] Total confidence that the hour when reason will conquer is not far off.

[Stepanenko] Your attitude toward the convening of the 29th CPSU Congress?

[Chikin] We are in favor of the unity of Communists of all republics of the former Soviet Union. But at present there are a number of legal obstacles which prevent us from electing delegates to a common congress. It is essential to seek forms of association—a union of parties, a communist international, or something of the kind.

Communist Party Official on Next Plenary Session

WS0803073693 Minsk ZVYAZDA in Belarusian 10 Feb 93 p 1

[Interview with Aleksey Kamay, second secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Belarus, by newspaper correspondent Valyantsin Zhdanko under the "Familiar Faces" rubric: "The Communist Party of Belarus Enters the Political Arena After 17 Months of Death"; place and date not given—first paragraph is introduction]

[Text] Some days ago, the members of the Central Committee bureau of the Communist Party of Belarus [CPB] organized a session of the bureau. For the first time in its history, the session of the Central Committee bureau did not take place in the fashionable building on Karl Marx Street. But where? This was my first question to Aleksey Kamay, second secretary of the CPB Central Committee.

[Kamay] Let us say, in Minsk. On the weekend, in some place...

[Zhdanko] So, you want to say that the session was of a clandestine nature....

[Kamay] No. It was not clandestine. We just looked for a convenient place to meet. We had to take into consideration such facts as finances, location.... We are planning to convene a plenary session at the end of February. For this purpose, we will lease some quarters.

[Zhdanko] Were all the former members of the bureau present?

[Kamay] The majority: 17 out of 24.

[Zhdanko] What about Vyacheslav Kebich and Sergey Ling?

[Kamay] As you know, they withdrew their party membership as a result of the law on depolitization. As to the other members who were absent... Alexander Grakhovski died. Anatoliy Kastenka and Eduard Shyrkovski withdrew their party membership in 1991. Ivan Shamyakin is ill. Arkadiy Rusetski is on a business trip.

[Zhdanko] What do you think: Are contradictions between the CPB and the Party of Communists of Belarus [PCB] really unsolvable?

[Kamay] In fact, there are no contradictions at all. We are members of the same party.... But there are some exterior factors and we have to consider them. I do not exclude the formation of an ultra radical wing and a kind of battle for the leadership.... But we have the same political views and approaches. My opinion is: We need one Communist Party in Belarus. I will do everything possible to realize this idea.

[Zhdanko] Still I do not quite understand you. Which of the two parties will form the basis for a reestablished party? What about its title?

[Kamay] The CPB unites the old communist party members who started to organize the new party structures after August 1993. The second half of the party members decided to wait for the rehabilitation of the party. We will have to register them by 15 March. Then, the communists will decide themselves about the party's title.

[Zhdanko] What about your personal viewpoint on the issue?

[Kamay] I do not want to get ahead of time. The time for such discussions has not yet come.

[Zhdanko] Can you anticipate any court proceedings on the issue of the Communist Party property?

[Kamay] No, as far as the nearest future is concerned. Personally, at the last session, I opposed the inclusion on the agenda of the issue of the party's property. It is clear that the decree was unconstitutional. Communists should have a free hand in this issue. I think we should not have demanded the return of the building of the former Gomel Oblast city committee which currently belongs to the medical college... But we still are of the opinion that our Republican authorities should give us some housing...

[Zhdanko] Did you discuss the possibility of printing your paper?

[Kamay] Sure, we did. But we should wait until March....

[Zhdanko] Was your session held behind closed doors? Did any government officials participate in it?

[Kamay] We had a public session. Before the session, we had met with the members of the CPB political executive

committee. Besides, those party members who are engaged in different organizational activities also participated in the bureau's session.

[Zhdanko] Will there be any staff changes at the plenary session in late February?

[Kamay] To my mind, no. But the plenary session will decide on the organization of the congress. Later, after the congress, the new staff of the Central Committee will decide on possible staff changes.

Trade Unions Want Restored Economic Ties Within CIS

WS0903094093 Minsk Radio Minsk Network in Belarusian 0400 GMT 9 Mar 93

[Text] The Association of Independent Trade Unions of Belarusian Industry has turned to all the Belarusian and CIS trade unions for support. The address in particular says that the breach by the politicians of the single economic space, carried out against the Belarusian people's will, has been the reason for the social and economic difficulties. Under the circumstances, the association suggests that the issue of the restoration of the single economic space within the CIS be urgently considered. Trade unions should come forward with an initiative and address the legislatures and governments of Russia, Ukraine, and other CIS countries with concrete proposals for the solution of these issues.

Academician on Need To Develop Energy Resources

WS0903130093 Minsk Radio Minsk Network in Belarusian 0400 GMT 9 Mar 93

[Report by Pavel Borin]

[Text] [Borin] We all know that recently the price of electric power has gone up several times. I suggest listening to excerpts from the speech by Academician Oleg Martinenko, the manager of the Institute of Heat and Mass Exchange, at one of the conferences devoted to the problems of the development of Belarusian power engineering.

[Begin Martinenko recording] If we consider the problem from the point of view of a scientist and not a politician, the situation is as follows. At the current moment we have per capita power production that amounts to 0.7 kilowatts. The United States has 3 and Norway 5.6 kilowatts per capita. In other words we have a shortage of power in Belarus.

I want to brief you on what is going on in this field. We are using Russian oil. It is the most convenient and available source of power, as we are connected with Russia via pipelines. Oil production is constantly decreasing. There is only one way to provide our transport and economy with oil products by means of our quota—by the introduction of heavy refinement. The government understands this and is making appropriate moves in this direction. Novopolotsk is beginning to introduce heavy refinement already. This will permit us not to burn industrial fuel oil, but to obtain light oil products or raw materials for the chemical industry, and to enhance our export potential by two or three times. Coal is absolutely hopeless for us. Billions of dollars would have to be invested in the Russian coal industry to make Russian coal satisfactory from the point of view of efficiency. Neither Russia nor Belarus is capable of it. In some ways, we are lucky to have Russia own more than 50 percent of the world's gas deposits.

Thus, gas is the only chance for the future of our power production. Belarus has one of the best gas infrastructures in the CIS. We can easily use gas for large and small consumers. This solves the problem of 25,000 of our rayon stations using low standard inefficient coal that are greatly polluting the environment, by reshaping them for the use of gas. [end recording]

[Borin] The task is to introduce heavy refinement of oil and to use gas rationally. We will tackle these issues in detail in our future programs.

Moldova

Article Alleges Discrimination in Draft Constitution

AU0703115293 Chisinau BASAPRESS in English 1853 GMT 6 Mar 93

[Text] Chisinau, BASAPRESS 6/3/1993—The project of the new constitution is a collection of reticences, contradictions and discriminatory norms, states the political observer from the Russian daily CHISINOVSCHIE NOVOSTI. Tatiana Borisova, the article's author underlines that the project fails to inspire unity between people because it doesn't guarantee the right to work and to a place of residence and fully "fresh boot" [as received] and it cannot be perfected from the microphones of the Parliament. The project doesn't guarantee the right of the citizens to a referendum, and does not imply responsibilities for the MP's in regard to the electorate. In addition, the rights of the cultural societies and unions are not guaranteed, writes the author of the article. The fact that the deputies didn't approve the participation of two members from the parliamentary faction "Conciliation," means that the legislators adopted the old tactics of marginalising the inconvenient holders of opinions, concludes the article.

Commander of 14th Russian Army Interviewed

PM0503124193 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 26 Feb 93 First Edition p 5

[Interview with Lieutenant General A.I. Lebed, commander of 14th Russian Army, by Svetlana Gamova in Chisinau; date not given: "A. Lebed: 'The Day the

Peacemaking Force Leaves the Dniester Region, I Will Start Preparing for War in Earnest'"—first three paragraphs are introduction]

[Text] Chisinau—This February's Moscow meeting between B. Yeltsin and M. Snegur marks a new reference point in the talks on the Dniester Region, enabling us to hope that the deadlock will be overcome.

Recently the presence of the 14th Russian Army on the territory of the left bank has increasingly been linked with the problem of that bank. National patriots see the Army as the cause of the economic and political crisis in which the Republic is bogged down. But the Dniester Region, especially since last summer's armed conflict, regards it as the guarantor of peace and stability in the region, pinning hopes for the future on A. Lebed, its commander. The general, who "combed Bendery with an iron comb" and drove the warring sides out of the city, enjoys a reputation on the left bank as the people's defender—a reputation reinforced by his struggle for the purity of the leadership ranks. Chisinau politicians, for their part, regard his active involvement in the Dniester Region's political life as an attempt to establish "Russia's military control" there.

Be that as it may, there is a question. Moreover, generals who take responsibility onto themselves have already turned up in our hot spots. It was all the more interesting to talk with Lieutenant General A. Lebed.

[Gamova] Aleksandr Ivanovich, what can account for the fact that you, an exclusively military man representing the army of a foreign state in the Dniester Region, find yourself at the center of seething political passions in Moldova?

[Lebed] For this, you must take a look at the region. It is unique insofar as there has been no interethnic conflict as such here. People of various nationalities were fighting on both sides. It is not Georgia against Abkhazia. Second, the war flared up and ended in the Dniester Region. How did I understand the situation when I arrived here? Because I graduated from Ryazan Military School and the Frunze Academy, where they did not teach diplomatic science. I believed that the separation of opposing forces had to be followed by dynamic political processes which would consolidate peace at the state and international legal levels. This had to happen with the participation of intermediaries—the United Nations and the CSCE. It was necessary to endeavor to prevent a new war from flaring up: It would, in itself, be a misfortune for the people living in the region. If you also consider that the Dniester Region is the key to the Balkans and that everyone here has territorial claims on everyone else, then it is possible to assume that war will embrace first the south and then the whole of Europe. If there is fighting in Karabakh, let us say, this is a tragedy. But that is a local war, whereas here it could spread wider.

[Gamova] Six months without war is not a bad result....

[Lebed] Unfortunately, six months of peace have produced nothing. Russia has calmed down to some extent. This is understandable. There is Central Asia, which has opened its borders, and dushmans are crossing it into Russia. There is the Caucasus, where war is spreading. There is an execrable economy and a generally unstable situation. Russia, which signed the bilateral agreement settling the Dniester conflict, has masses of its own cares. People looked and listened from afar—no shooting, thank God. Some people have forgotten, while others are expressly ignoring this issue. The situation is outwardly calm, but with tremendous inner tension.

The lack of a future and of any prospects does not make people enthusiastic. Or engage in vigorous activity. People are not sure that what has been built today will not be destroyed tomorrow. This is a zone of increased danger, and so no one is in any hurry to invest capital in it. The region is decaying before our eyes. Therefore people prefer to leave and take things with them. There is no influx of manpower. As for the two regiments of the peacemaking force, they came here after the war. The ruins were still fresh, and the emotions of the civilian population were white-hot. In that situation there was a particular need for a peacemaking force to be present: It extinguished the last hotbeds of war. It worked conscientiously. Those who came later saw a different picture. Trenches were overgrown with grass, the ruins had been taken away, people had been resettled, and tears had been wiped dry. The question arose: What are we doing here? No negotiations are going on, and we are standing idle. The question "Why?" arose in the higher echelons as well. So, if the peacemaking force is removed from here without seeing the peacemaking process through to the end, on the day that decision is made I will start preparing for war in earnest. When Russia was guaranteeing peace in the Dniester Region with the presence of its peacemaking force there, some certainty existed. But if the security zone is eliminated before the political conflict has been resolved, this will untie hands. Whose? Anyone's, for everyone can see that they can act with virtual impunity.

This is with regard to the question of why a Russian general engages in politics. If people make trouble, it is up to me to sort it out. In addition, the crime situation here is bad. The undeveloped institutions of statehood in the Dniester Region and its geographic location (the narrow strip of land is eminently accessible from both sides, and this attracts criminals and mafia structures) contribute to the overt, brazen, shameless plundering of the region. No one is afraid of anything.

[Gamova] How is the 14th Army behaving in this situation, and what does it feel it is?

[Lebed] The Dniester Region unilaterally decided the army's status. I declared in response that officially I could not accept it. It is ridiculous: It is a Russian army, but its status is decided by an unrecognized republic. And yet the Russian state does not take any measures to determine who I am in this world. What are we: a group

of troops or a separate army? What is to be brought out, what is to be sold to the national economy, to whom, and on what terms? No reply. On the other hand, there are consequences. Hardware is slowly rotting, and officers lead a tense life. If only there were just one star that we could use to find our bearings! Over the past five or six years politics has dictated the withdrawal of troops from distant foreign parts. Taking the path of least resistance, decisions have been adopted to disband many units. What have people done in such cases? They asked an officer: Where were you born? Tiraspol? Be placed at the disposal of the 14th Army commander. The results is that local people make up almost 50 percent of the officer corps, some 90 percent of the ensigns, and a majority of the soldiers.

[Gamova] Does it turn out that, in terms of composition, the 14th Army is more Dniester than Russian?

[Lebed] All obey the Russian army regulations. There is no insubordination, and people serve normally. But approximately 10 percent of the 4,000 officers intend to go to Russia, and 20-25 percent are vacillating. Officers argue like this: While we are here, we will be able to protect and evacuate our families. Either we go nowhere at all or we take our wives, children, and possessions with us. On the other hand, a less expensive life is attractive. If you end up in Siberia, let us say, you will howl at the moon. If conditions were guaranteed in the new place of service, people would go, but.... A bird in the hand is worth two in the bush....

[Gamova] Addressing labor collectives, you give assurances that the 14th Army will not be withdrawn from the Dniester Region. But you are a military man, and orders are orders....

[Lebed] I know the army in terms of both its makeup and its mood: No officer would take the responsibility for leaving the region to be ruined, particularly after Bendery. We will not leave here until this territory's status has been decided and until it has been guaranteed on an international level that peace will be preserved here. This is the opinion of everyone, and I share these views. Politicians can either take this into account or ignore it, but the following factor also exists: Unless all the problems that exist in the region have been resolved, the people themselves will not let the army leave. People in the Kremlin, the White House, or somewhere else might be indignant in this regard and adopt any decisions, but no orders and no willful decisions will help....

[Gamova] What is the way out?

[Lebed] I have talked with diplomats and read books. There have been precedents in history. For example, Finland as part of czarist Russia. But let us start at the beginning. I have reckoned up what the options might be. The DMR [Dniester Moldavian Republic] as part of Russia, based on the precedent of Kaliningrad Oblast. The DMR as a constituent part of Ukraine. And a quite fantastic option: Tomorrow, when a liter of gasoline will cost more than 200 rubles, the Soviet Union will at once be revived, and the Dniester Region will become part of it. The first option is not accepted. Russia will never agree to it: There is Chechnya, Tatarstan, and so on. This would mean putting our own head in a noose. Ukraine also will not want it for understandable reasons: There is Bukovina, Bessarabia, Crimea. Of course, the region is of considerable value, but you cannot bite on four sides at once. We have agreed on the example of the Union: At present that is only a fantasy. That leaves one thing: If we live here, we must come to an agreement.

[Gamova] But the Finnish model is essentially a confederation, on which the Dniester Region is insisting.

[Lebed] Yes, a confederation. But the Finns lived together with the Russians for 109 years, until Lenin let Finland go free. There were transparent borders and a single currency, but it had its own parliament, and if it did not ratify some law of the czarist government, that law was not valid on the territory of Finland. Attempts were made to shake those established foundations, but they led to nothing worthwhile.

[Gamova] And the Crimean option?

[Lebed] Such an option is also possible.... But the whole trouble is that there are ambitions but no talks process. The task is to preserve peace. What is preventing this, if not the ambitions of politicians? The bulk of the people do not want to fight, for they see no point in war. This means it is necessary to find ways to bring people closer together, to close the gap which Bendery created, and to alter its depth. But only time can do this. If, given our lack of education, we still rummage about in history, we can find sufficient examples on whose basis we must resolve the Dniester Region's problem. But, since Russia is busy with its own troubles, no other side is undertaking this.

[Gamova] In your view, can the recent meeting of the presidents of Russia and Moldova lend dynamism to the Dniester Region's static situation?

[Lebed] Undoubtedly. I personally am entirely satisfied with the results of the meeting between Boris Yeltsin and Mircea Snegur. This confirms yet again that common sense has prevailed. That which concerns the army stationed in the Dniester Region suits me as its commander. No ill-considered deadlines have been set. The 14th Army will be withdrawn from the region after its political status has been decided. This is the main point.

P.S. While the presidents of Russia and Moldova are holding talks and trying to bring their positions closer together, Gen. Lebed defines the place and role of the 14th Army proceeding from his own political ideas. The accord in principle on the Russian subunits' withdrawal from the Dniester Region is essentially disputed by the commander. In this way the general is clearly exceeding his regulation duties. Politicians and diplomats must arrange relations between the two sovereign states. Any interference by the military in this sphere could do irreparable harm.

Kiev Asked To Grant Citizenship to Dniester Ukrainians

OW0803163093 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1550 GMT 8 Mar 93

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] A congress of representatives of the Ukrainian population of Moldova's region of Dniester, held in Dubossary, sent a letter to the leadership of Ukraine asking it to set up a commission to consider granting Ukrainian citizenship to Dniester Ukrainians, who, according to the letter, are eligible for this since Dniester was formally part of Ukraine in 1922.

The congress is going to send similar appeals to the United Nations and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

Under the Ukrainian law, Ukrainian citizenship can be given to anyone born in Ukraine or his/her descendants, but the latter's status is not clearly formulated.

Newspaper Opposes Moldova's Unification With Romania

LD0803184093 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1149 GMT 8 Mar 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Fedor Angeli]

[Text] Chisinau, 8 Mar—The newspaper ZEMLYA I LYUDI of the Agrarian-Democratic Party of Moldova believes that the idea of reuniting Moldova with Romania, which is continually being raised by publications of the republic's National Front, follows from the aspirations of politicians who long ago lost touch with the people.

The paper asserts that only the people have the right to decide by referendum on any change of Moldovan statehood. "All the fabrications that Moldova cannot exist as an independent state, and that it will prosper only after being united with Romania, should be stopped. Those who do not like the state regime of independent and sovereign Moldova, and who will not hesitate to break the laws of the republic for their own ambitious aims, have no other option but to decide to take the citizenship of another state."

The paper writes that Moldova must be an integral, independent, and sovereign state. "History has given it a unique chance to assert its statehood. We should use this opportunity for the good of all our people. The present republican government is more realistic than all the former ones. It is capable of working effectively to bring Moldova out of its sociopolitical and economic crisis," ZEMLYA I LYUDI notes.

Gagauz Leader Topal Visits Cyprus, Turkey

AU0603164593 Chisinau BASAPRESS in English 1837 GMT 5 Mar 93

[Text] Chisinau, BASAPRESS 5/3/1993—On February 18, Stepan Topal, the President of the self-proclaimed Gagauzian Republic, visited Cyprus and Turkey on the invitation of the Cypriot society "Vakfi." "Together with Mustafa Celioglo, President of the Tatarians from Crimea, we had meetings with all the top leaders of Cyprus," declared Stepan Topal at his arrival when questioned by a BASA reporter. Stepan Topal mentioned that ten young Gagauzians would leave in the nearest future to Cyprus in order to obtain undergraduate courses there. "I went to Turkey to demand those 35 million dollars which were promised to the Republic of Moldova by the Turkish Government, but the leaders of social organisations with which I had negotiations told us that the money would be granted only after the statute of Gagauzia is adopted by the Parliament of Chisinau," concluded Stepan Topal.

Kazakhstan

Nazarbayev Warns of Decline in Standard of Living

OW0503183793 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1609 GMT 5 Mar 93

[Report by Andrey Pershin, Andrey Petrovskiy, and Vladimir Shishlin; edited by Boris Grishchenko; from the "Presidential Bulletin" feature—following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev, speaking at a meeting with heads of oblast administrations and heads of territorial subdivisions of the state committee on property, warned that "the main difficulties of the people of Kazakhstan remain ahead." He called on people to "live through and overcome" the coming material stratification of society, the bankruptcy of enterprises, unemployment, and the fall in the standards of living.

"The cabinet of ministers and I hoped that the country's economic recovery would happen faster than it actually is," admitted Nazarbayev. He said that the simultaneous resolution of the problems of economic liberalization and the stabilization of the monetary and financial system was "unattainable in such a short period of time." The president noted that the latest information suggests that social and economic difficulties are continuing to grow, the ruble is still losing value, and the population's standard of living is falling significantly. The head of state said that stopping the decline in production and reviving the economy would be made possible by a new national privatization program for 1993-1995.

According to Nazarbayev's data, some 6,198 properties with an estimated total value of 41 billion rubles (in 1991 prices) had been restructured in the republic. The number of people employed in privatized enterprises is now 767,000, or 12% of the working population, said the Kazakh leader. In addition, he called attention to the fact that a proposed plan on the privatization of the state housing stock, trading properties, and consumer services had still not been carried out.

Nazarbayev on Harvest Campaign, Agriculture Issues

LD0803135593 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 1045 GMT 8 Mar 93

[Interview with President Nursultan Nazarbayev by Mayak correspondent Viktor Glukhovtsev; place and date not given—recorded]

[Text] [Glukhovtsev] Nursultan Abishevich, the great Kazakhstan field work campaign—if we can put it like that—is beginning now. What are the main problems to be tackled during the spring sowing season?

[Nazarbayev] Workers in Kazakhstan's agriculture are experiencing the same difficulties as all other agricultural workers of the former Soviet Union: namely, nondelivery of mineral fertilizers and spare parts, and a shortage of fuels, lubricants, and financing. That is the whole situation.

Kazakhstan's agriculture, however, was always distinguished by a high degree of organization and mechanization, and we are doing everything possible to maintain these traditions. Agricultural production has not become unmanageable in our republic, though we have 10,000 peasant farms and private farmers in our republic, which is no small number for Kazakhstan.

In accordance with my decree of 8 February last year, 24 percent of agricultural enterprises have been privatized. Our method of privatization has been to allocate a family plot to each individual according to his length of labor service. We give him a property document registering his ownership of this land. With this capital, this share, as his property he can leave the collective or state farm and start up on his own, or he may remain in the labor collective.

The majority prefer to remain in the collective, because things are currently very tough for private farmers or for anyone setting up a peasant farm. They have no equipment, nowhere to sell their produce, and are always short of money. So we are taking the line of supporting farms at the first stage, when they are getting established. As for spring field work, the time has come to work on implementing my decree on the self-sufficiency of every settlement—especially in rural areas. In one year, sugar beet production has gone up three-fold and production of oleaginous crops has increased ten-fold in one oblast.

There has been a manifold increase in the number of livestock owned by the population. The oblast has not, in general, permitted any reduction in the number of cattle of all types, and considerable success has been achieved. In Kazakhstan's southern oblasts, spring field work is to begin in the next few days. I believe that we are well prepared for it and that the sowing campaign will run smoothly.

Agriculture always needs support. Despite all the difficulties we are experiencing, we are now, first of all, changing over to advance payment. A subsidy of 84 billion [R] has been allocated to agriculture, compared to R18 billion last year. In particular, we shall subsidize livestock production in order to prevent a drop in number of livestock. I believe that we shall live through this difficult period. You know that we managed to avoid a sharp drop in the number of livestock for Kazakhstan as a whole.

[Glukhovtsev] And yet, life is hard for an ordinary person at present. Prices are high. There are market problems. In your view—with agriculture being run as it is—how long will it take our republic to somehow stabilize the situation so that life becomes easier?

[Nazarbayev] We have set ourselves a task to draw up a brand new conceptual approach to Kazakhstan's agriculture. We know how much we need for internal consumption. Each rayon, each oblast, is now making calculations to find out what would be profitable to produce. We shall bring all the data together and draw up a new blueprint for our republic's agricultural development. We shall thus determine what to sell abroad, in what we can be self-sufficient, and what we need to buy.

The year 1992 was the first year when we went into autonomous flight, as it were, with our independence and sovereignty, with ties being severed, and with all the hardships experienced by others as well. Yet this negative experience, against the background of difficulties, has taught us a lot. Both in industry and in agriculture, I observe the same phenomenon: life has forced producers to look for suppliers and consumers to build ties. Horizontal ties will come into being. There is no doubt about it. All producers—both industrial and agricultural—will have to reduce costs, look for markets, and get by in a competitive environment. Therefore, I believe that all of them—in industry and in agriculture—need another two years to find both a supplier and a consumer for their products. Then a real market will emerge. By that time, because of denationalization and privatization, we should build a competitive economy. I believe that it will all work out.

Nazarbayev Forms Commission To Find War Prisoners

LD0903092793 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0839 GMT 9 Mar 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Fedor Ignatov]

[Text] Alma-Ata March 9 TASS—President Nursultan Nazarabayev of Kazakhstan has issued a decree to set up a commission charged with the task of releasing war prisoners, captured by mojaheeds, and searching for servicemen reported missing during the hostilities in Afghanistan.

The commission includes Yelena Bochkina, member of the Soldiers' Mothers of Kazakhstan Movement, People's Deputy Nikolay Zadorozhnyy, chairman of the republican Afghan War Veterans Organisation, representatives from several ministries and departments.

"We shall not limit ourselves only to the search for Kazakh war prisoners and their liberation," chairman of the committee Byrganym Aitimova, chairman of the parliamentary Committee for the Affairs of the Young People, stated in this connection. "Officers and men from other regions of the former Soviet Union are also languishing in captivity. We shall try to help them return home, too. For our part, we are looking forward to assistance from similar commissions in other CIS republics."

President Nazarbayev Takes 'Short Vacation'

OW0903115993 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1058 GMT 9 Mar 93

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Interfax has been informed by the press service of Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev that beginning on Tuesday [9 March], the president is taking a short vacation.

Tajikistan

Rakhmanov Arrives in Beijing; To Meet Leadership

LD0703171693 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1550 GMT 7 Mar 93

[By TIA-KHOVAR for ITAR-TASS correspondents Nabiy Karimov and Pavel Spirin]

[Text] Beijing March 7 TASS—"The aim of our visit to China is to raise Tajik-Chinese relations to a qualitatively new level, to give them powerful impetus to meet the challenge of times," Imamali Rakhmanov, chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Tajikistan, said on his arrival in Beijing on Sunday [7 March].

Speaking at a news conference, he expressed the confidence that the forthcoming talks with the Chinese leadership would lay down a lasting foundation for cooperation between the two states "contribute to the cause of peace and security in the region."

During his visit, Rakhmanov will meet Chinese President Yang Shangkun, Premier Li Peng, and General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party Jiang Zemin. The two sides are expected to sign 10 agreements and documents, including a declaration on the fundamentals of relationship and a protocol on cooperation between the Ministries of Foreign Affairs. The sides plan to discuss several issues connected with opening direct air communication between Dushanbe and Beijing and granting Tajikistan a 30 million yuan commodity credit.

PRC To Provide Credit, Aid

LD0803111293 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1000 GMT 8 Mar 93

[Text] China will allocate commodity credits amounting to 30 million yuan and humanitarian aid amounting to 3 million yuan to Tajikistan. This was declared by Li Peng, the premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, at negotiations with Tajik Supreme Soviet Chairman Imamali Rakhmonov. Rakhmanov is paying an official visit to China. The funds received as humanitarian aid are expected to be spent on buying food and medicine in China.

Russia To Provide 2.5-3 Million Tonnes of Oil

OW0803142193 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1313 GMT 8 Mar 93

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Tajik Prime Minister Abdumalik Abdullodzhanov told Interfax in an exclusive interview that, under an agreement reached at a recent meeting of CIS prime ministers in Surgut, Tajikistan would be receiving from Russia between 2.5 and three million tonnes of oil a year. He said his republic would shortly receive 50,000 tonnes of diesel fuel for spring sowing.

Abdullodzhanov said Tajik and U.S. experts had estimated that Tajikistan itself possessed enough oil to satisfy all its needed. He said American partners, having explored an oilfield in Leninabad Region where oil had been extracted since the 17th century, had come to the conclusion that between 66 and 68 percent of Tajik oil was of very high quality. However, it is accumulated at a depth of between 6000 and 10,000 km, which makes extraction difficult. The Americans, the Prime Minister said, had already started work on the deposit, and necessary equipment would arrive very soon. He said the Americans expected to ultimately produce up to 400,000 tonnes of oil a year.

Within the first quarter of 1994, the Premier said, an oil refinery would be put into operation in Leninabad Region, which was also a joint Tajik-U.S. project. It would be producing Ai-95 extra and Ai-93 petrol as well as high-quality diesel fuel. If everything went as planned, within two or three years Tajikistan would only need half of the amount of oil specified in the Surgut agreement, Abdullodzhanov said.

Troops Remain 'on Alert' for Opposition Attack

LD0903095193 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0800 GMT 9 Mar 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Galina Gridneva]

[Text] Dushanbe, March 9—The socio-political situation in the capital of Tajikistan remains difficult and highly unpredictable. An attack on the city by armed opposition units rumored to be planned for 5 March thankfully never materialized, but all the signs are that the official authorities are not ruling out similar moves.

Government troops remain on alert, while Interior Ministry and National Security Committee units have been sent back to their barracks. Armored police patrols prowl the streets around the clock.

Government buildings, the airport, and bridges are guarded by armored units, and all types of vehicles are subject to search. Military patrols are also monitoring the city's marketplaces.

The National Security Committee's press center reports that government troops recently disarmed several small bands of irregulars trying to infiltrate the capital from the direction of Ramit via the nearby Varzob gorge. Unidentified persons have scattered seditious and antigovernment leaflets in some residential areas of Dushanbe. According to the National Security Committee, the situation in Tajikistan's Pamir region is largely under control and there have been no major clashes with irregulars.

Refugees intimidated by opposition field commanders with stories of terrible retribution from government troops are now returning to their liberated villages, while a curfew has been imposed in a number of rayons in the Garm area until complete normality returns. The duties of commander there are being undertaken by the commanding officer of the Garm group of forces, Major General Maksud Mamadzhanov.

Opposition Denies Forming 'Islamic Republic'

LD0903120193 Tehran Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran Farsi Program Network in Persian 1030 GMT 9 Mar 93

[Text] Groups opposed to the Tajik Government have denied reports about the establishment of an Islamic republic in the country's eastern regions. A source close to these groups has said that groups opposed to the Tajik Government have merely formed a military council that they have named the Islamic-Military Council. The source claimed that the council had been formed to establish order and coordinate military actions.

Two weeks ago, former Tajik President Rakhmon Nabiyev announced that the opposition had established an Islamic republic in the eastern region of Tavil-Darreh.

Turkmenistan

President Says 'Major Achievements' Made in Past Year

OW0803142493 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1314 GMT 8 Mar 93

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Turkmenistan's president has extended his greetings to the women in the republic, wishing them "good health, good fortune, peace and prosperity."

President Niyazov observed in his congratulatory address that the republic has made major achievements over the year, such as introduced new power bodies (People's Council, and Council of the Elders), reinstated its traditional holidays, raised wages and social subsidies, including the right to a free of charge use of gas, water and electric power supplies.

In the future, President Niyazov claimed, the people of Turkmenistan will have a "much more prosperous and better life," noting that all this will be achieved as a

result of the implementation of the government's programs "10 Years of Prosperity" and "National Revival Movement."

Returns to Work

OW0903115093 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1058 GMT 9 Mar 93

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Turkmen President Saparmurad Niyazov has returned to work after recovering from an illness. Interfax was told by the presidential press service that the republic's cabinet of ministers had a Tuesday [9 March] meeting chaired by Niyazov.

Scientists' Objections to Iran AES Plan Rebutted

PM0803200993 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 6 Mar 93 First Edition p 4

[Vladimir Kuleshov report followed by Sergey Leskov commentary under general heading: "Attempt Being Made To Oust Russian Nuclear Scientists from World Market"]

[Text] Ashgabat—Scientists of the Turkmenistan Academy of Sciences have declared their official categorical "No!" to the future construction of the powerful Iranian nuclear electric power station which, according to preliminary information, will be located on the southeast shore of the Caspian, close to Turkmenistan's state border.

According to foreign press reports, a secret agreement between Iran and Russia was concluded as long ago as 24 August last year. Although it has still not officially been made public, it provides both for a whole package of construction and installation work by Russia's "Zarubezhatomenergostroy" in constructing the station and for the two countries' cooperation in formulating radiological protection and nuclear safety measures, in producing and utilizing radioactive isotopes in industry and agriculture, and also in training specialists and carrying out research and development.

Under the terms of the accord, which is designed for a period of 15 years, two reactors will be constructed in Iran, each with a capacity of 440 megawatts. But David Kidd, spokesman for the International Atomic Energy Agency, maintains that the agreement between Iran and Russia does not contain any accords on the fate of the spent nuclear fuel, which could be used to produce nuclear munitions. "At first the Russians were very surprised, but then they said that they had not thought about this," Kidd said.

"Not so long ago I met with Professor Gordon, an eminent U.S. scientist," Agadzhan Babayev, president of the Turkmenistan Academy of Sciences, told me. "He urged us scientists and the republic's entire public to say 'No!' to construction of the future Iranian nuclear electric power station. The main reason for this stand, which we have already officially stated to our government, is the too high seismic activity in the region of the proposed construction site. In addition, there is its proximity to a sea which is shared by everyone here. If this were to come about, many people would have to pay the price...."

I went to the Turkmenistan Academy of Sciences Institute of Seismology.

"Two years ago, before the breakup of the USSR, we were involved in work on assessing the seismotectonic conditions of the region designated by the Iranian side to accommodate the station," Batyr Karryyev, head of the experimental seismology laboratory, told me. "This region is characterized by intensive tectonic movements and by vigorous mud-volcanic and seismic activity. Very strong earthquakes have originated there repeatedly with an intensity of up to force 9. In short, there is no way a nuclear power station should be built there. The situation is also exacerbated by the proximity of the Caspian: The water level has been rising steeply since 1978. In 1991, at the request of the USSR 'Zarubezhatomenergostroy,' we reached a preliminary conclusion on the region of this nuclear electric power station in Iran. The Islamic republic is also familiar with our document, but, to all appearances, neither 'Zarubezhatomenergostroy' nor the Iranian governmental organization for nuclear power generation took it particularly into account."

During his fairly recent visit to Ashgabat Khadzhi Azim [name as transliterated], vice president of the Iranian organization for the construction and operation of nuclear stations, persistantly tried to convince Turkmen scientists and journalists that the nuclear electric power station would do no one any harm. But the Iranian power engineers ought to have heeded the opinion of Turkmen scientists! Until recently there was no system of seismic observations on the territory of the Islamic republic equal to the importance of the planned project.

"Chernobyl showed us all what is what," Agadzhan Babayev said. "But we have already forgotten it and are once again preparing a powder keg for ourselves. I can only be amazed at the behavior of the Iranian Government in choosing a very densely populated region which shakes almost every day. We are against this position of Iran's."

[Leskov begins] The conflict which has flared up over the possible construction of a nuclear electric power station in Iran according to a Russian project is part of what has recently become the usual picture of Russia being ousted from regions where it has traditionally held strong economic positions. Very plausible pretexts are advanced for breaking off contacts, as in this case. But the practice of other deals shows that, once Russia has gone, it is followed by the competitors who little by little initiated the annulment of the former treaty.

The objections to Russia's cooperation with Iran in the nuclear power sphere are unconvincing for many reasons. A nuclear electric power station with a capacity of

300 megawatts is also being constructed in Iran according to a Chinese project without eliciting any protests. Nuclear electric power stations are constructed in seismic regions in many countries, including the USSR, and the means of protecting the reactor from vibrations up to force 10 are no secret. In just the same way many nuclear stations have been constructed on the seashore—this is considered the usual practice in ecologically sound West Europe and Japan.

This is why you get the impression that competitors are deliberately creating a ballyhoo over the plan for a Russian nuclear electric power station in Iran. The most surprising thing is that there is still no specific project as such over which it would be possible to argue. "Zarubezhatomenergostroy" Chief Engineer S. Tipikin has said that a suitable site for the nuclear electric power station is only being sought at present. The possibility that it will be found far from the coast has not been ruled out.

To all appearances, the Iranian project will be an improved version of the nuclear electric power station which the USSR constructed in Finland. In terms of a number of very important indicators the Lovisa Nuclear Electric Power Station is considered one of the best in the world. At the same time our specialists do not rule out the use in this project of previously secret military technologies which were used to totally eliminate vibrations on missile launchers. In this case, prior to licensing, research has to be carried out on a scale unprecedented in any of our former international projects.

As regards the lack of an agreement on the return of spent nuclear fuel from Iran, it is simply too soon to speak about this yet. Specialists who have been involved in international projects know that always and everywhere the contract for the construction of a nuclear electric power station is signed first and then a contract for fuel. But here there is still a long way to go to the first stage. In general, I cannot understand what the fuss is all about: Russia signed the agreement on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, under which it pledged to remove spent assemblies from its nuclear stations. Russia unswervingly fulfills this regime in all contracts.

A senior employee of the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy told IZVESTIYA's correspondent that many high-ranking U.S. diplomats have unofficially but persistently raised during talks the question of construction of a Russian nuclear electric power station in Iran. But the Russian side has invariably declared: All obligations will be fulfilled, but we will not renounce the nuclear electric power station. The question is all the more fundamental for Russia because not one cent has been allocated from the billions promised by the West for improving Russian nuclear electric power stations. Western companies insist on constructing nuclear electric power stations in Russia according to their own plans. Russia in turn argues that it has adequate potential and needs only certain kinds of equipment.

At all events, Russia must earn money independently and be able to stand up for itself in the tough competitive struggle. As regards the "secrecy" of the agreement between Russia and Iran, people in the Ministry of Atomic Energy shrugged their shoulders in a quandary and suggested that Turkmenia's representatives familiarize themselves with this document, about which the world press is badly informed, as is clear, incidentally, from our correspondent's report. But official notification of a sovereign state—which is what Turkmenistan is—about the course of talks between other countries is not part of the practice of diplomatic etiquette.

Armenia

Defense Minister Makes 'Surprise Visit' to Mardakert

NC0803210693 Paris AFP in English 2021 GMT 8 Mar 93

[Report by Patrick Kamenka]

[Excerpts] Drmbon, Azerbaijan, March 8 (AFP)—The Armenian defense minister made a surprise visit at the weekend [6-7 March] to Mardakert in the besieged enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan which Armenian military experts said was about to fall to Armenian control.

The Mardakert region of northern Nagorno-Karabakh, visited by Armenian Defense Minister Vazgen Manukyan is the last Azerbaijani stronghold. Armenian military experts have claimed that they will capture it in the next few days and thereby control the entire enclave. Asked about his visit to this region, which is still officially a part of Azerbaijan, Manukyan said he "traveled a lot."

Officially, the Armenian fighters in Nagorno-Karabakh are volunteers from this region. But it is evident that Armenia has been supporting its nationals in Nagorno-Karabakh, an enclave in Azerbaijan whose population is predominantly Armenian.

"The troop morale is good," Manukyan said as he inspected Armenian positions in Kusapat, just outside Mardakert. "The operations are successful because the people are fighting to free their land," he added. [passage omitted]

Manukyan denied that any Russian forces were aiding the Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh. Baku has claimed that Russian troops, particularly the 127th and 128th regiments, are aiding the Armenians in the Lachin corridor that connects Armenia with Nagorno-Karabakh.

This journalist who traveled in the corridor Sunday did not see any sign of Russian troops.

NKR Forces Report Success in Mardakertskiy Rayon

NC0803150193 Yerevan Armenia's Radio First Program Network in Armenian 1300 GMT 8 Mar 93

[Text] The Nagorno-Karabakh Republic's [NKR] self-defense forces achieved new successes in Mardakertskiy Rayon on 6 and 7 March. The villages of Kusapat, Metsshen, Mokhratag and Dzhanyatag were liberated. Armenian freedom fighters also occupied the heights overlooking Nerkin-Oratag and Damirli. The fighting is continuing.

NKR self-defense forces headquarters reported that Azerbaijani units suffered substantial losses in men and material and left some armored cars on the battlefield. There are injured among the Armenian freedom fighters.

The enemy shelled Gadrut from military bases in Fizulinskiy Rayon on the night of 6 March. The shelling caused destruction. An Armenian freedom fighter was killed and another was injured.

Azerbaijani units stepped up their operations against the Lachin humanitarian corridor last Saturday and Sunday [6-7 March], shelling its southern sector. The NKR self-defense forces returned the fire.

A brief exchange of fire took place on the border near Movses in Armenia's Tavushskiy Rayon last night. Azerbaijani armed units used heavy-caliber weapons. One of our fighters was injured.

The Armenian Defense Ministry Press Service reported that the Azerbaijani side shelled Khndzoresk and Kornitsor in Gorisskiy Rayon with artillery. The Armenian forces retaliated and forced the Azerbaijanis to cease firing. Our side did not suffer any casualties.

An ARMENPRES correspondent reported that Lieutenant Anushavan Mkhitaryan, the head of the border post at Kayan in Idzhevanskiy Rayon, has found out that the Azerbaijanis have killed the four freedom fighters injured and taken prisoner during fighting on the heights near Paravakar in Tavushskiy Rayon on 4 June 1992. Their bodies were returned to their parents on 8 March on Idzhevanskiy Rayon border. Talks are going on about a prisoner exchange.

Government Pledges Financial Support to NKR

NC0803170293 Yerevan Armenia's Radio First Program Network in Armenian 1300 GMT 8 Mar 93

[Text] In order to meet the important needs of Nagorno-Karabakh Republic [NKR], the Armenian Government has decided to set aside 98 million rubles for the NKR state budget. Of those, 50 million will be used to pay loans used for the central state capital investments. The 48 million rubles will be used to finance the budget, obtain fuel, and pay for additional power requirements.

Fifty 50 million rubles out of 1.410 billion rubles allocated for Armenia's Pensions and Employment Fund has been allocated to a similar fund in the NKR to pay for the 1992 shortfall.

Parliament Discusses Debate Over Constituent Assembly

OW0903120293 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1058 GMT 9 Mar 93

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The Armenian parliament continued on Tuesday [9 March] morning to discuss whether to include in the agenda the question of the possible calling of a constituent (constitutional) assembly.

The previous evening, the deputies, having discussed the matter practically all day, could not come to any sort of resolution.

The opposition—the National Self-Determination bloc, the Dashnaktsutnyun party, and the liberal democrats—are insisting upon the calling of a constituent assembly to adopt a new Armenian constitution. The Armenian National Movement, which rules the republic, is the main opponent of the motion to call a constituent assembly.

According to data from the opposition, about 130 of 247 Armenian deputies are in favor of a constituent assembly.

Some 1500-2000 opposition supporters have been demonstrating since this morning outside the building in which the Armenian Supreme Council is meeting; similar demonstrations were held last evening calling for a constituent assembly.

President Pledges To Crack Down on Crime

MK0503164593 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 5 Mar 93 p 3

[Armen Khanbabyan article: "The President Does Not Guarantee an Easy Life, but Promises To Put Things in Order"]

[Text] Republic President Levon Ter-Petrosyan and Prime Minister Grant Bagratyan have held a conference on the performance of the law enforcement bodies. The president spoke about the tasks facing the law enforcement bodies during the transitional period, which he described as very complicated and difficult, when old laws stop working while new laws have yet to be devised. The fact that under these conditions the criminal world is raising its profile, the president stressed, is an objective process, characteristic of all the former Soviet republics. Although representatives of opposition political forces and their press try to make the public believe that this is the result of the incompetence of the authorities, Ter-Petrosyan noted, parties and deputies are interfering in the work of the law enforcement bodies. The authorities are accused of failing to deal with rising crime and mafia activity, but as soon as action begins to be taken, forces that have become targets of law enforcement bodies' attention are immediately taken under protection by the selfsame political forces, which calls the sincerity of their intentions into question.

"The people," the president said, "are justifiably outraged over the looting of cargoes going to Armenia across the entire territory of Georgia. However, similar things are also happening within Armenia. At airports, on railroads, and supply lines in general, entrepreneurs carrying, for example, gasoline from one part of Armenia to another have on several occasions been forced to pay so- called taxes that are in fact illegal." "Stopping this practice," the president stated, "is the top priority, and first of all things will be put in order at the airports, because the blockade is bound to continue for a long time yet. Possibly the situation in Georgia, too, will remain unstable, and therefore the airports continue to be, in fact, the only window to the outside world." Ter-Petrosyan stated that the government had already issued appropriate instructions and that the situation at Yerevan airport would be rectified within a week, promising that after this the situation on the railroads and highways would be placed under strict control.

According to the president, the performance of the law enforcement bodies has also been affected by the political climate in the republic. The opposition's campaign creates the impression that the current authorities are only temporary. However, the talk about the temporary nature of the present authorities has been going on since the time they came to power, that is, since August 1990. Since then, Ter-Petrosyan said, governments and presidents in many republics of the former Union have changed, with even civil wars starting in some areas, yet the situation in Armenia is still fairly stable. He did not promie the people an easy life soon, observing philosophically in conclusion that the Armenian nation has existed for over 3,000 years and neither the president, nor the opposition can play with its fate. Both today's authorities and the opposition are temporary phenomena, but the Armenian nation and the state will remain forever.

Investment Bank, Links With Turkey, Iran 'Priority'

OW0503183693 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1609 GMT 5 Mar 93

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Artyum Atalyants [spelling as received], presidential advisor on international economic links, says that Armenia must step up its economic links with Turkey and Iran, its neighbors. At a news conference he said that Armenia must become a banking country, a "banking interface" between the East and the West. The advisor thinks that creating a favorable climate for fast expansion of the country's economic potential was the country's top priority.

Besides, he thinks that to replenish its hard currency resources, Armenia must set up an investment bank with an equity capital of at least $5 to ten million in the U.S.A. or Western Europe.

On the question of economic links with Moscow the advisor thinks that if Russia succeeds in stabilizing its economy and currency, then Armenia will have no reason to quit the ruble zone.

The presidential advisor told journalists that when he meets Russian Vice-Premier Boris Fedorov shortly, he will propose a plan of setting up an Armenian-Russian investment Bank.

Azerbaijan

Russian, Turkish Ministers To Mediate on Karabakh

OW0903005793 Baku Azerbaycan Radio Televiziyasi Television Network in Russian 1500 GMT 5 Mar 93

[From the "Telefaks" newscast]

[Text] According to Turkish television reports, the foreign ministers of Russia and Turkey will soon visit Yerevan and Baku in pursuit of their intermediary mission—to assist in the resolution of the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia. This became known at the conclusion of a visit to Moscow by Turkish Foreign Minister Hikmet Cetin and his talks with Andrey Kozyrev, his Russian colleague, on 2 March—after which both ministers made a joint statement on the Karabakh conflict. It is assumed that the leaders of the Russian and Turkish Foreign Ministries will meet with the Armenian and Azerbaijani presidents in the course of their mission.

Defense Ministry Bans Daily Battlefield Reports

LD0903110893 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 1000 GMT 9 Mar 93

[Text] The Azerbaijan Defense Ministry has introduced a new form of reports from battlefields. Thus, daily reports have been temporarily suspended and replaced by weekly reports. The TURAN agency reports that the measure has been introduced in order to prevent leaks of state and military secrets.

Elchibey Sends Letter to UN Secretary General

OW0803204193 Baku Azerbaycan Radio Televiziyasi Television Network in Russian 1500 GMT 5 Mar 93

[From the "Telefaks" newscast]

[Text] The president of Azerbaijan has sent a letter to the UN secretary general in connection with the anniversary of Azerbaijan's admittance into the United Nations. The letter notes Azerbaijan's adherence to the principles of territorial integrity of other states and noninterference in their internal matters, as safeguarded by the UN Charter.

At the same time, the Republic of Armenia is conducting large-scale military operations behind the curtain of separatism being brutally raised in the republic's territory. According to a document received by the Kheber Service agency from the Azerbaijan president's press service, Azerbaijan has repeatedly appealed to the Security Council, which resulted in visits by representatives of international organizations and the rendering of humanitarian aid to the republic.

First Round of People's Congress Held in Baku

OW0803120693 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1052 GMT 8 Mar 93

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The two-day first round of the Large People's Congress of representatives from Azerbaijan's major political parties, took place in Baku on Sunday [7 March]. The coordinating council Birlik (Unity) was formed, and must within one week prepare recommendations on ways to strengthen national security and state-building. These recommendations are expected to be discussed at the second round of the congress set for 13-14 March.

The goal of the forum is the working out of a general platform upon which all of Azerbaijan's political and social forces can be concentrated so as to overcome the critical situations in politics and the economy.

Georgia

Shevardnadze Views Abkhazia, Russia, Resignation

LD0803194893 Tbilisi CONTACT INFORMATION AGENCY in Russian 1520 GMT 8 Mar 93

[Excerpts] Eduard Shevardnadze, chairman of the parliament of Georgia and head of state, said in his regular radio interview today that the formation of the Georgian Army is being carried out very successfully. The competence of the commanders today is significantly higher than two to three months ago. The goal of his visit to Abkhazia was to gain assurance on the reliability of Sukhumi's defense, and to familiarize ourselves with the situation in the army and in the whole region and to meet the representatives of the Abkhazian side. We did not succeed in doing the last thing, he said.

Touching on the visit of Grachev—whom Shevardnadze has not met—to Abkhazia, the head of state said that it has not brought any positive results either to the Abkhaz or to the Georgian side. [passage omitted]

Eduard Shevardnadze described the message from the White House to Russia and Georgia regarding the improvement of relations between the two states as an important document, whose authors had taken a good look at the problem and had gained a clear understanding of the fact that the Caucasus is an area where an escalation of confrontation threatens stability in Europe and further afield.

Yesterday was the first anniversary of Eduard Shevardnadze's return to Georgia. During this period quite a lot has been done, but the most important thing is that the world has seen that Georgia has chosen a democratic track and it has therefore been recognized. "I have also contributed," Shevardnadze said, "to the fact that we have chosen the difficult path of democracy, and though

dictatorship can be established much more easily, we will never abandon our plans. Establishing democratic order and setting up the first democratic institutions were among the most difficult things in the history of the Georgian state, and this stage we have completed successfully."

Answering the correspondent's question about the possibility of his resignation, the head of state said: "I think that there are no grounds for talking about this, but if the people say that someone else will perform these duties better than Shevardnadze, then it's possible to talk about it. Such rumors lead our countries to deadlock and we should do everything to prevent them from coming true."

Abkhaz Leader: Sukhumi Spared by Shevardnadze

OW0903114493 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1057 GMT 9 Mar 93

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Tamaz Nadareishvili the chairman of the Abkhazian government loyal to Tbilisi, believes that the Abkhazian formations did not storm Sukhumi due to Georgian leader Eduard Shevardnadze's arrival in that city. According to reports from Sukhumi, the assault had been scheduled for March 4.

Speaking on Georgian TV on Monday [8 March], Nadareishvili alleged that 300 Russian career officers under General Leshchuk's command operated on the side of the Abkhazians. This particular group of officers was expected to carry out the assault of Sukhumi, after which the city was to be occupied by Abkhazian formations and "mercenaries from the North Caucasus, he said. "Following Shevardnadze's arrival in Abkhazia, the Russian officers refused to attack the city," he added.

He noted, at the same time, that the danger of an assault was still there. The city is securely protected, however, and reinforcement and additional military equipment are coming, he said.

Nadareishvili accused Russia once again of aggression against Georgia. He also said that for two days running, combat aircraft with Russian symbols had dropped bombs on the Georgian positions.

Anti-Shevardnadze Film Shown on Television

OW0803141393 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1313 GMT 8 Mar 93

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] An Ostankino telecast was unexpectedly interrupted in Georgia on the evening of 7 March. In its place, a film entitled "Shevardnadze—the Mask Torn Off" was shown. The film was prepared by a Western television company, probably one based in Germany. It contained statements directed against the Georgian leader. Shevardnadze was called, for instance, "a bloody dictator," and former president Zviad Gamsakhurdia "the lawful president and beloved son of the Georgian people." The film was cut off after about 15 minutes.

Interfax was told at the technical service of Georgian television that the broadcast was made from transmitters located in Pitsunda, in Abkhazia.

Tbilisi expressed the opinion that "Abkhazian separatists" had decided to mark the anniversary of Shevardnadze's return to Georgia. It was on 7 March 1992 that he arrived in Tbilisi to lead the republic.

Parliament Declares Recognition of South Ossetia Invalid

LD0903150693 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1429 GMT 9 Mar 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Albert Kochetkov]

[Text] Tbilisi March 9 TASS—The decision to recognise the Republic of South Ossetia adopted by the Supreme Soviet of Northern Ossetia evoked a negative reaction in the parliament of Georgia. The decision has been taken here as "intervention in internal affairs of Georgia" and as "support to South Ossetian seperatists".

The parliament is expected to take special steps in this connection.

Gudauta Government To Ratify Treaty With Dniester

AU0803100793 Tbilisi Radio Tbilisi Network in Georgian 0800 GMT 8 Mar 93

[Text] The NEGA news agency has reported that, in the next few days, the Gudauta leaders [self-proclaimed government in Abkhazia] are planning to convene a session at which, according to observers, they will ratify the treaty concluded with the so-called Dniestr and Gagauz Republics. At the same time, observers point out that a law on citizenship will be submitted for discussion. This law envisages dual citizenship in Abkhazia.

Shevardnadze To Visit Armenia, Ukraine

OW0703134493 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1316 GMT 7 Mar 93

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] It is now known that Georgian leader Eduard Shevardnadze would go on a formal visit to Armenia before March 20. Georgian Foreign Minster Aleksandr Chikvaidze says Shevardnadze is also scheduled to visit Ukraine in the middle of next month.

Foreign Minister Chikvaidze Visits Spain

AU0803101093 Tbilisi Radio Tbilisi Network in Georgian 0800 GMT 8 Mar 93

[Text] Batoni [Georgian polite form of address] Aleksandr Chikvaidze, minister of foreign affairs of the Republic of Georgia, has gone to Spain. The aim of the visit is to regulate questions of bilateral relations between Georgia and Spain and to prepare a future meeting between the heads of state of the two countries.

Estonia

Russian Envoy Denies 'Active Postimperialist Policy'

LD0903121593 Tallinn Radio Tallinn Network in Estonian 1800 GMT 8 Mar 93

[Text] Russian Ambassador to Estonia Aleksandr Trofimov stated today to Supreme Council Chairman Lennart Meri that the so-called Karaganov doctrine in no way forms the official Russian policy. The views of the Russian academician Karaganov published in the Russian Foreign Ministry journal DIPLOMATICHESKIY VESTNIK depict Russia implementing an active postimperialist policy. According to Karaganov's vision, Russia must again begin to fulfill her traditional role in the area of the former Russian Empire by cajoling local leaders and, if necessary, sending in troops.

In a speech on the 75th anniversary of the Republic of Estonia, President Meri criticized this doctrine. He also expected that the Russian Foreign Ministry would officially denounce it. The basis for the Russian official foreign policy conception was approved on 3 March at a Security Council session under the chairmanship of President Yeltsin. On the same occasion, the political principles of the Russian military doctrine were also discussed. Those have so far not been published. The doctrine in force up until now was fairly liberal but envisaged the need to maintain control over strategically important sites in the Baltic states.

During the meeting between the Estonian president and the Russian ambassador, possibilities were discussed for improvement of Estonian-Russian relations on the issues that did not find a satisfactory resolution after the latest talks. Meri stated to the Russian ambassador that Estonia guarantees all human rights to all the people resident in the country. The president drew the ambassador's attention to the fact that language requirements are being liberalized for the elderly and was convinced that this is the first step of many aimed at improving Estonian-Russian relations.

Meri emphasized that he sees President Yeltsin's greetings sent on the 75th anniversary of the Republic of Estonia as a step whose logical conclusion could only be to recognize the Tartu Peace Treaty, at least the points on which both parties agree.

Russians 'Shocked' by New Proposals on Troops

MK0603161793 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 6 Mar 93 p 3

[Unattributed report under the headline: "Estonia"]

[Text] At the Estonian-Russian interstate negotiations the Estonian delegation has advanced a new draft document concerning the withdrawal of Russian troops from the territory of Estonia, and also the status of their presence there.

"Our delegation has been shocked by the move made by the Estonian side over the issue of the Russian troop withdrawal, which undoes all the work accomplished so far," Vasiliy Svirin, head of the Russian delegation and ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary, said. According to him, the treaty was 90-percent ready and had been coordinated with the Estonian and Russian delegations.

According to Estonian delegation chairman Juri Luik, the former draft treaty had been characterized by general political declarations that could be interpreted in rather conflicting ways. The new document from the Estonian side concretizes and legally clarifies the previous agreement and defines the sides' obligations.

Popular Centrists Demand Change in Government Policy

WS0903120593 Tallinn ETA NEWS BULLETIN in English 1907 GMT 8 Mar 93

[From 8 March 1993, RAHVA HAAL & POSTIMEES p 1]

[Text] 8 March 1993—The Popular Centrist Party leaders and county organizations' representatives met on Saturday [6 March] to discuss the activities of the government and the Riigikogu in the present political and economic situation. The party published a statement demanding principal changes in national policy and "a competent government which would protect Estonia's national interests and possessed popular confidence." The five-months-old government "has no serious programme and has returned to Soviet- style measures, thus directly harming Estonia's national interests in economy, defence and security," the statement read. The Centrists also regretted the government's "limited potential for cooperation." The Popular Centrists announced of their opposition to the present government and stressed that the party has "firm positions on the rapid withdrawal of the Russian troops, breaking the deadlock of the ownership reform and achieving social stability in the society."

Laar Satisfied With Economic Performance

OW0803162593 Moscow BALTFAX in English 1549 GMT 8 Mar 93

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Within the last six months the amount of foreign cash invested in the Estonian economy has grown from EEK [expansion not given] 6.6 bn [billion] to EEK 9.7 bn, Premier Mart Laar told the State Assembly on Monday [8 March]. He said that the number of joint ventures with foreign capital was also on the increase.

"Within four months this government succeeded in what its predecessors could not in 18 months," said Laar.

He rejected the accusations, advanced by Rein Veidemann, a centrist MP, that the economic reforms have

stalled in the country. Laar insisted that during this summer the Estonians "did not suffer from cold or hunger," the national currency remained stable, and the economy has reoriented to the West.

Prime Minister Receives World Bank Experts

WS0903121593 Tallinn ETA NEWS RELEASE in English 1936 GMT 8 Mar 93

[Text] Tallinn, 8 March 1993—Estonia has pursued [a] systematic economic policy that has been successful, a group of visiting World Bank [WB] experts, led by John Hansen, told Prime Minister Mart Laar on Monday [8 March].

Hansen specifically pointed out Estonia's holding by free trade principles. Estonia has accomplished a lot in this field so that [the] bank's experts may help Estonia joining GATT, Laar told ETA.

WB experts also offered their help in finding credits to create new jobs. Raising unemployment is a major problem Estonia faces, the bank's experts said.

Latvia

Trade Agreement for 1993 Concluded With Moscow

WS0903115593 Riga LETA in English 1521 GMT 8 Mar 93

[Text] Riga, 8 March (LETA)—[The] Latvian Foreign Trade Ministry has received the agreement on trade and economic cooperation in 1993 between the Latvian and Moscow governments signed by both parties.

The document caused much political fuss at the beginning of February when Moscow Mayor, Yuriy Luzhkov, announced economic sanctions against Latvia and Estonia "due to the violation of Russian minority rights in the two countries" though at the time the Moscow government had not signed the agreement yet.

The Latvian-Moscow agreement provides for both parties not only regulating the bilateral trade within quotas set by the intergovernment agreement between Latvia and Russian federation but also performing additional deliveries. Moscow will receive extra food and medicine supplies but Latvia—rolled metal and rubber products.

Movement for National Independence Holds 6th Congress

WS0903120293 Riga LETA in English 1453 GMT 8 Mar 93

[Text] Riga, 8 March (LETA)—"Our objective is to win elections, to form a government and to elect [a] President," such was the main idea expressed during the 6th Congress of the Movement for National Independence of Latvia (MNIL), which took place in the National Theatre at the weekend. The membership of the first conservative national patriotic movement of the awakening period in Latvia totals to 1577 people. Odisejs Kostanda leader of the MNIL [words indistinct] political parties and movements was falling sharply. The MNIL was gaining popularity also among farmers and young people, and the leader of the MNIL pointed out that those who had lost their trust in the present leaders of the Latvian popular front, but who still had faith in goals declared by it, were also joining his movement.

The delegates of the congress listened to a review by Odisejs Kostanda on performance of the MNIL in the time period after the last congress, reports by experts on political and economic situation in Latvia, on its defence forces and juridical power. The delegates of the congress accepted amendments to the program and statutes of the MNIL, adopted regulation of the main revision commission, agreed on principles of nominating candidates from the MNIL for the elections of the 5th Saeim or parliament, and elected revision commission and the council of the organization.

Representatives of the conservative parties from Sweden, Norway, Italy and Germany addressed the 6th congress of the MNIL. They pledged to provide their colleagues in Latvia with all kinds of support during the election campaign. They also pledged to push their governments to increase their efforts in making Russia speed up the withdrawal of the Russian troops from the Baltic States.

Lithuania

Problems in Repaying Russia for Gas Supply

LD0803185493 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network in Lithuanian 1700 GMT 8 Mar 93

[Excerpts] Efforts by the government to pay the debt to Russia for natural gas and to settle accounts with the suppliers in hard currency by 1 March have so far produced no results. During the first eight days in March, only $680,000 and 179,000 German marks were paid to the Lentransgas company by the Lietuvos Dujos state enterpruise, which is approximately one day's gas payment. About $30 million is required to buy the amount of gas needed by Lithuania per month.

Since 1 March Lithuania has been paying the Lentransgas company $81 per 1,000 cubic meters of gas. The same price for gas is passed on to the consumers in Lithuania; in coupon terms it is 39,730, calculating that one dollar equals 480 coupons.

Zaneta Drobnytė, director of the Economy and Finance Department at the Lietuvos Dujos enterprise, told the BALTFAX correspondent that (?nobody has yet started paying for gas in hard currency) [passage indistinct]. The old debts by 1 March already amounted to 23 billion coupons. So far the government's decision which

entrusts the Klaipeda oil enterprise to grant a $10-million credit to the Lietuvos Dujos with zero interest has not yet been carried out. According to Drobnyte, this decision does not satisfy the Lietuvos Dujos enterprise because it will never be able to repay the credit.

According to the information available to the Ministry of Power Engineering, the Klaipeda oil enterprise is prepared to send the above sum at any time to a given account number. [passage omitted]

The Ministry of Power Engineering believes that on 1 April, as the Lentransgas company has warned, the supply of gas could be discontinued mainly because of the negligence of the Lietuvos Dujos enterprise.

Opposition, Government Clash Over Russian Oil

PM0803185593 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 5 Mar 93 First Edition p 7

[Yuriy Stroganov report: "They Say There Is No Such Thing as Red Oil... but Lithuania's Opposition Believes Otherwise and Opposes Oil Purchases in Russia"]

[Text] Vilnius—The participation of republic government representatives in the conference on questions of oil and gas supplies held in Surgut prompted a sharp reaction from the opposition in Lithuania. According to opposition leader V. Landsbergis, participation in this event will not yield economic benefits for Lithuania but, on the contrary, will do tremendous political damage. He drew attention to the fact that there were no Latvian or Estonian representatives at the conference. This gives grounds for raising the question of whether the unity of the Baltic countries is being jeopardized.

However, Trade and Industry Minister A. Sinevicius, who was head of the Lithuanian delegation, pointed out that any East or Central European state may join the Oil and Gas Council and acquire the chance to invest in the extraction of this raw material and to exploit oil wells for their own needs, leaving a portion to Russia. It is for the higher authorities to decide whether this form of obtaining oil and gas for Lithuania is acceptable, he noted.

But the opposition views any close economic contacts with Russia as a betrayal of the nation's interests. Even the decision to lease to Russia a portion of the Mazeikiai Oil Refinery's capacities, which is beneficial to Lithuania, was denounced. It is alleged that the mutually advantageous and equal contract will make Lithuania dependent on Russian monopolism.

Lithuania is choking from a lack of oil and gas. Fuel prices are growing catastrophically, radiators are barely warm, and hot water is available once a month for a few days. The left-wingers who acceded to power declared: There is no such thing as red oil, and political games involving the people's vital needs will lead to no good. Naturally, Russia and Lithuania can only have equal treaties which do not infringe the Baltic state's rights.

Lithuania does not yet have its own oil terminal, and there is no money for a speedy solution to the problems. Deputy Energy Minister R. Tamosiunas, who participated recently in a conference in Moscow, concluded: In the absence of its own terminal affording an opportunity to obtain oil from other countries funds must be invested in oil extraction, insofar as Russia has declared that opportunities to supply neighboring states with fuel will depend upon this... But even in this case, owing to the lack of money it will be necessary to participate in oil extraction in other forms: dispatching construction workers, equipment, food products, light industrial goods.

In this situation, the right wing believes that nevertheless oil does have political overtones. Incidentally, at the very same press conference where V. Landsbergis severely criticized the participation of a delegation in the Surgut conference, he also taked about Russia's claim to the role of... international gendarme, and about the worst Russian export—the imperialist ways from which President B. Yeltsin's opponents suffer.

Landsbergis Gives News Conference on Moving Toward Europe

LD0903120493 Vilnius Radio Vilnius in English 2230 GMT 8 Mar 93

[Report on news conference by leader of the Seimas opposition, Vytautas Landsbergis, with two unidentified announcers on 8 March; Landsbergis speaks in Lithuanian fading to announcer-read English report—recorded]

[Text] [First announcer] By inertia Lithuania is still going to Europe but at the same time it is being dragged into Asia, said the leader of the Seimas opposition Vytautas Landsbergis at a news conference today [8 March].

[Second announcer] On Friday [5 March] Mr. Vytautas Landsbergis took part in the sitting of the European Council's Parliamentary Assembly Commission. The commission gathered to discuss Lithuania's possibilities of joining the Council of Europe. Members of the meeting were unanimous in their opinion that Lithuania was meeting all the basic requirements raised by the Council of Europe. A report on the issue was made at the committee by a representative of Great Britain. Estonian membership in the international organization is not doubted either. Only procedural points remain to be settled. At the news conference today Mr. Vytautas Landsbergis said that Lithuania was still moving in the direction of Europe by inertia, yet concurrently attempts of drawing it toward Asia were also observed. One of such attempts was the participation of a Lithuanian delegation at the meeting of power engineering specialists in the Russian city of Surgut last week.

[Landsbergis] That is most likely not an only attempt of dragging us into some kind of a post-Soviet structure. We read about a congress of cooperative owners in Moscow which also demonstrated a restoration of the Soviet Union beginning with subsidiary structures. That is how

the fate of Lithuania is being decided, whether we are in Europe or in the so-called Eurasia.

[Second announcer] The leader of the Lithuanian Seimas opposition claimed that a drive towards Eurasia could be seen if a closer look were taken at the last three years of Lithuania's power engineering policies when alternatives for the East markets were rejected. [sentence as heard] Vytautas Landsbergis: [Landsbergis] It is not clear why such possibilities were turned down, although all were agreed that at least a temporary oil terminal should be built. On the one hand it is said that Lithuania could receive oil through the existing oil facilities in Klaipeda, but then these possibilities are denied.

[Second announcer] Mr. Vytautas Landsbergis regretted that the chairman of the parliamentary Democratic Labor Party faction, Mr. Justinas Karosas, defined the opposition's concern as sheer suspiciousness.

[Landsbergis] A sense of responsibility should not be termed as suspiciousness. On the contrary, lack of such a sense can be defined as like-mindedness, and we should not tell people as Mr. Karosas does that without Russia we shall be stark naked and poor.

[Second announcer] The leader of the parliamentary opposition said he was concerned by the talk that Lithuania has no treaty signed with Russia. Such a treaty was concluded in July 1991, said Mr. Vytautas Landsbergis. Commenting on a likely split of the Democratic Labor Party, Mr. Vytautas Landsbergis said this:

[Landsbergis] No one doubts that a certain differentiation of opinion should take place. There are dogmatic people in that party and people of democratic thinking. It is doubtful that the old revolutionary party discipline can hold those people together. The announcement of the existence of leftist forces in the party is a maneuver. On the one hand it could unite the most infamous communist hard-liners, and another aim is to present the Democratic Labor Party as a centrist, not leftist political force.

[Second announcer] The leader of the parliamentary opposition, Mr. Vytautas Landsbergis.